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ABSTRACT
Today it is recognised that âir pollution and the associated greenhouse ô-ffectare 
global phenomenon which could have dire consequences for the entire world population. 
However, in the past, especially during the Cold War Era, the Soviet totalitarian regime 
claimed that pollution was purely a by-product o f  a free market economy. As the nature 
o f a totalitarian regime restricts both the availability o f information associated with 
pollution problems and the individuals right/ability to acknowledge and protest against 
environmental degradation,the pollution situation in the Former Soviet Union reached 
catastrophic levels long before the fall o f  Communism in 1991.
With the demise o f the Soviet regime it has become evident that air pollution from 
various sources, such as heavy industry and a growing transportation base, has been 
exacerbated by inadequate pollution abatement facilities and the authorities’ desire to 
overproduce without due consideration to the exploitation o f natural resources and the 
environment in general. When combined with the rapid and secretive Soviet growth o f 
both the civil and military nuclear industries, which have led to extensive airborne 
radiation contamination, the Former Soviet Union is faced with deteriorating air quality. 
This will inevitably affect the health o f  a large proportion o f  the population.
While it is now widely accepted that the Former Soviet Union has severe 
environmental problems, the financial predicament o f each new independent state appears 
to have ‘indefinitely’ postponed attempts to solve the issues at hand. Although there is a 
growing awareness o f environmental problems, both government structures and the 
citizens o f  the Former Soviet Union have to evolve away from the previous totalitarian 
regime in order to successfully deal with the environmental degradation in their country. 
As basic survival has become the utmost priority for all concerned during the present 
economic recession, this is unlikely to occur for many years to come.
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ABBREVIATIONS
CIS - Commonwealth o f Independent States
CO - Carbon Monoxide : A  highly toxic gas
CO2 - Carbon Dioxide : The main Greenhouse Gas is given off when any
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WHO - World Health Organisation. Established 7 April 1048
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Process o f  the accumulation o f too many nutrients in water, 
eventually resulting in loss o f  oxygen
The period taken for radioactivity o f a substance to decline by half
Dust and soot, especially in the fumes from diesel engines, linked 
to respiratory diseases and cancer
A unit o f  energy absorbed from ionising radiation
A radioactive nuclide
Roentgen equivalent man
A unit o f  radiation dose that would produce the same effect in a 
person as one roentgen
A  unit o f  radiation damage
MAPS
Page
Map 1 - Soviet Nuclear Reactor Sites 42
Map 2 - Chernobyl and Exclusion Zone 45
Map 3 - Belarus 46
Map 4 - Ukraine 47
Map 5 - Radiation Dispersal, 3 May 1986 48
Map 6 - Kazakhstan ' 87
Map 7 - Ecology o f Novaya Zemlya Region 97
Map 8 - Dumping Areas o f  Solid Radioactive Waste in the Kara Sea 98
Map 9 - Novaya Zemlya 99
Map 10 - The Ural Mountains Critical Environmental Region 103
Map 11 - Transportation Routes o f Radioactive Waste 120
Map 12 - Map o f  M oscow Showing Radiation Sites 136
Map 13 - Map o f Moscow Showing Three o f the Research Institutes
which have caused elevated radiation readings 139
Map 14 - Lithuania 201
- 8 -
TABLES
Page
Table 1 - Incidence o f  Thyroid Cancer in Children in Belarus 1986-1992 63
Table 2 - Atmospheric Test Explosions over Novaya Zemlya 1957-1962 94
Table 3 - Underground Test Explosions on Novaya Zemlya 95
Table 4 - How Different Age Groups Perceive Foreign Investment will
Affect Pollution Levels 149
Table 5 - Influences on Health, Moscow 156
Table 6 - How Effective are Government Steps to Curb Pollution? (Moscow) 157
Table 7 - Prior to the Chernobyl Accident did you Consider Nuclear
Plants to be Potentially Dangerous? 159
Table 8 - Percentage o f  each Different Age Group, who did not Perceive
Nuclear Energy to be Dangerous before 1986. 162
Table 9 - Influences on Health, Murmansk 193
Table 10 - How Effective are Government Steps to Curb Pollution? (Murmansk) 194
Table 11 - Is the Government Withholding Information?(Murmansk) 199
Table 12 - How Trustworthy is Environmental Information Provided by the Media? 206
Table 13 - Influences on Health, Vilnius 211
Table 14 - The Effectiveness o f Government Measures to Curb Pollution, (Vilnius) 212 
Table 15 - Are the Government Withholding Information?(Vilnius) 215
- 9 -
GRAPHS
Page
Moscow Case Study
Graph 1 - Carbon Emissions 146
Graph 2 - To What Extent do Transport and Industry Contribute to
Air Pollution in Moscow? 148
Graph 3 - Can You Trust Environmental Information Provided by
Russian Television? (Differences between the two genders) 151
Graph 4 - Can You Trust Environmental Information Provided by the
Russian Government? (Differences between the two genders) 152
Graph 5 - The Percentage o f  Each Age Group Which Felt that Environmental
Information Provided by the Government was Trustworthy. 153
Graph 6 - How Effective are Government Steps to curb Pollution from Nuclear
Installations? Comparison Between Responses Before and 
After the Tomsk 7 Explosion, April 1993. 158
Graph 7 - How Close is Your Home to a Nuclear Energy Plant? 160
Graph 8 - Prior to the Chernobyl Accident did you Consider Nuclear Plants
to be Potentially Dangerous?(Differences Between the Two Genders) 161
Graph 9 - How Severe is Russia’s Radiation Problem? 164
Graph 10 - Differences Between the Two Genders 165
Graph 11 - Should Russia Abandon Their Nuclear Energy Programme?
(Differences Between the Two Genders) 166
Graph 12 to 17 - Do you Feel that the Government are Withholding
Information About Various Radiation Sources? 168-173
- 10
Page
Kola Peninsula Case Study
Graph 18 - Prior to the Chernobyl Accident did you Consider Nuclear
Plants to be Potentially Dangerous? 196
Graph 19 - Differences Between the Two Genders 198
Vilnius Case Study
Graph 20 to 22 - Can You Trust the Environmental Information Provided by the 
Government? A Comparison Between Moscow, Vilnius and 
Murmansk. 207
Graph 23 to 25 - Have you ever Signed a Petition Linked to the Environment?
(Moscow, Vilnius and Murmansk) 208
Graph 26 to 28 - Have You Ever Demonstrated Over an Environmental Issue?
(Moscow, Vilnius and Murmansk) 209
Graph 29 to 31 - Have You Ever Contributed Money to an Environmental
Campaign? (Moscow, Vilnius and Murmansk) 210
Graph 32 to 34 - Prior to the Chernobyl Accident did you Consider Nuclear 
Plants to be Potentially Dangerous?
(Comparisons between Moscow, Vilnius and Murmansk) 213
Graph 35 - Would You Knowingly Eat Food Grown Near the Exclusion Zone? 214
Graph 36 - Comparison Between Vilnius and Moscow. Should the Respective
Governments Abandon Their Nuclear Energy Programme? 216
- 11
PHOTOGRAPHS
Page
Photo lan d  2 - Views o f  Murmansk Harbour 177
Photo 3 and 4 - Ships and Icebreakers in Murmansk Fjord 179
Photo 5 - Rusting Ships in the Harbour, in Close Proximity to Living Quarters 180
Photo 6 - What the Tundra Should Look Like 186
Photo 7 - Severely Damaged Spruce Trees around the
Severonikel Plant, Murmansk 186
Photo 8 and 9 - The Severonikel Plant 187
Photo 10 - “Greenpeace” graffiti on the Courthouse Wall, Murmansk 192
ILLUSTRATIONS
Diagram 1 - The Sarcophagus 54
Diagram 2 - In the Nuclear Field 137
12-
TNTRODTTCTTON
The ecological situation in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) has reached 
catastrophic proportions. The Soviet regime’s rapid and somewhat irresponsible 
industrialisation programme over seventy four years has taken its toll not only on the 
environment but on the health o f the people. Environmental degradation o f  air, water and 
land has led to at least one-fifth o f the FSU land mass being classified as environmental 
disaster zones. Half o f  these areas fall in the most densely populated European sector and 
therefore are 'having adverse effects on many people’s lives.
This particular study concentrates on different aspects o f air pollution in the FSU. 
In the first part, the implications o f industrialisation and a growing transportation base in 
urban centres will be examined. It will show that while pollution abatement facilities and 
changing fijel emphasis have been partially effective in reducing emissions, the way 
forward in the future is to adopt comprehensive conservation policies.
The nuclear legacy from both civil and military activities which have led to 
extensive radioactive airborne pollution will be analysed in the second and third parts. The 
secretive nature o f  the nuclear industry in a ‘secretive society’ has only exacerbated the 
associated environmental problems. Contamination o f several areas will not subside for 
many years to come.
As one o f the defining characteristics o f  a totalitarian regime is the deliberate and 
sustained attempt to manipulate public opinion, public perceptions o f  these two pollution 
sources will be discussed in the final part. Surveys were conducted, by the researcher, in 
Moscow, Murmansk and Vilnius (Lithuania) to evaluate how a random sample o f  citizens 
viewed the situation in the country. While perception and reality do not always 
correspond, each o f the fifteen new states faces a dilemma. With the present economic 
situation throughout the Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS) overshadowing 
every aspect o f daily life, there are only limited resources which can be used to improve 
the ecological consequences o f  long-term communist policy.
The hypothesis underlying this study is that the scale o f  the environmental 
catastrophe affecting the FSU is a consequence o f its totalitarian politica l regime. The
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way the Soviet Union developed over seven decades from a. backward, semi-feudal 
agrarian society, through rapid industrialisation, ruthless collectivisation o f  agriculture, 
political dictatorship and rigid central control, has isolated it from Western societies with 
their built-in health and safety regulations which generally discourage the worst effects o f  
environmental pollution. Hence environmental pollution in a totalitarian state like the 
FSU poses great dangers, sometimes fatal, not only for the people living in that country, 
but for the whole o f humanity. The Chernobyl disaster is a timely reminder o f this. It only 
became general knowledge because o f  the fortuitous circumstance that the wind was 
blowing north westwards and the increased radiation was spotted in Scandinavian 
countries. This alerted the world and forced the Soviet authorities to “come clean,” so 
precipitating the process o f  glasnost ( ‘openness’) and, indirectly, leading to the demise o f  
the Soviet communist regime and the Soviet Union.
A totalitarian state is likely to lack the checks and balances o f  liberal democracies, 
suppress pressure and environmental lobby groups, and maintain an atmosphere o f  
secrecy to smother health-threatening consequences o f  its economic and military policies. 
This is all the more apposite to a rapidly industrialising state like the Soviet Union which 
took “shortcuts to economic progress,” cutting corners and bypassing rigorous checks 
and tests in order to achieve substantial economic development and to reach and sustain 
military parity with the USA, especially during the Cold War period.
If this hypothesis is proved correct, the world is threatened with similar dangers 
from other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes that have at their disposal nuclear 
capabilities and bacteriological weapons - Iraq, China, Pakistan, - not to mention parts o f  
the erstwhile USSR (Russia, Kazakhstan).
The dominant feature o f totalitarian regimes is that their leaders thwart the 
individual citizen’s ability to act independently. First, the single ruling party assumes 
control o f Ml matters o f state importance and even o f relatively peripheral issues (like art, 
sport and small business). It creates the impression that the population should have no 
concerns or interests in regard to ‘political’ matters, as the Party will always act in their 
best interests. Second, even if some members o f  the public or even specific groups (e.g. 
writers) may inwardly have had environmental worries, there was always the in-built fear 
o f criticising the regime. Open criticism brings various repercussions which could affect
14-
not only their own lives, but those o f their family as well (e.g. refusal o f  the Komsomol to 
provide a personal reference for the critic’s children to go to university or gain a 
particular job).
Ironically, the disintegration o f the Soviet Union occurred alongside and was 
encouraged by an emerging environmental movement in some o f the Republics, especially 
the three Baltic states. This brief period o f growth in environmental awareness did not 
last. Environmental issues were put on the back burner with the ensuing economic 
recession. Everyday material problems invariably took precedent over environmental 
issues. The general public ‘apathy’ towards forming an effective environmental movement 
during the last decade o f  the 20* Century indicated that the long-lasting consequences o f  
a totalitarian regime still frmdamentally dictate people’s thinking and actions. Although 
the USSR no longer exists, attitudes towards the environment have not significantly 
changed. It will take a future generation which has not lived under communist rule or has 
not been directly influenced by people o f that era, before a new awareness and radically 
new attitudes can emerge. With thisi in blind, environmental pollution even in an erstwhile 
totalitarian state will remain problematic and even dangerous for the rest o f the world. 
The fall o f  Communism throughout eastern and central Europe was only the first step in a 
process o f change which needs time to fulfil its potential. N o one can predict the future o f  
the FSU. It is possible that in some new states (if not all) political and economic instability 
could help preserve a government and society which contain the basic totalitarian features 
o f  previous regimes, including in regard to pollution.
My research methods largely involved participant observational techniques in 
strategic locations o f the old USSR - Murmansk, Vilnius, St. Petersburg, Moscow, 
combined with questionnaires in Vilnius, M oscow and Murmansk. In so far as my study 
and research pertain largely to the 1980s and 1990s, I have set a time limit o f  January 
2000 for information and conclusions.
During numerous visits to the FSU (1993-1995) I have been fortunate enough to 
meet several academics and ecologists who are interested in the environmental situation 
o f the country. In M oscow (April 1993) I was introduced to K. Nikonorova, a social 
ecologist. Not only did she provide me with relevant sources, but she invited me to attend 
the International Symposium, “Women for the Environment Protection” at the Russian
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Academy o f  Sciences (23-26 November 1993). This particular Congress was held under 
the auspices o f UNESCO and the European Network for Women's Studies (based in the 
Netherlands). While in the capital, I also visited the Moscow State University where I was 
introduced to Dr. Tatiana Krasovskaia o f  the Geographical Faculty. As with most o f  the 
people I met. Dr. Krasovskaia was very helpful and informative.
In April 1994 I travelled to Lithuania, where I attended a course o f  lectures at the 
University o f  Vilnius with other students from Ireland and Norway. While I was only in 
Lithuania for a relatively short time I managed to travel to cities such as Kaunas and 
Klaipeda and with the help o f Prof. Nerius Beiga, distributed a Lithuanian version o f  my 
questionnaire. As a new independent state Lithuania’s response to the survey could have 
been different to that o f  Russia, and therefore would be beneficial for comparative 
purposes.
My visit to Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula occurred in October 1994. Owing to 
difficulty in travelling to this destination it took over two days to arrive. However my 
journey via Oslo and Tromso (Norway) was in itself informative as I met several British 
workers who provided information about foreign industrial activities in the region. While 
in Murmansk Mrs. Nadezhda Malysheva o f  the Youth Studies Institute, introduced me to 
various people and organisations linked to the environment and health services. 
Conversations with Gennady Matishov o f  the Sea Biology Institute, Dr. L.P. Vostokova, 
chief doctor at the regiods medical centre, Igor Kudrik and Frederic Hauge (Head) o f  the 
Norwegian Environmental Group, Bellona with offices based in Murmansk and the 
Conference on Youth and the Environment,” at the Children’s Palace all provided me 
with valuable knowledge o f  the region. Travelling to such areas as Monchegorsk also 
gave me first hand experience o f the extensive pollution on the Kola Peninsula.
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Part I
Air Pollution in Urban Areas
Chapter 1 
Industry
The Soviet Union was the first country to establish recognised pollution standards 
in the fbn^ o f  Maximum Permissible Concentrations (MPC). By 1955 the country 
already had 26 monitoring stations which statistically recorded the levels o f  air pollutants 
in the atmosphere.^ Today, in theory there is at least one monitoring station for every 
town which has a population o f  over 100,000 people.^ Unfortunately, while Goskomstat, 
the State Statistics Commission, registers pollution in 421 cities, there are still 2000 
inhabited areas which are not being monitored properly.^ This is especially true o f  areas 
which have military bases which, by their nature, are out o f bounds to civilian monitors. 
Hence although air pollution figurés in 1989 represent 94 million tonnes, it is feared that 
the true figure could be at least 30% greater., 4
While there are many causes o f  air pollution, the main sources in urban areas, 
which house two-thirds o f  the Former Soviet Union’s (FSU) population,^ are industry 
(stationary) and transport (non-stationary). The levels and type o f  industrial airborne 
pollution are dependent on the actual industry, the fuel used to generate production and
 ^ Bridges, O., and Bridges, J.W. ‘Comparison of Air Quality in the UK and Russia, ’ The 
Environmentalist 15. 1995, pp 139-145.
2 Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destniction. Westview Press 
Oxford, 1993, p 36.
 ^ Massey Stewart, J., The Soviet Environment: Problems. Policies and Politics Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992, p 205.
 ^ Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 98.
 ^ Op. cit. p 5.
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the weather. In general, the concentration o f  pollutants is lower during the summer than 
in the winter. In warmer weather not only is less fuel consumed, but the vertical uplift and 
mixing rates o f the air increases, creating greater dispersal.^ Transportation, while only 
creating 39/o o f  total air pollution levels (1990), can be the main source o f  environmental 
degradation in large cities.^ Non-stationary emissions at present are only estimated using 
data information linked to fuel consumption and traffic density. Yet again figures could 
therefore be underestimated. The balance o f  pollution sources between the two categories 
is almost irrelevant to the urban dweller. As only 15% o f  this vast group breathe air which 
meets recognised safety standards, a general cleanup is the only desirable answer.^
Although the Soviet authorities maintained that environmental disruption could 
not “exist in a society where the state owned all the means o f production,”  ^it has become 
blatantly obvious that pollution is directly linked to industrialisation and population 
growth, irrespective o f  political agendas.
The Five-Year Plans, an integral part o f  the Soviet command economy, formed 
the Soviet industrialisation programme which detrimentally affected the environment. 
With the state ownership o f  all industry, even as late as 1992, 85% o f  Government 
investment was devoted to heavy industry. Only 15% was dedicated to consumer goods.*® 
Official attitudes within the country maintained that over-production could only be o f  
benefit. For most o f  the Soviet period, at least until the mid-1960s, there was maximum 
emphasis on production. Financial incentives were only given if  quotas were met. They 
would far outweigh any token fines administered by pollution abatement agencies which 
incidentally for many years were part o f the same agencies which set industrial quotas.
In an historical context the external environmental costs were rarely taken into
consideration. The Soviet authorities rarely took into account the damaging effects o f
excessive exploitation o f natural resources as they were regarded as having no value until
drawn into the production process.*^ The side-effects o f  industrial activities in the form o f
 ^ Armand, D.L., Gerasimov, I.P., and Yefron, K.M., Natural Resources of the Soviet Union. Their Use 
and Renewal. W.H. Freeman and Company, 1971, p 80. -
Peterson, D. J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press 
Oxford, 1993, p 44.
 ^ ‘State Report on the Condition of the Environment,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 7 October 1992, p 6.
 ^ Goldman, M.I., The Spoils o f Progress. Cambridge University Press, London, 1972, p 2.
‘“Golitsyn, G.S., ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS during the Transitional period,’ RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol.2, No. 2, 8 January 1992, pp 33-42.
Singleton, P., Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union Praeger, New York, 1976, p 20.
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airborne emissions were also initially greatly underestimated. Zeigler claims that industrial 
pollution was initially a function o f  a “regional economic base rather than a conscious 
government policy.”'^  In more recent years the authorities have known the consequences 
o f pollution; therefore their inability to take appropriate action could be partially linked to 
their reluctance to reduce industrial output in case it adversely affected the USSR’s 
standing as a Super Power during the Cold War era.
When taking into account the lack o f public environmental information before 
Glasnost, it is not surprising that industry in the FSU has traditionally created vast 
amounts o f  air pollution. In the late 1960s, a WHO report under the supervision o f  Prof. 
K.A. Bushtuyeva established that industrial (stationary emissions) were generated in the 
main by seven major branches o f industry in the FSU.'^ Today this still holds true for 
Russia. The worst offending categories are the energy industry and iron and steel 
industries which account for 50%'^ o f all stationary airborne pollutants.'^ This is followed 
by the oil industry which produces 9% and the chemical industry 7% o f  airborne 
pollutants.'®
Since the early 1970s, the government took steps to reduce atmospheric pollution 
from stationary sources. Investment in air pollution controls within all sectors o f  the 
economy incrementally increased over time. In 1985, 234 million roubles were allocated; 
by 1988 this had risen to 317 million roubles.'^ A 1990 State Nature Committee 
(Goskompriroda) Report set out a fifteen-year plan involving an investment o f  39 billion 
roubles.'* Although increasing finances were available, the allocation was far from 
adequate. Even the 1990 figures only represent one-fifth o f what was actually needed.'®
Zeigler, C.E., Environmental Policy in the USSR. Frances Pinter. London. 1987. p 20.
Mole, V., T h e  Geography o f Air Pollution in the Soviet Union.' In: Singleton, F., Environmental 
Misuse in the Soviet Union. Praeger, New York, 1976, p 22.
' ’ It should be noted that since the fall o f^ m m u n ism  this percentage may have changed for each o f the 
15 new states. For example, Russia now only has 145 non-ferrous metallurgy entcqirises instead o f  250. 
In: Medvedev, Y., ‘Crisis can be Overcome,’ Moscow News. 9 July 1993, p 10.
Feshbach. M., and Friendly, J R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books. New York, 1992. pp 1-5. 
Peterson, D.J.. Troubled Lands: The Lenacv o f Soviet Environmental Destniction. W estview Press. 
Oxford, 1993, p 30.
Turnbull, M., Soviet Environmental Policy and Practice. Dartmouth Publishing Company. Aldershot.
1991. pp 91-212.
'* Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books. New York. 1992. p 256.
* Op . cit. p 256.
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Unfortunately the efficient utilisation o f these funds never occurred: the USSR  
ceased to exist in 1991. Examples o f  non-action include the following:
i) Owing to traditional psychological barriers, ministries were 
reluctant to halt production even temporarily to install new equipment; 
therefore up to 25% o f the fimds per annum were never used (1989).^®
ii) Investment into Soviet technology was not always appropriate to 
or available for some o f  the worst polluting industries. The 1981 law 
which stated that all new enterprises in addition to those which wanted to 
expand had to meet certain environmental standards was not totally 
successful as Soviet technology was at least 20 years behind its major 
Western counterparts.^' A  lack o f spare parts and trained personnel 
exacerbated the problem.
iii) In 1986 emission criteria were established for 200 substances. This 
increased to 600 in 1989. Even in 1986, 95% o f pollutants were from a 
limited but well-established list o f  pollutants, such as sulphur, nitrogen, 
ash and particulates.^^ It could be argued that the authorities should have 
diverted attention to these as they created the most problems, not the 
many other sources o f  pollutants found in minuscule levels. Although 
standards were set for hundreds o f pollutants, the Soviet inspectorate was 
only equipped to measure 52 in 1991.^^
Despite these problems the policies adopted were partially effective as industrial 
emissions fell by 23% during 1980-1990, from 72.8 million tonnes to 55.7 million
tonnes.^"'
20 Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy o f Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 46.
On. cit. p 41.
Turnbull, M., Soviet Environmental Policy and Practice. Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, 
1991, pp 143-162.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the USSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 6.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 44.
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Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine : an Example of 
Heavy Industry
Norilsk has been described as the worst polluted city in Russia. It was established 
in the 1930s as the site o f an infamous Gulag camp. Today the city is the most northerly 
industrial region on earth, approximately 300 miles above the Arctic Circle with an 
average winter temperature o f -40° While the actual city has a population o f  174,000^® 
(1989), the surrounding area contains an additional 96,000.^^
Norilsk has an abundance o f raw materials from a series o f open-cast mines. 
During the Soviet period these were exploited intensively in an attempt to ensure 
economic independence from the Capitalist West. The region’s resources account for 
33% o f the world’s nickel reserves, 42.5% o f  copper reserves and 90% o f  platinum 
metals.^* Over the last 50 years industrial smelting activities have polluted the atmosphere 
with sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, hydrogen sulphide and solid particles. When 
exposed to moisture in the air, these components are turned into acids which are 
extremely destructive to the environment and humanity.
In 1998, total emissions from Norilsk were 2,324,500 tonnes.^® O f this figure a 
mere 24,500 tonnes were transport related,^® indicating that 99% '^ o f the city’s pollution 
originates from stationary sources.^^ Over 50% o f  stationary sources, 1.2 million tonnes, 
were in the form o f sulphur dioxide emissions. This is 72 times the MPC.^^
Sulphur emissions have effectively killed every tree within a 200km radius o f  the 
industrial centre.^ '^ In 1970 it was estimated that 6,000 hectares had been destroyed, by 
1988 this had increased to 382,000 hectares.^® Human health has also been adversely
Donovan, P., ‘Frozen assets on the last Frontier,’ Financial Times. 29 February 1992, p 15.
2^  Massey Stewart, J., The Soviet Environment. Problems. Policies and Politics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992, p 226.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the U SSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 210.
^ Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
Feshback, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the U SSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 291.
Op. cit. p 295.
Peterson, D.J. Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 33.
There are only 15 cars per 1000 residents in Norilsk.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 291. 
Donovan, P., ‘Frozen Assets on the last Frontier,’ Financial Times. 29 January 1992, p 15. 
Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
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affected. In 1957, a survey o f 350 people showed that 35% o f residents complained o f  
respiratory problems and 20% suffered from eye complaints?® During the 1980s, Norilsk 
officially became the city with the highest rate o f lung cancer amongst men in the world. 
It should be noted that the further deterioration o f health coincides with an increase in the 
volume o f smelting and therefore power generation in 1957, when rich underground ores 
were discovered at Talnakh. Unfortunately any improvement in air quality caused by a 
changing shift in the source o f power energy during the 1970s was by far overridden by 
these increases in smelting activities.^^
Today, the company now known as Norilsk Nickel is only 38% state owned.^* 
This, however, has not stopped the industry from continually polluting the atmosphere. 
There is a reluctance to shut down the complex as it still produces 80% o f Russian nickel, 
one-fifth o f the world’s output.^® Unfortunately, the early 1990s saw an increase in 
emissions. The complex emitted over 187,000 tonnes more in 1991 than in 1990.^ The 
industry was fined 1.8 million roubles by the Russian courts in September 1992, in order 
to generate money for forest protection."" The fine was never paid, indicating that the 
FSU still does not have an appropriate enforcement system to obtain such penalties.^^
So-called pollution devices in Norilsk are only 23% effective."'  ^In the early 1990s,
the Soviet authorities planned to import technology to cut these emissions by two-thirds.^
By 1993, 82 million roubles were put aside to upgrade filtering systems,"'® but only 31
million was actually spent.^ The true cost o f upgrading even one o f the six smelters is
estimated at $60 million"'^ . At present a refiirbishment contract is being negotiated with
^ Bond, A., ‘Air Pollution in Norilsk; A Soviet Worst Case,’ Soviet Geography. Vol. XXV, No.9, 
November 1984, pp 665-675.
Op. cit. p 668.
^ Bond, M.S., ‘Back to Nature,’ The Geographical Magazine. Febmaiy 1996, pp 16-18.
Op. cit. p 17.
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p 69.
Op. cit. p 69.
Fines to curb pollution emissions have predominantly been ineffective throughout Russian history. 
During the Soviet era token fines were minimal when compared to the profit of over production. Today 
much larger fines, even though still charged in roubles, simply cannot be met by the industries, and are 
_ the^ore effectively ignored.
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p 69.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J R., Ecocide in the USSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 255.
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p 69.
Op. cit..p 69.
Donovan, P., ‘Frozen Assets on the Last Frontier,’ Financial Times. 29 January 1992, p 15.
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Outokumpu, a State-Controlled Finnish Group?* The overall situation at Norilsk is 
unlikely to improve in the near future as survival is the companies’ main objective. 
Obtaining business and hard currency is their main priority. Attempts to expand foreign 
outlets are being facilitated by the opening o f an office in London to help serve Western 
markets."'®
Measures to Improve the Situation in Industry
There have been several approaches to the reduction o f  pollution from heavy 
industry in the FSU. They include the dispersal method, filtering devices and a change in 
fuel emphasis. Initially, the dispersal method, which involved the use o f tall smoke stacks, 
was adopted. In theory, contaminants would be spread over a greater distance, therefore 
diluting the substances and reducing the need for other types o f pollution systems. This 
method never really worked as the majority o f pollution still fell within a five-mile radius 
o f industrial plants.®®
Equipping factories with filters and purification devices (scrubbers), which trap 
particulate matters preventing contact with the atmosphere, was later adopted. Yet again 
this Soviet policy had only limited success. By 1987, in the non-ferrous industries, 55% of 
filters were over ten years old, 26% were not working properly, causing an additional
900,000 tonnes o f emissions to enter the atmosphere.®' In the ferrous metallurgical 
industry, 60% o f  cleaning devices were over ten years old and 13% o f  these were faulty.®^  
As the combined industries represent the worst offenders in terms o f airborne pollution, 
creating 15,348,000 or 26% o f total emissions in 1989,®® any failure o f  abatement 
technology should be closely examined. If all types o f heavy industry are taken into 
account, only 78% o f pollution control equipment fitted was deemed to be relatively 
efficient in 1989.®"' Evidently, many industries, which had not been upgraded since the 
enactment o f the 1981 law, did not even have pollution controls. This is shown by the fact
Donovan, P., ‘Frozen Assets on the Last Frontier,’ Financial Times. 29 January 1992, p 15.
Op. cit. p 15.
Turnbull, M., Soviet Environmental Policy and Practice. Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, 
1991, pp 143-162.
®' Op. cit. p 148.
Op. cit. p 148.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 31.
On. cit. D 31.
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that o f the 25,000 counts o f serious emissions recorded in 1990, only 38% o f the 
industries responsible had any form o f pollution controls?®
With the advancement o f  Glasnost and Perestroika, in the mid-to-late 1980s, the 
worst offending industries were closed down. Between 1986 and 1990, one thousand 
factories were shut down, costing the USSR 10 billion roubles in lost revenue.®® This 
included the Nairit Scientific Production Plant at Yerevan in Armenia. Owing to the 
monopolistic industrial production system, this further exacerbated the declining 
availability o f  essential medicines in the country. Today not only do the relevant 
authorities have to take this type o f  consequence into consideration before closing ‘dirty’ 
factories, but they have to consider the additional cost o f  unemployment during a period 
o f economic decline.
The energy sector is the second worst polluter in the country. Fossil fuel power 
plants, which traditionally burnt coal and then oil, emitted vast quantities o f sulphur, 
nitrogen, carbon oxides and dust particles into the atmosphere. The introduction o f  
pollution abatement facilities has only had limited success; therefore, the fall in such 
emissions as sulphur and carbon dioxide during the last few decades must have originated 
from another source.®^
The improvement in air quality can partially be explained by a changing fuel 
emphasis. Historically, power plants always burnt coal. The worst types were Kashpira 
Shale and Lignite which emit 22 grains and 10.4 grams o f sulphur dioxide per cubic 
metre.®* Over time coal is gradually being replaced by oil and eventually natural gas. Each 
new form o f energy in theory is cleaner than the previous one, thereby enhancing air 
quality.®®
Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
^ Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the USSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, pp 248-249.
Sulphur emissions fell from 12.6 million to 8.7 million tonnes between 1981 and 1990. The 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe called for a 30% reduction o f SO2 by 1993. Russia 
met this quota in the European Sector by 1990. In Golitsyn, G.S., ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS during 
the Transitional Period, RFE/RL Research Report. Vol.2, No.2, 8 January 1993, pp 33-42.
^ Armand, D.L., Gerasimov, IP ., and Yefron, K.M., Natural Resources of the Soviet Union. Their Use 
and Renewal. WM Freeman & Company, 1971, p 85.
Oil also has a relatively high sulphur content. Lack of appropriate technology and money prevented the 
USSR from constructing de-sulphurisation plants until the late 1970s; therefore burning oil was as 
detrimental to the environment as coal.
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The decline in the use o f coal was not adopted because o f  environmental 
concerns. As extraction costs began to increase, the use o f major coal reserves in the 
Donetsk Basin began to decline. After 1976, an alternative source o f energy was required. 
To a certain extent, the shortfall was covered by coal from a series o f other regions, 
including the Kuzbas (Kuznetsk Basin) and Ekibustez areas. While some areas, especially 
the Kuzbas, have coal which is relatively lower in sulphur content they have higher ash 
content (40%) and moisture content (8-12%), indicating a declining calorific value. 
Other sources o f coal have even greater sulphur content than the Donetsk Basin seam. 
Coal from the Kizel mine has an 8.4% sulphur content and realistically should not be 
bumt.®^  Other forms o f fiiel were therefore utilised.
The USSR had the largest reserves o f natural gas in the world: therefore, this 
source o f energy was used to power energy stations. Unfortunately, the authorities have 
traditionally been reluctant to burn natural gas, as it was perceived to be too valuable in 
terms o f  hard currency which could be obtained on the open market. Even though natural 
gas is the most efficient o f the three sources o f energy in terms o f units o f  CO2 emissions 
per unit o f derived energy, it has not been utilised to its frill potential.
The shift in fuel emphasis has gone through different stages. The use o f coal 
increased until 1977. Between 1977 and 1985 it declined, but as a direct consequence o f  
the Chernobyl Accident, it began to increase again after 1986. As there has been a falf-ofp 
in nuclear power, “long-term guidelines call for greater, not lesser reliance on coal as an 
energy fuel in the 1990s.”^^ Unfortunately, in 1989, 25% o f the 709.8 million tonnes o f  
coal consumed was lignite, one o f the ‘dirtiest’ coals in existence. Therefore, this greater 
reliance on coal can only have a detrimental effect.® The use o f  natural gas, although not 
comprehensive, improved during the late 1980s. In 1985, 41% o f thermal power plants 
used natural gas. This increased to 53% in 1990.^ A  fall in the reliance on oil is also
Turnbull, M., Soviet Environmental Policy and Practice. Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, 
1991, pp 91-212.
Piyde, P.R., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991, p 27.
Op. cit. p 27.
Sagers, M.J., ‘News Notes.’ Soviet Geography Vol. 30, 1989, pp 512-520.
Nekrasov, A.S., ‘Conceptual Energy and Environmental Problems of Economic Policy in the Former 
USSR,’ Energy Economics. Vol. 15, No. 4, October 1993, pp 273-284.
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visible in the thermal power plant industry during the same period. In 1985, 26% of  
thermal stations were oil fired; in 1990 it had fallen to 16%.®
The situation has now entered a new stage. With the formation o f the NIS (New  
Independent States), the conversion to natural gas will slow again. Taking Belarus as an 
example, the fall in sulphur dioxide emissions o f  24% during 1980-1990 can no longer be 
sustained, as the cost o f natural gas from Russia, which has the main resources, has 
greatly increased. The aim to cut sulphur dioxide emissions by 30% during the 1990s 
cannot realistically be met.®
The Ukraine has a similar dilemma. It cannot afford natural gas and the coal seams 
in the majority o f its mines are over 100 years old. Therefore, it has resorted to the 
continuation o f nuclear energy and foreign investment.® Russia’s growth o f  natural gas 
use could also decline again. In order to obtain hard currency it is trying to increase its 
exports o f the product. As an example, in 1993, Russia agreed to supply $2 billion worth 
o f  natural gas to I ta ly .T h e  fact that this gas will have to be pumped via a pipeline 
through the newly independent Ukraine may be problematic.® In total, Russia exported 
90 million cubic metres o f  natural gas in 1993.^®
Energy Conservation
The rational use o f energy could represent a substantial solution to reducing air 
pollution levels. Traditionally the F SU is often compared with the United States in order 
to show how inefficient the system is. While the FSU and the USA produce similar gross
emissions per annum, the F SU only produces approximately 50% o f the American level o f
Nekrasov, A.S., ‘Conceptual Energy and Environmental Problems of Economic Policy in the Former 
USSR,’ Energy Economics. Vol. 15, No. 4, October 1993, pp 273-284.
^ Piyde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p 187.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 9.
^ Graham, R , ‘Russia in gas pact with Italy,’ Financial Times. 20 January 1993, p 3.
® In order to cut emissions there is a concerted effort to move to gas-fired power stations world-wide. 
During the 1990s, the United Kingdom was investing £3.5 billion in gas-powered stations and the 
upgrading of sulphur scrubbers in existing coal stations. This is the UK’s attempt to cut sulphur 
emissions by 70% of the 1980 level by 2005. InîBeavis, S., ‘Eggar rejects European calls to tighten curbs 
on Pollution,’ The Guardian. 22 October 1995, p 6.
0^ ‘News Agency,’ Moscow news. 11-17 February 1994, p 8.
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industrial output/^ It is estimated that per $1000 unit o f GNP the Soviet Union produced
27.0 tonnes o f emissions from stationary sources. The USA only produced 15.9 tonnes. 
The FSU is even more inefficient when compared with the European Union(EU) as its 
energy consumption per GDP is 4.8 times greater than in the EU.^  ^ The excessive 
consumption o f energy is related to past Soviet economic policies. In order to change this 
habit, the concept o f  natural resource conservation needs to be accepted both by industry 
and by the household consumer.
According to Goskompriroda, industrial and domestic energy requirements could 
be cut by 40% if the country adopted proper efficiency measures and changed its 
economic policies. '^  ^ When looking at heavy industry, which consumed 57% o f  all 
electrical output in 1987,^  ^ there are three ways in which energy reduction could be 
obtained.^  ^They are:
i) Lower usage o f heavy metal in products.
ii) Increase in the quality o f  production. Reducing the need to replace
products will cut down on use o f  electricity, therefore reducing 
emission levels.
iii) Matching o f  industrial production with demand as in capitalist
economies.
The restructuring o f  many industries could lead to a 30% reduction in energy 
demands with only a relatively small cost to the economy.^^ This is especially true o f  
industries related to the Military. Conversion to consumer goods, which are usually less 
reliant on heavy metals, does not require as much initial energy input. There are many
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the U SSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 210.
Sagers, M.J., ‘News Notes,’ Soviet Geography. Vol. 30, 1989, pp 512-520.
Fromme, J.W., ‘Energy conservation in the Russian manufacturing industry,’ Energy Policy. Vol. 24, 
No. 3, March 1996, pp 245-252.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R., Ecocide in the U SSR  Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 141.
^Mn the U.S.A. industry consumes only 37% of total energy production. In : Feshbach, M., and Friendly, 
J.R., Ecocide in the U SSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 141.
Turnbull, M., Soviet Environmental Policy and Practice. Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, 
1991, p 96.
Cooper, C.R., and Schipper, L., ‘The Soviet Energy Dilemma,’ Energy Policy. Vol. 19, No. 4, May 
1991, pp 344-362.
Fromme, J.W., ‘Energy conservation in the Russian manufacturing Industiy,’ Energy Policy. Vol. 24, 
No. 3, March 1996, pp 245-252.
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considerations which should be taken into account before restructuring any industry. In 
today's economic climate, unemployment would be a major consideration.^^
Economic reform which eliminated large-scale subsidisation o f energy would also 
be beneficial in the long-term. According to De Bardeleben, “prices o f  energy resources 
traditionally have been set so low that it is economically difficult to justify conservation 
efforts.” ®^ For example, power plants only pay 18 roubles for a tonne o f  coal, but it costs 
30 roubles to produce it in the first place. For residents there is no real charge for heating 
or hot water. There are no meters to record or control consumption, as many domestic 
supplies are centrally administered. The only exception to this is household electricity.^  ^
Total elimination o f  subsidies will be difficult, especially when combined with hyper­
inflation and the devaluation o f the rouble. Under the Soviet regime, oil prices for internal 
consumption were approximately 10% o f  world prices. Although there have been many 
price rises since the fall o f Communism, they have been offset by successive devaluations 
o f  the currency. This has meant that although in 1992 the price o f  oil had reached 
one-third o f  world levels, by the spring o f  1993 in real terms it had fallen to a mere 4% o f  
world prices.
Basic conservation techniques could also be adopted in individual homes. Houses 
and apartments could be fitted with thermostats to regulate heat levels. There is room for 
improvement in thermal insulation which is very poor in the FSU, well below western 
standards. Ironically, the building regulations after 1958 created an additional problem. 
Even in extremely cold climates, windows became larger, leading to a 30% increase in 
heat consumption.®
For example, the fiiel and energy industry employs four million people, produces 10% of Russia’s total 
output and provides 20% of Russia’s capital investment. This all needs to be taken into account before 
restructuring. In; Shafanik, Y., ‘Fuel industry is litmus paper of Russian economy,’ Business World 
Weeklv.2 A p r i l l 9 9 3 . p l l .
^ De Bardeleben, J., The Environment and Marxism Leninism. The Soviet and East German Experience. 
Westview Press, Oxford, 1985, p 60.
Cooper, C.R., and Schipper, L., ‘The Soviet Energy Dilemma,’ Enerev Policv. Vol. 19, No. 4, May 
1991, pp 344-362.
^ Norman, P., ‘Cool look at the costs of Global Warming,’ Financial Times. 20 April 1993, p 17.
^ Nekrasov, A.S., ‘Conceptual Energy and Environmental Problems of Economic Policy in the former 
USSR,’ Energv Economics. Vol. 15, No. 4, October 1993, pp 273-284.
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Overall, it is estimated that if proper energy conservation programmes were 
initiated, the subsequent reduction in energy consumption would lead to a lowering o f  
CO2 levels in the FSU by 25% o f the 1990 level by 2020/^
An indirect conservation o f  natural resources could also occur by preventing 
industrial accidents, therefore reducing environmental problems. In 1992, environmentally 
damaging accidents, which are not included when estimating emissions per annum, 
increased by over I7%.® Outdated technology, equipment and an apparent decline in 
adherence to regulations, have meant that Russia has to allocate nearly 2% o f  its GDP per 
annum to clean up the consequences o f accidents. During 1991-1992 there were 1500 
accidents in the chemical industry, which led to large-scale environmental problems. As 
75% o f  equipment in the chemical and oil refining industries is over 20 years old, 
accidents will continue to occur at an increasing rate. Overall it is estimated that future 
clean up costs could represent 5% o f Russia’s GDP/^ This is a greater expenditure than 
that allocated to the health service (4% GDP is spent on health care).®
The oil and gas pipelines in the FSU are over 550,000km in len g th .^  o f  them 
have been in use for over 35 y e a r s . A  combination o f  a harsh climate and inappropriate 
design o f pipelines has led to a series o f  breakages which have adversely affected the 
environment. Speedy construction o f  pipelines in the early 1980s led to cut-off valves 
being placed every 30 miles instead o f  every 3 miles, potentially creating greater 
wastage.® V. Danilov Danilan, Russian Ecology and Resource Minister, beiieves 30% o f  
total energy supplies could be lost in such accidents.^' The situation could be improved if  
industries were required to take out obligatory accident insurance schemes. At present, 
any resulting damage caused by industrial accidents is covered by State mechanisms.
® Bashmakov, I., and Makarov, A., ‘An Energy Development Strategy for the USSR.' Enerev Police'
Vol. 19. No. 10, December 1991, pp 987-994.
Baiduzhy. A., The end o f  the Century in Russia w ill be a time o f catastroplpé.’ Nezavisimava eazeta 7 
July 1993, p 6. '
Op- c it. p 6.
^ Feshbach. M., and Friendly, J R.. Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books. New York. 1992. p 261.
Baiduzhy. A., The end o f the Century in Russia will be a time o f  catastrophe.' Nezavisimava eazeta 7 
July 1993, p 6 . -
® Stranglin, D.. ‘A iling L ands.’ Moscow M aeazinc. Jimc-Jiily 1992. pp 36-45.
Dempsey. J.. ‘The Reforming o f  Russia : Much illness linked to Pollution.' Financial Tim es 13 Mav
1992. p 9. ■
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Those who cause the problem have therefore no economic responsibility for their
actions. 91
Alternative Energv
Energy conservation can also occur by replacing fossil fuel with alternative 
energies obtained from renewable sources.
HydroelectricitV.
This is already well established in the former Soviet Union. During the 1960s, it 
accounted for 17.4% o f  the nation’s electrical output.^  ^Although this form o f  power is in 
theory free from air pollution, large-scale schemes adopted in the Soviet Union created 
environmental problems o f  their own. In order to create vast man-made dams needed for 
the process o f  electrical generation, there is a considerable loss o f land. In the Soviet case 
it is estimated that 15 million acres o f land have been flooded since the 1920s.® The 
natural flow o f existing rivers were also altered, causing sedimentation and eutrophication 
which have had adverse effects on the natural environment and eventually the local 
population. Hydroelectricity has been under attack by ecologists in recent years. This, in 
combination with the growth o f nuclear energy since the 1970s, has seen the proportion 
of.electrical generation from hydroelectrical plants fall to 13% o f total ou tp u t.D esp ite  
this trend, the re-establishment o f  small-scale hydropower would be beneficial in rural 
areas. Until the early 1960s, there were several thousand small-scale facilities with a 
capacity o f up to 30 megawatts (each). These were abandoned in favour o f  large-scale 
power engineering plants.®
Nekrasov, A.S., ‘Conceptual Energy and Environmental Problems of Economic Policy in the former 
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Solar.
Owing to the requirement o f sunlight for this form o f electricity, the southern 
regions o f  the former Soviet Union would be the most appropriate places for its use. In 
order to be competitive with conventional electricity sources, the designated areas would 
require up to 2000 hours o f sunshine per annum.^  ^Unfortunately, solar power plants are 
relatively more expensive to construct than traditional plants, therefore the price o f  
electricity would be between two and three times greater.®
Wind.
Electricity from this source is only practicable in areas where the average wind 
speed is 8-20 metres per second.^  ^ Such areas could include the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, 
Kaliningrad Region, Black Sea Coast, Kamchatka and the Kola Peninsula. A  relatively 
large installation o f 250kw would cost 30 million roubles to construct. In rural locations it 
is estimated that this cost could be recouped within six years. Smaller capacity wind 
stations o f  20-50kw would provide enough energy for a family o f four. Unfortunately, 
such plants are not manufactured in Russia.®
The Russian Association for the Promotion o f Wind Power obtained a contract 
with the Husumer Schiffswerft Company in Germany to build a wind-power station in the 
Saratov Region. Under the agreement, assembly o f the plant will be under German 
Supervision and Russian maintenance personnel will be trained up to Western standards. 
Ten more units will be supplied in the near future. 70% o f  the cost is being met by 
Germany under the national Eldorado Programme.
Today, renewable energies in Russia are underdeveloped. While they will never 
totally replace conventional electricity supplies, they could provide an important source o f
^ Medvedev, Y., ‘Alternative Prospects of Power Production in Russia,’ Moscow News. 28 July 1993, p 
10 .
® Op cit. p 10.
^ Op. cit. p 10.
^ Op. cit. p 10.
Klasson, M., ‘German wind-electric plants in Russia,’ Moscow News. 1 October 1992, p 7.
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power in more rural locations. The Ministry o f Fuel and Energy in the Russian Federation 
believes that nearly 60% o f electrical demand could be met by renewable sources in some 
regions. Unfortunately, financial constraints in the country will not allow this to happen 
for many years to come.
While energy rationalisation, conservation policies and the use o f  alternative 
renewable energies can only be o f benefit to the economy and the environmental situation 
in the FSU, Yablokov estimates it will cost at least $10 billion to initiate. With the 
present economic situation, all o f  the new governments are trying to keep their public 
expenditure down. The recession has had an adverse effect on the authorities’ attempts to 
curb pollution. At present, the only reason for a fall in the usage o f  natural resources is a 
fall in industrial output. For example, in 1991 overall production fell by 15%.^® The 
situation worsened by 1993 as the output o f  rolled stock fell by 9.9% and steel by 11% 
during January-May.^ ^^  ^ While this has led to a decline in overall emissions, it has not 
directly been caused by environmental policies.
With this is mind any consumer boom in the future could have catastrophic 
implications for the environment. Although televisions and refiigerators have already 
reached saturation levels in the FSU,'® there are still few dishwashers, personal 
computers, air conditioning facilities, etc. With economic growth people will want to
i
purchase such products. While the FSU could potentially produce these items, especially 
with the conversion o f military industries, the lack o f environmental control devices in 
industry at present would lead to an increase in airborne emissions. As financial 
assistance for environmental controls is scarce, any increased output will be more 
inefficient than before.'® It is debatable if  the FSU environment will survive the recession. 
However, unless action is taken now, it is even more unlikely to survive economic growth 
in the future.
Medvedev, Y., ‘Alternative Prospects of Power Production in Russia,’ Moscow News. 28 July 1993, p 
10.
Dempsey, J., ‘The Reforming of Russia : Much illness linked to pollution,’ Financial Times. 13 May 
1992, p 9.
Suokko, K., ‘After the Fall,’ Earthwatch. January-February 1993, pp 19-21.
Medvedev, Y., ‘Recession in iron and steel industry still goes on,’ Moscow News. 9 July 1993, plO.
This could be indicated by the decline in production of televisions from 2,283,000 in 1994 to 966,000 
in 1996, when compared with the growth of other products such as motor cars, which increased from 
793,000 in 1994 to 808,000 in 1996. In : The Europa World Year Book. Gresham Press, London 1999, p 
2976.
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Chapter 2 
Transport
The growth o f  the motor vehicle industry world-wide has created additional air 
pollution sources which have exacerbated the Greenhouse Effect. In 1959 there were a 
total o f  50 million cars, by 1995 this had increased to over 700 million.' While in 
percentage terms. Eastern Europe and the CIS only accounted for 7%  ^ o f the market 
(USA=33%), in 1995, pollution from transportation in 150 major cities (in the FSU) 
caused over 50% o f total airborne emissions, in that year.^
The disparities between car ownership in the U SA and the former Soviet Union 
were established many years ago. In 1970, there were two people per car in the USA, 
compared with 147 in the Soviet Union." By 1990 this had fallen to 1.7(USA) and 
17(USSR) respectively.^ This indicates that although the USA still has more vehicles, 
there has been a rapid growth o f car ownership in the USSR during the 1970-1990 
period. The opening o f  the Togliatti Plant in 1975 could explain this trend. The growth o f  
the motor vehicle industry has led to vast increases in airborne pollutants. In 1970, 
vehicular emissions only accounted for 13.1% o f  total pollution levels. By 1990, this had 
increased to 33.8% or 35.5 million tonnes o f noxious gases. ^
While the USA has many more vehicles on the road than the former Soviet Union, 
its cars are relatively cleaner and more efficient. The USSR produces two-thirds o f the 
USA levels o f  atmospheric exhaust pollutants.^ This disparity has been caused by several 
factors.
 ^ Buckley, R., ‘The Motor Car Prepares for the 21st Century,’ Understanding Global Issues. September 
1995, pp 1-18.
 ^ Op. cit, p i.
 ^ Op. cit. p 3.
Golitysn, G.S., ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS during the Transitional Period,’ RFE/RL Research 
Report. Vol. 2, No. 2, 8 January 1993, pp 33-42.
 ^ Op. cit. p 34.
 ^ Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands. The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 44.
 ^ Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the USSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 110.
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i) Russian cars are older than those found in America. Unfortunately, this 
trend has worsened during the last two decades. In 1980, the average age 
o f a Soviet car was 7.5 years. In 1985 it was 9.4 years and by 1993 it was 
12 years.®
ii) Unleaded petrol. The use o f  leaded petrol has been banned in major 
cities throughout the FSU. Although between 1980 and 1990 Soviet 
production o f lead-free petrol had increased from 18.5% to 48%, there is 
still room for improvement.^ Unfortunately, recent reports in the West 
have indicated that unleaded petrol is not as beneficial to human health as 
originally anticipated. If unleaded petrol is not used in conjunction with a 
catalytic converter, there are fears that it may cause cancer, owing to 
relatively high contents o f  benzene in the fiiel (especially super unleaded 
p e tr o l) .A s  few Russian cars have catalytic converters, even the new 
AN-91 petrol in use, which corresponds with EU standards, may have a 
detrimental effect on health.
iii) Poor infrastructure. A  lack o f  investment has led to poor road quality. 
This, combined with inefficient organisation o f  traffic and bad car design, 
has meant that the existing 16.9 million car fleet (1991)” consumed over 
20% more fuel than necessary.'^ It is estimated that at least one-third o f  
Russian roads need immediate reconstruction at a cost o f  $4.5 billion. A  
one-year delay in repairing this 1350km o f  infrastructure will cost an extra 
$250 million.'"
iv) Truck Fleet. Heavy trucks in the former Soviet Union have traditionally 
created more air pollution than any other sector o f the transport industry. 
Heavy trucks account for 23% o f  total motor vehicles on the roads, but
 ^ Chemyakova, N., ‘Foreign Car Market Conquer Russian Market,’ Business World Weekly. 2 April 
1993, p 8.
® Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
Britton, A., ‘Unleaded Petrol causes Cancer,’ Ten O’clock News. Meridian, 26 October, 1994.
“ Chemyakova, N., ‘Foreign Car Market Conquei^Russian Market,’ Business World Weekly. 2 April 
1993, p 8. ‘
Cooper, C.R., and Schipper, L., ‘The Soviet Energy Conservation Dilemma,’ Energy Policv. Vol. 19, 
No. 4, May 1991, pp 344-362.
Tkachenko, A., ‘How to Revitalise Russia’s Transport System,’ Moscow News. 9 July 1993, p 8.
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generate up to 77% o f  the pollution.'" This is exacerbated by the fact that 
many existing roads can only take loads o f 6.5 tonnes. In order to cater 
for heavy trucks, this should be 10 tonnes.'"
v) Bus Fleet. In general the bus fleet throughout the former Soviet Union 
is run on petrol. However, by 1988, 30% o f the fleet had been converted 
to diesel.'" A WHO report in 1996, claims that conversion to diesel • 
engines, although more efficient in terms o f miles per gallon than petrol, 
may have been premature. The report indicates that there is no safe level 
o f exposure to particulates from vehicle emissions.'^ It can cause illness 
and premature death. Unfortunately, dust particulates predominantly come 
from diesel not petrol engines. Even diesel cars fitted with oxidation 
catalysts do not filter out a large proportion o f dust particles.
vi) Production o f Cars. The production o f cars indirectly creates air 
pollution problems. Fortunately, with rising energy costs, the metal ratio 
intensity designated for transport may fall. This will lead to smaller, lighter 
vehicles. To a certain extent such a trend has already occurred. The weight 
o f the Volga car fell from 1283kg in 1970 to 1,121kg in 1985. The 
Moskvich car fell from 683kg in 1980 to 551kg in 1985;'® At present a 
greater improvement would be difficult to obtain as the plastic industry in 
the former USSR is underdeveloped. In 1991 the USSR only produced 
20% o f the USA plastics level.
Health. In 1990 exhaust fumes in the USSR accounted for 22% o f  nitrogen oxide 
emissions, 44% o f hydrocarbons, and 60% o f carbon oxides."® This obviously has an 
effect on human health. In 1999 a WHO Report suggested that 8,000 people had died 
prematurely as a result o f traffic fumes in the UK."' As the UK has 23.3 million vehicles.
Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
Tkachenko, A., ‘How to Revitalise Russia’s Transport System,’ Moscow News. 9 July 1993, p 8.
Cooper, C.R., and Schipper, L., ‘The Soviet Energy Conservation Dilemma,’ Energy Policv. Vol. 19, 
No. 4, May 1991, pp 344-362.
Brown, P., ‘Car Pollution Dilemma,’ The Guardian. 25 October 1996, p 4.
Cooper, C.R., and Schipper, L., ‘The Soviet Energy Conservation Dilemma,’ Energy Policv. Vol. 19, 
No. 4, May 1991, pp 344-362.
Op. cit. p 351.
Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
Derbyshire, D., ‘Fumes kill more than road crashes,’ Daily Mail. 16 June 1999, p 19.
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in contrast to 11 million in Russia (1997),"" it could be surmised that approximately 4,000 
die prematurely in Russia. As car quality in Russia is very poor, this figure could be 
substantially higher. The other adverse effect on health is from motor accidents.
Car ownership is perceived to be an indication o f living standards. Before the fall 
o f Communism there were disparities between the different regions o f the USSR. For 
example, in Estonia there were 97 vehicles per 1000 population,"" while in Azerbaijan it 
was only 27 vehicles per 1000 population."" In theory, the economic decline in the 1990s 
shoùld have led to a fall in car sales. In major cities, however, the opposite has occurred. 
Although there is a low purchasing power, the sales o f both home-made and foreign cars 
have become more rapid. In the latter case, despite being hindered by government 
protectionist policies, 98,000 foreign cars were imported into Russia during 1992.""
It is estimated that there is a shortfall o f  three million cars per annum in Russia."" 
St. Petersburg only had two outlets to purchase vehicles in 1991, indicating that sales 
promotions are as inadequate as the production o f vehicles."" The Russian car market has 
rapid growth potential. In August 1992, a Motor Show was held in M oscow for the first 
time in 80 years. Such promotion o f  the car industry in Russia led to 600,000 car sales in 
1 9 9 4  "8 is estimated to reach the one million mark by the year 2000."^ The growth o f  the 
second-hand market is also quite rapid. N ow  that travelling abroad is much easier, some 
Russian businessmen purchase cars at auctions in the USA to resell in Russia at a vast 
profit. A  Ford Taurus which can be bought for $5,000 in the USA at auction can be sold 
in Russia for up to $18,000 (1993 prices)."®
Despite an economic downturn the growth o f the motor vehicle market has been 
dramatic. While the increase in numbers will lead to greater air pollution levels, at least
Buckley, R , ‘Avoiding Gridlock. The Role of Public Transport,’ Understanding Global Issues. October 
1997, pp 1-18.
Lavrov, S.B., ‘Regional and Environmental Problems of the USSR. A Synopsis of views from the 
Soviet Parliament,’ Soviet Geography. Vol. 31, 1990, pp 477-499.
Op. cit. p 481.
Chemyakova, N., ‘Foreign Car Market Conquers Russian Market,’ Business World Weekly. 2 April ^  
1993, p 8.
On. cit. p 8.
Voloshina, V., ‘Mercedes are no longer in Vogue,’ Moscow News. 26 March 1993, p 10.
^ Buckley, R , ‘The Motor Car Preparing for the 2P ‘ Century,’ Understanding Global Issues. September 
1995, pp 1-18.
Op . cit. p 2.
Radyshevsky, D., ‘Buying Cars in America,’ Moscow News. 26 March 1993, p 10.
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new cars will be relatively more efficient. Unfortunately, the same cannot always be said 
about vehicles obtained via the second hand market. With time and an improvement in the 
financial situation within the country, the use o f cleaner technologies may help alleviate 
some o f  the problems."'
Conclusions
Mainstream scientists predict that Global Warming, predominantly caused by 
excessive air pollutant levels, will dramatically change the planet on which w e live. Even 
attempts to reach agreement on the stabilisation o f emissions at International summits, 
such as Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the Kyoto Conference in 1997 are not enough to 
prevent the perceived problems. General Circulation Models predict that if  action; Ts not 
taken to curb emissions the average world temperature will rise by 1.4° C by 2050."" If 
US proposals at the Kyoto Conference had been accepted, the increase would have been 
1.3° C. The EU proposals to cut Greenhouse gases by 15% would lead to a 1.2° C 
temperature increase."" While these measures would save a predicted 6-7 million fives, it 
is estimated that 20 million people would still face starvation, drowning, lack o f  water, 
etc., caused by climatic changes and an ever-increasing number o f natural disasters.
Global warming has already altered the climate o f the former Soviet Union. For 
example, December 1996 was the mildest Russian winter month since records began over 
117 years ago. In Moscow, it was 5.3° C warmer than normal, no snow had fallen."" I. 
Nazarov, Deputy Director o f the Institute o f Global Climate and Ecology believes that a 
doubling o f Greenhouse gases over the next 50 years will create many changes to 
ex-Soviet territories. Permafrost, which covers 58% of Russian land, will begin to melt."" 
60% o f Siberia will become swamp-like areas."" Large inhabited areas, such as St.
It should be noted that government figures related to transport emissions only take into account urban 
areas. Pollution from rural areas and sources such as boats and aeroplanes are not taken into 
consideration. As it is estimated that 5 million tonnes of the 15 million tonnes of jet fuel per annum are 
wasted owing to inefficient engine performance, the overall figure for air pollution from all types of 
transportation are underestimated. In: Nekrasov, A.S., ‘Conceptual Energy and Environmental Problems 
of Economic Policy in the Former USSR,’ Enerev Economics. Vol. 15, No. 4, October 1993, pp 273-284.
Brown, P., ‘Global Warming will kill 20 million,’ The Guardian. 2 December 1997, p 3.
Op. cit. p 3.
Hearst, D., ‘Moscow Basks in Snowless Indian Summer,’ The Guardian. 14 December 1996, p I6.This 
timely warm spell potentially could have led to an agricultural disaster for Russia. Farmers were 
predicting crop failure as there was no snow cover to protect seedlings from harsh frosts.
Hearst, D., ‘Moscow Basks in Snowless Indian Summer,’ The Guardian. 14 December 1996, p 16,
^ Yemelyanenko, V., ‘Selling Air Pollution on the Black Market,’ Moscow News. 26 February-4 March
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Petersburg, Riga, Tallinn, Murmansk, Vladivostok and Odessa will constantly be under 
the threat o f  flooding.®
When it is estimated that over 20% o f the former Soviet Union is already 
designated as ecological disaster areas and an additional 35% is rapidly deteriorating, the 
FSU cannot realistically afford to lose more land to the effects o f  global warming in the 
fijture."® Unfortunately, in order to help prevent this, vast amounts o f money are required 
to improve the environmental situation. Yablokov estimates it will cost at least $140 
billion to limit air pollution, $75-100 billion to cut down on CO2 and an additional 
$200-$300 billion to substitute environmentally friendly technology in industry."  ^The CIS 
does not have these resources.
Although the Soviet Union took steps to prevent air pollution fi'om the 1970s 
onwards, policies were only partially effective. Since the fall o f Communism, there has 
been an environmental improvement in terms o f total air pollutant levels. However, this is 
purely “an unwanted side effect o f economic collapse and social hardship.”"® Although 
pollution levels have decreased, the fall is not directly correlated with the fall in economic 
production. This indicates that per unit o f  production pollution levels have remained 
constant and in some cases have actually increased."' Assuming an eventual economic 
recovery, industrial emissions could increase dramatically if  environmental measures are 
not put in place beforehand. In many o f the new states such measures are deemed too 
costly. They will have to wait until the economy picks up, creating even greater pollution 
during the interim period. Today each new state must take charge o f  its own 
environmental problems; they can no longer rely on or blame centralised environmental 
protection ministries for their misfortunes. As very few new states have adopted air 
quality standards o f any kind,"" the perceived improvement in air quality can only be
1998, p 7.
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991, p 3.
Levine, J., ‘Vorontsov ; Way of the Warrior,’ Moscow Magazine. 1992, p 43. ^
Suokko, K., ‘After the Fall,’ Earthwatch. January-February 1993, pp 19-21.
Golitsyn, G.S., ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS during the Transitional Period,’ RFE/RL Research 
Report. V0 I.2 , No. 2, 8 January 1993, pp 33-42.
Pryde, P R , Environmental Management in the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991, p 3.
Golitsyn, G.S., ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS during the Transitional Period,’ RFE/RL Research 
Report. V0 I.2 , No. 2, 8 January 1993, pp 33-42._
- 3 8 -
sustained if  the economic problems (e.g. Reduction in industrial output) in the CIS 
continue.
In theory, international financial aid could help the situation. The IMF has recently 
resumed loans to Russia even though the country is behind in its required schedule o f  
economic reform. The money is however inefficiently used. At its worst there are reports 
that the Russian Central Bank has siphoned off IMF aid to offshore accounts."" 
Encouraging foreign investment into industry could also be beneficial, as long as such 
investment takes into account the cost o f  environmental controls required in present 
Russian industries. Foreign businesses, which are only interested in capitalising on a 
relatively cheap work force in the FSU, could yet again adversely affect the environment. 
Luring foreign companies to invest in Russia under the present political and economic 
conditions could prove difficult. Previous experiences o f  such firms as BP Amoco could 
deter other investors. BP Amoco paid £350 million in 1997 for a 10% share o f Sidanko, 
Russia’s sixth largest oil company. The Russian firm subsequently went bankrupt.""
At the end o f the 1990s there were indications that Russia had a trade surplus, 
created by recent oil price increases. Inflation had fallen to 3% a month, and industrial 
output had increased."" If this is the start o f an economic revival, the new millennium 
could have mixed implications for the environment.
Alexander, A., ‘Russia still a test of Business Nerves a year after the Crisis,’ Dailv Mail. 13 August 
1999, p 65.
Op. cit. p 65.
Op. cit. p 65.
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Part II
The Nuclear Energv Legacy
Chanter 3 
Nuclear Energy
Introduction
Nuclear energy for many years was perceived as a relatively clean process which 
could generate power for an ever-increasing world population. With growing 
international concerns over global warming, the continuing expansion o f  nuclear energy 
production became an acceptable policy for several countries. As it only takes one tonne 
o f  uranium to produce the equivalent amount o f energy from 16,000 tonnes o f  coal, 
nuclear energy appeared to represent a solution to reducing CO2 emissions.'
The Chernobyl Accident of 1986 Changed This 
View for Many Countries
The expansion o f the nuclear industry slowed dramatically after 1986. By 1995, 
only 17% o f  the world’s power originated from a nuclear source." As 60% o f  the existing 
reactors will have reached the end o f  their working life by 2020 this is estimated to fall to 
14% by 2015." Unless there is an extensive nuclear construction programme, there will be 
a decline in the electrical output from nuclear energy.
The following chapters look at the commercial nuclear programme adopted in the 
Former Soviet Union. There is an extensive analysis o f the Chernobyl Accident, the
' Buckley, R., ‘Nuclear Energy,’ Understanding Global Issues. July 1997, p 3.
" Op cit. p 1.
" Op. cit. p i .
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detrimental effects on health, the future o f nuclear energy towards the millennium and, 
finally, as a comparison, a brief look at the safety o f nuclear energy in Western Europe.
Nuclear Energy Industry^
The Soviet Union was the first country to establish a commercial nuclear energy 
plant at Obninsk (125km south-west o f  Moscow) in 1954. Rapid development 
predominaivfiy in the European part o f  the country (Map 1, p 42) came in the form o f two 
types o f reactors.
(RBMK) - “Reactor, High, Power, Channel Type.”
Graphite Moderated
(VVER) - “Water, Water, Power Reactor.”
Water Pressurised
By 1985, nuclear power produced 10.8% o f  the Soviet Union’s electricity 
requirements." With a continued high priority under a centralised government, it was 
estimated to reach 20% by the year 2000." The Chernobyl accident o f  26 April 1986 
checked this expansion. The target was never met.
The Soviet authorities often maintained that their nuclear power plants were safer 
than those in other parts o f the world. Previous accidents at Shevchenko (1973) and 
Beloyarsk (1978) were never publicly reported." The only incidents which were cautiously 
acknowledged by the Soviet press were foreign accidents, notably Three Mile Island 
(USA)." Under Cold War rhetoric, the Soviet regime could point out that nuclear reactors 
in the West were o f  a different design to those in the Soviet Union. Soviet propaganda 
claimed that no such accident could possibly occur in the USSR.
In 1985, the Deputy Director o f  the Kurchatov Institute, Lev Feoktistov stated;
‘ Zciglcr. C.E., ‘Environinciilal Protection in Soviet East European Relations.’ In : De Bardeleben. J.. To 
Breathe Free. Eastern Europe's Environmental Crisis. John Hopkins Press. Baltimore, 1991. pp 83-98.
' Pryde. P R., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union. Cambridge Universitv Press. Cambridge. 
1991, p 37.
" Op. oil, p 44.
 ^ Hawke. N., The Worst Accident in the World. Chernobvl. the end o f the Nuclear Dream. Chaucer 
Press. London. 1986, p 5.
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“In the thirty years since the first Soviet nuclear power plant opened, there 
has not been a single instance when plant personnel and nearby residents 
have been seriously threatened, not a single disruption in normal operation 
occurred, that would have resulted in the contamination o f  the air, water 
or soil.”®
A  year later, the wOrst recorded accident at a civil nuclear plant occurred. If the Soviet 
authorities had acknowledged previous incidents and had heeded the warnings given by 
the KGB seven years previously about the potential problems at Chernobyl, the incident 
might have been averted.^ Similar problems were detected at Ignalina (also RBMK 
design) in Lithuania in 1983, indicating an inherent fault flaw in the RBMK design.'®
Soviet reporting on the disaster was sporadic. Although evidence o f  the incident 
was acknowledged by the West shortly after the actual explosion, it took two days for the 
Soviet authorities to confirm the accident (to the rest o f  the world).'' The Soviet general 
public was not informed until after the May Day Celebrations. Gorbachev made his first 
address to the public 18 days after the accident.'" Media coverage became very 
contradictory and confusing, offering both overoptimistic and pessimistic evaluations o f  
the disaster, which ultimately placed many Belorussian and Ukrainian lives at risk.
The public handling o f the incident, especially within the USSR, cast/doubts on 
the process o f  glasnost. The time delay indicated very little had changed under the New  
Soviet regime. Gorbachev, even ten years after the event, had no regrets about how he 
had dealt with the situation, claiming he was a lawyer not a scientist.'" While he readily 
admits he was slow to announce Chernobyl, he was still working within the constraints o f  
the Soviet system which was obsessed with nuclear secrecy. After all, glasnost was in its 
infancy, it was still only nine weeks old when Chernobyl occurred.
 ^ Hawke, N., The Worst Accident in the World. Chernobvl. the end of the Nuclear Dream. Chaucer 
Press, London, 1986, p 5.
 ^ Yuri Andropov warned of the potential dangers of the RBMK reactor at Chernobyl, 21 February 1979 
via a secret note to the Kremlin. In: Raffaelli, J., ‘Kremlin Warned of Dangers Years Before Disaster,’ 
The Moscow Tribune. 25 April 1993, p 5.
Kapelyushny, L., ‘Ten Years with Chernobyl,’ Izvestiva. 23 April 1996, p 7.
Trehub, A., ‘Chernobyl Openness in Action,’ Radio Free Europe. 2 May 1986, p 10.
Ziegler, C.E., Environmental Policv in the USSR. Frances Pinter Press, London, 1987, p 27.
Nine o ’clock News, BBCl. 25 April 1996.
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Chernobvl
The Chernobyl accident occurred at 1,23 a.m. on 26 April 1986, when Reactor 
N o.4 exploded during a routine safety test. Although the remaining three reactors at the 
plant were not affected, they were immediately shut down, representing a total loss o f  
400,000kw o f electrical power. The first major period o f  radioactive fallout occurred over 
the next 24-48 hours. A second heightened period occurred between 2 and 6 May, when 
the reactor overheated again, probably during attempts to extinguish the graphite fire.'" 
Those immediately at risk lived in the workers’ town o f  Pripyat, a mere one kilometre 
from the reactor. 60,000 people,'" o f whom 17,000 were children,'" were evacuated on 27 
April. Pripyat became a ghost town in the centre o f  a 30km exclusion zone (Map 2, p 45) 
which will remain highly contaminated for many years to come.
Owing to the position o f  the Chernobyl Plant and weather conditions during the 
first few critical days, the Ukraine and Belarus were the most contaminated regions (see 
Maps 3, 4 and 5 pp 46-48). Although Belarus has no nuclear stations, the Republic 
suffered up to 70% o f Chernobyl’s radioactive fallout.'" According to the Belorussian 
Children o f  Chernobyl Fund, 40% o f the Republic is seriously contaminated. '® In early 
1992, it was estimated that 16,530 sq. km. had been affected.'^ The worst affected areas 
were the south and south-east regions o f  Gomel and Mogilev. By December 1992, the 
Russian Academician, A. Tsyb, had revised this estimate up to 46,000 sq. km."® In total, 
Belarus effectively lost 20% o f its farmland (1.6 million hectares) and 15% o f its forests 
(6.3 million hectares)."' Twenty seven cities and 2697 villages containing one fifth o f  the 
population are known to be contaminated."" This means that 2.2 million people, 25% o f
14 Marples, D .R , The Social Impact of the Chernobvl Disaster. Macmillan Press, London, 1988, p 59. 
World in Action. ‘The Forgotten Children,’ TVS, 5 April 1993.
Tucker, A., ‘The Fallout from the Fallout,’ The Guardian. 17 February 1996, pp 12-16.
‘Four Years After Chernobyl : Report from the Byelorussian Republic,’ Anglo-Soviet Journal. Spring 
1990, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp 8-10.
Marples, D., ‘Belarus,’ Radio Free Libertv. Vol. X, No. 4, 16 February 1993, p 4.
Op . cit. p 4.
Op. cit. p 4.
‘Four Years After Chernobyl : Report from the Byelorussian Republic,’ Anglo-Soviet Journal. Spring 
1990, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp 8-10.
Chernyak, L, ‘Four Years After Chernobyl,’ In : Riordau, J., Soviet Social Realitv in the Mirror of 
Glasnost. St. Martins Press, Loudon, 1992, p 125.
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Map 2 
Chernobvl and Exclusion Zone
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whom are under 14 years o f  age, are living in areas which are potentially dangerous to 
human health/^
The Ukraine, which already has natural elevated background radiation levels, also 
suffered severely from contamination/^ In total, 40,000 sq. km. were affected^^ One 
hundred and twenty three thousand hectares o f farmland and 136,000 hectares o f  forest 
have been withdrawn from use. Nearly four million people are known to be living in 
contaminated areas, 1.5 million o f these being children.
As some areas have been permanently evacuated, the Soviet authorities built 
21,000 new houses and 15,000 flats in supposedly clean areas.^  ^While many people were 
relocated in major cities, such as Minsk and Kiev,^  ^ creating even greater overcrowding, 
others found themselves in new towns. Slavutich, 40 miles north-east o f Chernobyl 
became a modem new town, predominantly for the Chernobyl workers. The location was 
initially approved by the Health Ministry; however, in March 1989, published radiation 
maps revealed the town itself had been built on a heightened radioactive path.^  ^ In order 
to improve the situation 200,000 cubic metres o f irradiated soil were removed from the 
town at a cost o f  50,000 roubles.^® In the late 1980s some residents tried to leave the 
area, but although the town is very modem, they found that outsiders were unwilling to 
exchange their present home for one in Slavutich. A  prime example o f  this was 
recorded in 1988, when the Party Secretary at the Chernobyl Plant, Evgenii Boradavko, 
refused to move his family from Kiev to Slavutich.^  ^ Today (1999) most residents in 
Slavutich are more settled, the area having become their home. When Chemobyl closes in 
the year 2000, they may have to encounter a second upheaval, causing even greater social 
and economic dislocation, as 6,000 o f  the residents work at the nuclear plant.^^
Khodosvky, V., ‘Grim Aftermath of Chemobyl for Belomssia.’ In ; Riordan, J., Soviet Social Realitv in 
the Mirror of Glasnost. St. Martins Press, London, 1992, p 122-125.
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p 154.
Skachko, V., ‘Supreme Soviet Requests help for Chemobyl Victims,’ Nezavisimava eazeta. 23 April 
1995, p i .
Op. cit. p 1.
Perera, J., ‘Chemobyl Clean-up casts a Political Shadow,’ New Scientist. 15 July 1989, p 28.
^ “Settler Towns” were established outside Minsk, consisting of high-rise blocks accommodating 11,000 
people. In; Frame, A., ‘Poisoned by Chemobyl,’ The Dailv Mail. 13 May 1995, pp 22-23.
Marples, D., 'Chemobyl - Summer 1990,’ Report of the USSR. Vol. 2, No. 26, 29 June 1990, pp 14-17.
Op. cit. p 15.
Op. cit. p 16.
Tolz, V., ‘USSR : This Week,’ Radio Libertv. 2 November 1988, p 10.
‘Inside Chemobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
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Some evacuated areas were later re-inhabited. In Belarus approximately 21,000 
people were allowed back to their homes. However, in late 1989, 21 villages were 
evacuated for the second time owing to radioactive hot spots.^ "^  Other areas which were 
never evacuated, but close to the 30km zone, have witnessed a population decline. For 
example, up to 20,000 o f the younger and better educated population left Khoinki 
(Belarus) during the ten years after Chemobyl.^^
The actual Exclusion Zone, which is approximately the size o f Greater London,^  ^
in theory should still be uninhabited. As the water supply, land and air are still 
contaminated, it is surprising that, by 1988, 1,200 people had illegally moved back into 
the zone.^  ^Generally, these were elderly people who returned home to live their lives out. 
It has been estimated in Izvestiva that a person over 50, who takes precautionary 
measures, will not receive a lethal dose o f  radiation before the end o f his or her natural 
life.^  ^ Unfortunately, family visits meant that during the summer o f 1988 there were at 
least 60 children within the exclusion zone; this is more than likely to cause health 
problems in the future.^  ^By 1996 the number o f  people living within the zone had fallen 
to 700, owing to natural decline and some residents finally moving away.^
By October 1992, 24,000 people had entered the zone for differing reasons.^  ^
Obviously this figure will have continued to increase with time. The most surprising 
‘visitors’ to the exclusion zones are tourists. Chernobyl Interlnforum runs tours to the 
stricken Chernobyl Plant at a high cost; a two day tour for three people costs in excess o f  
$1000.^ ""
Price, T., Political Electricity - What Future for Nuclear Energy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1990, pp 287-292.
Aitkin, R., ‘Living in the Shadow of Chernobyl,’ Earlv Morning News. BBCl, 24 April 1996.
^ Op. cit.
Kapelyushny, L., ‘Ten Years with Chernobyl,’ Izvestiva. 23 April 1996, p 5.
^ Op. cit. p 5.
Marples, D., ‘Chernobyl Area Declared Unfit for Permanent Habitation,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 1, 
No. 8, 24 February 1989, pp 17-18.
Kapelyushny, L., ‘Ten Years witli Chernobyl,’ Izvestiva. 23 April 1996, p 5.
Marples, D., ‘Belarus,’ Radio Free Liberty. Vol. X, No. 4, 16 February 1993, p 4.
Gall, C., ‘You are now inside the Z one Chernobyl is Practically a Tourist Site,’ Russia Review, 6
May 1996, p 40.
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The Sarcophagus
The sarcophagus was rapidly constructed around the disabled reactor to try to 
prevent any further deterioration o f  the situation. In theory the 24 storey building would 
house 135 tonnes o f uranium and plutonium/^ prevent large quantities o f radioactive dust 
from escaping and rain from entering the reactor, possibly causing another chain reaction. 
According to the Soviet authorities, “the design o f the sarcophagus totally excluded the 
possibility o f  radioactive substances being released from the damaged reactor into the 
atmosphere”.
Originally, the structural lifetime o f the sarcophagus was estimated to be 30 
years."^  ^ Unfortunately, owing to the sheer speed with which the sarcophagus was 
constructed, the quality o f the work and the material used were poor. Within five years o f  
the accident the sarcophagus had started to show signs o f deterioration. The sarcophagus, 
which had been built on the original base o f the reactor, was becoming unstable. The 
actual structure was never hermetically sealed. A  series o f  holes, which covered a total 
area o f  2,000 sq. metres,^  ^ were proving problematic owing to changing conditions 
within the crippled reactor. As a short-term solution, many o f  these holes were patched 
up, but it became obvious that the sarcophagus would need to be replaced well within its 
predicted 30 year life span.
By 1991, Soviet scientists at Chernobyl considered seven possible options to deal 
with the potential problem o f  the sarcophagus. The three main ones included
i) permanent entombment in concrete
ii) completely covering the area with sand
iii) new second airtight sarcophagus"^^
‘Inside Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
Petrosyants, A., (Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nuclear Energy Utilisation), ‘The 
Utilisation of Nuclear Energy,’ Soviet News. 29 April 1987, p 150.
Shcherbak, Y., ‘Ten Years of the Chernobyl Era,’ Scientific American. April 1996, pp 32-37. 
Medvedev, Y., ‘Nuclear Monster to be Encased in Pyramid,’ Segodnva. 30 March 1995, p 9. 
‘Inside Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
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All three o f these options had possible problems. If the sarcophagus was entombed in 
concrete it would be almost impossible to inspect the contents o f the crippled reactor for 
a chain reaction. The second option, while being the cheapest solution, could have caused 
the nuclear fiiel to overheat as sand is a recognised insulator. The third option would be 
expensive and, with poor equipment and lack o f technology, a second sarcophagus may 
have proved to be no better than the first.
With the collapse o f the F SU, the sarcophagus remains a problematic issue. It nov/ 
falls under the jurisdiction o f  the Ukrainian Government, which opened the arena to an 
international market in 1995-1996 by announcing competition details to find the best 
possible solution to the deteriorating condition o f  the sarcophagus. The eighteen 
countries, which took part in the competition, put forward several new proposals. They 
included plans which considered dismantling the No. 4 Reactor. This was rejected as it 
was deemed far too dangerous, especially as nobody had any experience o f this type o f  
procedure. A  joint-stock company in St. Petersburg (Atompodzemenego) suggested 
burying the unit in an airtight bunker with walls constructed o f special concrete materials 
at a cost o f $1.5 billion."^  ^ The actual winner o f the competition was a joint 
French/Ukrainian project, led by Campenon Bernard, which recommended placing a 
pyramid unit over the sarcophagus.^^ The new cover would be 200 metres tall, take two 
years to complete and cost in excess o f $15 b i l l io n . I t  has been suggested that this 
expensive option has only been considered for financial reasons. Aleksandr Plugin, Chief 
Designer at Atompodzemenego Company believes, “the winning project is often the one 
accompanied by the most money, not necessarily the best one.”^^ This could be true when 
taking into account that a large proportion o f the cost o f  the pyramid project would come 
from foreign sources and Plugin’s own solution would only take three months to 
complete, while the construction o f a pyramid would take at least two years.^^
Whatever solution is finally adopted, action must be taken as quickly as possible. 
Alexander Borovoi, Chief Scientist at Chernobyl, states that the, probability o f  the 
sarcophagus collapsing within the next ten years (by 2006) is 70%.^  ^ Ironically, although
^ Medvedev, Y., ‘Nuclear Monster to be Encased in Pyramid,’ Segodnva. 30 March 1995, p 9.
Shcherbak, Y., ‘Ten Years of the Chernobyl Era,’ Scientific American. April 1996, pp 32-37.
Medvedev, Y., ‘Nuclear Monster to be Encased in Pyramid,’ Segodnva. 30 March 1995, p 9.
Op. cit. p 9.
Op . cit. p 9.
‘Inside Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
- 5 2
the sarcophagus is deteriorating rapidly, causing concern throughout the world, if  the 
Chernobyl accident had occurred after the break-up o f the FSU there is, “no room for
confidence that .......  it would be possible to build a similar protective sarcophagus,” "^^
leading to even greater widespread radioactive contamination.
Inside the Sarcophagus
The sarcophagus houses the crippled No. 4 nuclear reactor and as much o f  the 
radioactive debris that the liquidators could physically shift into the enclosure. It is 
estimated that it covers up to 90% o f the reactor’s total radioactivity.^^ It is therefore an 
extremely dangerous area. Since the accident, an expedition o f scientists led by Viktor 
Popov has been investigating the subsequent deterioration o f the situation inside the 
sarcophagus. In order to do this, scientists have had to enter the enclosure on many 
occasions, as the electronics in robotic computers from both the East and West, have 
been destroyed by excessively high radiation levels.^® The following description and 
pictorial diagram (Diagram 1, p 54) briefly demonstrate the main problems which these 
scientists have discovered in the sarcophagus. Unfortunately, if  they are not dealt with 
soon, radioactive contamination fi*om the Chernobyl Plant could yet again shatter the lives 
o f many people in the Former Soviet Union.
In 1990, S T. Belyaev, A.A. Borovoi and A. Yu. Gagarinsky, leading scientists 
from the Kurchatov Institute o f Nuclear Energy, presented a paper to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the condition o f  Reactor No. 4 inside the 
sarcophagus. The report revealed that the reactor pit was nearly empty, indicating that 
despite Soviet assurances to the contrary, a total meltdown o f  the core had occurred. 
Graphite, uranium fiiel and metal had melted down, flowing in a liquid form to the lower 
chambers o f the crippled reactor. Once cooled, it crystallised into lava type substances
known as corium.^  ^ Solid stalactites appeared, reducing the threat o f  another explosion.^^
Altshuler, 1.1., Golubchikov, N., and Mnatsakanyan, R.A., ‘Glasnost, Perestroika and 
Eco-sovietology,’ In : Massey Stewart, J., The Soviet Environment. Problems. Policies and Politics. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p 209.
Medvedev, Z.A., ‘The Global Impact of the Chernobyl Accident, Five Years After.’ In : Massey 
Stewart, J., The Soviet Environment. Problems. Policies and Politics. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992, p 21.
‘Inside Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
Edwards, M., ‘Chernobyl,’ National Geographic. Vol. 186, No. 2, August 1994, p 106.
^ Op. cit. p 106.
^ ‘Inside Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
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Initially, scientists were pleased with this find as the radioactive fuel was sealed 
inside the lava formations, safe from contact with water. Unfortunately, during the last 
five to six years, the lava has become increasingly “brittle,” causing two potential 
problems.^°
i) The ‘brittle’ lava is turning into radioactive airborne dust, which 
could escape into the atmosphere as the sarcophagus becomes more 
unstable. This danger is further enhanced by the fact that the reactor lid, 
which fell four metres during the initial explosion (Diagram 1, p 54), could 
fall farther into the lower chambers, resulting in an enormous dust storm.^^
A similar prognosis could occur after a natural disaster such as an 
earthquake.®^
ii) The ‘brittle’ lava is also absorbing moisture. In 1994, it was 
discovered by Edvard Pazukhin that the lava contained solidified uranium.
When in contact with water, the uranium becomes highly radioactive.®^
The situation inside the sarcophagus has obviously changed during the last thirteen 
years. Some areas o f the damaged reactor have never been explored as radiation levels are 
still too high or access is problematic. While some scientists at the Plant believe more 
research is needed, Viktor Popov claims it is time “to stop frightening people, they’re 
scared enough already.”®^ He now believes that only engineering work to secure the 
structure is required. By 1996/97 research inside the sarcophagus had been cut back 
dramatically owing to a lack o f finance, equipment, relevant technology, the failing health 
o f expedition scientists®® and a general apathy towards the problem. The crippled reactor, 
appears to have become part o f the Ukraine’s everyday life which people would like to 
forget.
Edwards, M., ‘Chernobyl,’ National Geographic. Vol. 186, No. 2, August 1994, p 100-116.
‘Inside Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
Op. cit.
On. cit.
Op . cit.
While none of the scientists have suffered from Acute Radiation Sickness, several now have problems. 
Geraschenko has had a major stroke, Zakinsky died from a heart attack in his early forties and Popov has 
failing eyesight.
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Food Contamination
High radiation levels after the Chernobyl Accident have contaminated food 
produce in the Former Soviet Union, /. Radioactive elements, especially caesium, 
entered the food chain relatively rapidly as isotopes were absorbed by vegetation via root 
systems, which were destined to be ingested by animals and eventually eaten by the 
general public. The food produce from Belarus was at greater risk than most other areas 
owing to the composition o f the soil. Belarus has large areas o f marshland, so caesium 
tends to remain in the top layers o f the soil for longer periods, contaminating food 
supplies for many years to come.®®
The Soviet authorities attempted to prevent radioactive produce reaching human 
consumption. Contaminated crops were harvested and destroyed. Farm animals were 
rounded up and relocated to clean areas. Fresh milk, fishing and the consumption o f wild 
berries and fruits were banned in the worst affected regions.®  ^Despite these efforts and, in 
theory, the monitoring o f all produce, contaminated food still entered the food supplies.
According to the USSR Deputy Prosecutor, General V. Andreyev, between 1986 
and 1989, two million tonnes o f  milk were considered unsafe for human consumption 
owing to excessive iodine 131 contamination.®  ^ Unfortunately, some o f this milk, while 
not allowed to be consumed as a drink, was made into butter and cheese.®  ^ A. 
Yaroshinskaya, writing in the daily Izvestiva. suggests that the amount o f unsafe milk was 
even greater than acknowledged by the authorities. On occasions, in Belarus, when milk 
exceeded the set safety levels, she believes that the level was adjusted by the authorities in 
order to allow the milk into the market place.^ "^  Professor Yelena Burlakova is quoted as 
estimating that ‘adjustable’ safety standards saved the FSU at least 1.7 billion roubles.^^
It is not surprising that large quantities o f  milk were regarded as unsafe for human 
consumption, when dairy farming practices after the Chernobyl accident are taken into 
consideration. In the worst affected areas, dairy farming rapidly became an indoor
^ ‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1991, p 47.
^ Yaroshinskaya, A., ‘Forty Secret Protocols of the Kremlin Elders,’ Izvestiva. 24 April 1992, p 3.
Marples, D., Social Impact of the Chemobvl Disaster. Macmillan Press, London, 1988, pp 63-64.
Yaroshinskaya, A., ‘Forty Secret Protocols of the Kremlin Elders,’ Izvestiva. 24 April 1992, p 3.
Op. cit. p 3.
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industry, as grazing land was highly contaminated. Unfortunately for six months cattle 
were fed on a combination o f ‘local produce,’ which was often contaminated, and a 
special supplement o f  salts and minerals. After this time period cattle were transported to 
clean grazing areas for six months which was supposedly “adequate for the animal 
organisms to rid themselves completely o f radionuclides.”^^ In contrast, eight years after 
the explosion, 340 farms in North Wales and 112 farms in Cumbria (United Kingdom) 
were still under government restrictions as farm animals were registering excessive levels 
of radiation.'®
During the same period (1986-1989), 47,500 tonnes o f meat in Belarus exceeded 
allowable contamination levels.^ "^  Yet again not all o f  this produce was destroyed. 
Radioactive meat was mixed with uncontaminated jueat at a ratio o f one to ten for the 
production o f sausages and canned meat. The USSR Ministry o f  Public Health secretly 
recommended that the contaminated meat should be dispersed widely throughout the 
country “to prevent a large total accumulation o f  radioactive substances in people’s 
bodies.” ®^ Contaminated food was therefore more or less present in all areas o f  the Soviet 
Union.
It appears that those living in rural areas were more likely to eat contaminated 
foods than in the larger urban areas. Clean food from other regions was brought into 
major cities, such as Kiev, in order to feed the local population, who now had to reject 
their locally grown produce. Those living in small villages did not receive adequate levels 
o f food supplies; therefore they had no option but to revert to eating their own produce. 
The additional cost o f clean food also presented a problem for many households. The 
Soviet authorities attempted to compensate for this extra living cost by providing a 25% 
wage increase and an additional subsidy o f 30 roubles per month (in 1989).^® Initially, this 
may have eased the burden; however with the fall o f Communism and the subsequent 
hyperinflation experienced throughout the Commonwealth o f  Independent States 
many people yet again couldn’t afford ‘clean products’ sold in official shops.
Marples, D., Social Impact of the Chernobvl Disaster. Macmillan Press, London, 1988, pp 75. 
Nine o’clock News, BBCl. 26 April 1994.
Yaroshinskaya, A., ‘Forty Secret Protocols of the Kremlin Elders,’ Izvestiva. 24 April 1992, p 3. 
Op. cit. p 3.
Perera, J., ‘Chernobyl Cleanup Casts a Political Shadow,’ New Scientist. 15 July 1989, p 28.
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In general, it appears that food was not carefiilly screened for radioactivity after 
Chernobyl. Only food which was destined for M oscow and St. Petersburg was thoroughly 
checked.^^ With this i^mind, it was probably necessary for a number o f West European 
countries to restrict the import o f  food products from the USSR.^^ To help overcome 
Western anxieties. Radio Moscow announced an end to the controls on radioactive 
products in Kiev’s city market place during July 1987, implying there was no longer a 
potential problem.^® This report was not transmitted to a domestic audience. In contrast, 
during the late summer o f 1987, Anatoli Romanenko (Minister o f  Health Protection in the 
Ukraine) maintained that the monitoring o f food would continue for several more years in 
the city o f  Kiev.
As the monitoring for radioactive elements in fresh produce was inadequate, the 
authorities failed to provide healthy olean food for their people. This, combined with 
many other factors, has led to a deterioration in the health o f those living in the worst 
affected areas. Even if  the general public did not believe they were purchasing “clean 
produce” from official shops, they had no other viable alternatives. Many were not in a 
position to question the level o f radiation present in their food supply, as public 
information on the extent o f  contamination was very vague. The first radioactive caesium 
distribution maps were not made public until 1989,^  ^ so people could not see whether the 
area in which they lived and produced fresh fruit etc. was actually Contaminated.
Twelve years after the Chernobyl Accident new health regulations concerning 
food standards were adopted on 1 March 1998 in Russia. For example the permissible 
levels o f caesium in one litre o f milk now fell below 50 becquerels, from the previous limit 
o f  370. However, owing to a series o f  demonstrations throughout the six districts most 
affected by the Chernobyl Accident, the introduction o f these new standards was delayed 
until 31 December 1999 in the Bryansk and Kaluga Provinces. It is estimated that 95% o f  
all agricultural output in the Bryansk Region would not pass the new standards, therefore 
it would be impossible to sustain the population.
Marples, D., ‘Towards the Fifth Anniversary o f the Accident at Chernobyl,’ Report on the U SSR  Vol.
3, No. 7, 15 February 1991, pp 13-15.
^ Tass Announcement 8 May 1986. In: Soviet News. 14 May 1986, p 232.
Marples, D., Social Impact o f the Chemobvl Disaster. Macmillan Press, London, 1988, p 63.
^ Op. cit. p 63.
Stein, G., ‘Where is the Chernobyl Fallout Now?’ Report on the USSR Vol. 3, No. 24, 24 July 1991,
pp 6-11.
^ Grachov, A., and Smolyakova, T., ‘New Health Regulations and Standards for Food Products,’
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Chernobvl - Today
Today, the Chernobyl Plant still has two reactors in operation, producing two 
gigawatts o f electricity. Safety levels are reported to have improved, enabling the complex 
to be completely shut down within two minutes.^® While there has not been an accident on 
the scale o f the 1986 disaster, the plant still suffers from minor releases o f  radioactivity. 
Almost exactly ten years after the accident Reactor No. 3 was reported to have been 
contaminated by radioactive dust in four different areas.C onflicting reports suggested 
causes ranging from sloppy work practices,^® to problems with a disused water filtration 
system between Reactors Three and Four.^® While the real cause may never actually be 
known, it does show that the nuclear plant at Chernobyl still represents a potential 
danger, which the Ukrainian Government will have to deal with.
The closing down o f the Chernobyl Plant may be regarded as the only real long 
term solution for the Ukrainian Government. However, in the short term it could be 
argued that it would create even greater hardship, as like most other indebted countries^ 
the Ukraine, unable to finance an alternative energy, claims not to be able to survive 
without the electricity produced by the nuclear programme.
The dilemma facing the Ukrainian Government is complicated. The cost o f the 
Chernobyl Disaster is extensive. The Deputy Prime Minister, Vasily Durdinets, estimates 
that the aftermath o f the Chernobyl Disaster costs the Ukraine $1 billion per annum. 
Five percent o f the annual budget is appropriated to a state programme to alleviate a wide 
variety o f problems associated with the disaster. The money has been raised by the 
introduction o f a 12% income tax placed on the Ukrainian workforce.Realistically, in 
financial terms the real need is several times greater, but the Ukrainian Government is in 
no position to allocate extra fiands.
Rossiiskava gazeta. 14 March 1998, p 4.
^ ‘Inside Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 19 March 1996.
^ Tass Report, ‘Anniversary Reminder of Chernobyl,’ The Guardian. 26 April 1996, p 13.
^ Tass Report, ‘Sloppy Staff Blamed for Spillage,’ The Independent. 26 April 1996, p 10.
^ Tass Report, ‘Anniversaiy Reminder of Chernobyl,’ The Guardian. 26 April 1996, p 13.
Kapelyushny, L., ‘Ten years with Chernobyl,’ Izvestiva. 24 April 1996, p 5.
^ Skachko, V , ‘Supreme Soviet Requests Help for Chernobyl Victims,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 28 April 
1995, p 1.
^ Shcherbak, Y.M., ‘Ten years of the Chernobyl Era,’ Scientific American’. April 1996, pp 32-37.
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As the financial cost o f  the accident is so great, it seems strange that the 
Government is prepared to allow the Chernobyl Plant to continue operating, so risking 
another major disaster. When the Ukraine first became independent, the Government 
stipulated that the Chernobyl Plant would be permanently shut down. However, owing to 
a growing energy crisis in 1993, the Government repealed their own decision by an 
astounding 221 - 38 vote,^° indicating that the Chernobyl Plant would continue operating 
until its resources were exhausted.
Unfortunately, previous Soviet development has meant that the Ukraine is reliant 
on nuclear energy for approximately 30%^ o f its electricity (from five nuclear plants). 
With the onset o f  each winter the Ukraine felt that its people still needed the energy 
supply from the Chernobyl Plant. Alternative energy sources in the Ukraine, such as the 
coal industry, became more expensive: while wages increased production started to fall, 
owing to coal seams becoming more inaccessible and an increase in the number o f  
underground mining accidents.^® The cost o f gas supplies fi’om Russia also increased 
rapidly as the new independent states now purchased such products at market prices. In 
1996, the gas supplies from Russia cost the Ukraine £72 million a week.^ Under present 
economic conditions, there is a flaw in the Ukrainian Government claim that it still needs 
the electricity generated by the Chernobyl Plant. Between 1990 and 1993, industrial 
production fell by 23%, therefore the demand for electricity should have also declined in 
real terms.^®
Various international conferences over the last few years led to the agreed closure 
o f the Chernobyl Plant by the year 2000. At the Ottawa Conference (December 1995) the 
Ukrainian Government secured $3 billion^ ® fi*om the ‘G7 leaders’ to end the Chernobyl 
saga. Under the agreement, the remaining operational reactors were to be shut down, the 
sarcophagus and surrounding facilities made safe and an alternative energy supply in the
Vaganov, A., ‘Chernobyl Atomic Power Station Will Operate a Little Longer,’ Nezavisimava gazeta.
26 October 1993, p i .
Meek, J., ‘Ukraine to Retain Disaster N-plant,’ The Guardian. 28 October 1993, p 12.
Pryde, P R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Union. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, p 160.
”  For example, an accident at the Lugansk Coal Mine on 9 June 1992, killed 57 miners. In : Marples, D., 
‘Chernobyl and Nuclear Energy in Post Soviet Ukraine,’ RFE/RL Report. Vol. 1, No. 35, 4 September 
1992, p 58
Brasier, M., ‘West Faces Soaring Cost of Chernobyl,’ The Independent. 20 April 1996, p 17.
‘Chemobyllians,’ The Economist. 2 July 1994, p 13.
^ Clark, V , ‘Pledge on Chernobyl Closure,’ The Observer. 21 April 1996, p 20.
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form o f  a thermal power station to be established near Slavutich/^ in order to take up the 
shortfall o f the lost electricity production when Chernobyl is finally closed.
Unfortunately attempts by the West to shut down Chernobyl became a slow  
drawn-out campaign, which led to growing disillusionment on both sides. To the Ukraine, 
Chernobyl represented a lifeline in monetary terms to retaining independence. For 
example, under the Soviet regime, the Ukraine was allocated an extra $2.6 million in 1991 
to deal with Chemobyl.^^ In 1992 (after independence) the West designated $27.7 million 
in funds for the same purpose.^^
As Chernobyl supplied only 5-7% o f  the Ukraine’s electricity, it is not surprising 
that the Ukrainian Government was accused o f “holding the international community to 
ransom.” ®^° Yevgeny Adamov, Russia’s Minister o f Atomic Energy, has suggested on 
Ekho Moskvy Radio, that attempts by the Ukraine to obtain additional international 
finance could be qualified as “nuclear blackmail.” ®^^ Even if  there had been an element o f  
coercion involved, without the financial aid from the international community the Ukraine 
would not have been in a position to safely decommission Chernobyl.
Parishkura, K., and Vershilla, R., ‘Chernobyl Atomic Power Station to be Closed Down,’ Segodnva, 14 
April 1995, p 3.
^ Kapelyushny, L., ‘Ten Years with Chernobyl,’ Izvestiva. 23 April 1996, p 5.
^ Op. cit. p 5.
Clark, V., ‘Pledge on Chernobyl Closure,’ The Observer. 21 April 1996, p 20.
Reuters in Moscow, ‘Moscow accuses Ukraine of Blackmail over Chernobyl,’ The Guardian. 12 May 
1998, p 16.
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Health After Chernobvl
Introduction
It is estimated that ten million people have been affected by the Chernobyl 
accident in some w ay/ The effects on the general health o f those living in the worst 
contaminated areas o f Belarus and the Ukraine have already reached catastrophic 
proportions. The impact on health appears to be worse than even the most pessimistic 
forecasts given in the mid to late 1980s. As radiation illnesses can take several years to 
become evident, the long-term prospects for health in “the high radiation regions are sadly 
poor.”® The following paragraphs will initially draw attention to the plight o f  a growing 
number o f  sick children. The fate o f  the clean-up workers at the Chernobyl Plant will then 
be discussed, as both categories have suffered from high doses o f radiation and have 
incurred some o f the worst side-effects.
Special Case - Children
The accident at Chernobyl has affected children’s health to varying degrees. Vast 
numbers become ill from minor ailments more often, and take much longer to recover 
owing to low immune systems. More worryingly, many children now suffer from 
potentially fatal cancers which were almost unheard o f  prior to the Chernobyl incident. As 
an indication o f the severity o f the problem, o f  a 50,000 child population in Chernigov 
(Ukraine)® (Map 4, p 47), it is estimated that five out o f  every six children have some 
form o f illness related to Chernobyl radiation. Official figures show 2,500 children are 
suffering from blood diseases, a fourfold increase since the explosion, 7,000 have severe 
stomach complications (a tenfold increase), while at least 4,500 are known to have 
impaired thyroid functions."  ^There is a similar situation in Polesye, Belarus (Map 3, p 46),
‘ 50^ General Assembly of the United Nations. September 1995. In: Tucker, A., ‘The Fallout from the 
Fallout,’ The Guardian. 17 February 1996, pp 12-16.
 ^ Shcherbak, Y.M., ‘Ten Years of the Chernobyl Era,’ Scientific American. April 1996, pp 32-37.
 ^ Chernigov is 40 miles east of Chernobyl.
‘World in Action,’ TVS, The Forgotten Children. 5 April 1993.
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as 50-70% o f children have health problems, ranging from common illnesses to 
tuberculosis.®
Belarus, suffering the highest levels o f contamination, has witnessed a very sharp 
increase in cancers, especially thyroid cancer. There are over 2,000 reported cases in this 
region, 20% o f which are children.® Table shows the increases amongst children
within different districts o f  Belarus.® Gomel has been the worst affected, with 71 recorded 
cases by mid-1992. This is not surprising when it is considered that 20% o f  children have 
been subjected to radiation in excess o f  200 rems, with another 5% receiving over 1000 
rems.® Ironically, Leonid Ilyin (Director o f the Institute o f Biophysics, Moscow) stated 
that there would only be 30 additional cases amongst the whole population o f the Gomel 
area over the next 35 years.^
Table 1 - Incidence of Thyroid Cancer in Children in Belarus. 1986-1992
In : Pryde, P.R. Environmental Resources and Constraints in the 
Former Soviet Republics, Westview Press, Oxford, 1995, p 181.
Region o f  
Belarus
1986 198
7
198
8
198
9
199
0
199
1
1992* Total
Brest 0 0 1 1 6 5 5 18
GOMEL 1 2 1 2 14 38 13 71
Grodno . 1 1 1 2 0 2 6 13
Mogilev 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 4
Minsk District 0 1 1 1 1 4 4 12
Minsk City 0 0 1 0 5 2 1 9
Vityebsk 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 4
Total 2 4 5 6 29 55 30 131**
First six months o f 1992.
The World Health Organisation reported that by April 1993 the total had 
increased to 168 children, and by December 1993 to 196.
 ^ Rich, V., ‘Concern Grows over Health of Chernobyl Children,’ New Scientist. 21 April 1990, p 23.
® Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, p 181.
 ^ Op. cit. p 181.
® Marples, D., ‘Chernobyl Four Years On,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 2, No. 16, 20 April 1990, p 52.
 ^ Marples, D., ‘Narodichi Raion in Distress,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 1, No. 23, 9 June 1989, p 10.
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Tamara Bialakaya, medical researcher in Minsk, estimates that all Belarus children 
have received at least 10 gray o f  radiation since 1986/° This is 100,000 times more than 
encountered as background radiation per annum." The Russian claim that the childhood 
thyroid cancers were linked to a lack o f  iodine in the soil and water supplies no longer has 
any credibility when such damaging statistics have been provided.’®
A  rapid increase in thyroid cancer appears to be a harsh reality o f radioactive 
iodine-131 contamination. Keith Baverstock,’® claimed that there were over 800 children 
in the FSU suffering from this form o f cancer by lOOb.’"’ He predicts that an additional
16,000 children will contract the disease within the next 40 years.’® In comparison, there 
were only 154 cases o f  thyroid cancer amongst children in the United Kingdom between 
1962 and 1992.’®
Those most at risk were the children o f pregnant women at the time o f  the 
accident, along with babies and toddlers in the 0-3 years age range. The risk o f these 
children developing cancer during their lifetime is 700 times greater than normal.’® It is 
predicted that between 4,000 and 8,000 are likely to fall ill.’® At least 10% will die,’^  while 
the survivors will require lifelong medication. In contrast, prior to the Chernobyl incident, 
the chance o f developing thyroid cancer amongst this age group would be one in a 
million.®”
Many o f these cases possibly could have been prevented if stable iodine tablets 
had been issued more rapidly to deter the intake o f  radioactive iodine 131 by the thyroid.®’ 
Children appear to be more susceptible to iodine 131 and other radioactive isotopes than
Rich, V., ‘Concern Grows over Health of Chernobyl Children,’ New Scientist. 21 April 1990, p 23.
Op. cit. p 23.
Perera, J., ‘Chernobyl Clean up casts a Political Shadow,’ New Scientist. 15 July 1989, p 28. Also: 
Marple, D., ‘A Retrospective of a Nuclear Accident,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 2, No. 16, 20 April 1990,
p 18.
Keith Baverstock is a radiation scientist working for the WHO.
Patal, T., ‘Iodine First Aid is Not Enough,’ New Scientist. 27 April 1996, p 7.
" Op . cit. p 7.
‘Child Cancer Rises After Chernobyl,’ The Guardian. 25 March 1995, p 12.
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Farihall, D., ‘Funds are sought for Cancer Battle,’ The Guardian. 13 April 1990, p 16.
Op. cit. p 16.
WHO Report. Quoted in : Tucker, A., ‘The Fallout from the Fallout,’ The Guardian. 17 February 1996,
pp 12-16.
Iodine tablets were given to five million Russians during 1986, but they were not issued until four days 
after the accident. Some did not receive tablets in the Bryansk Region for two months, owing to 
distribution problems. By this time damage had already occurred as iodine 131 has a half life o f eight 
days. In: Patel, T., ‘Iodine First Aid Not Enough,’ New Scientist. 27 April 1996, p 7.
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adults. In general, a growing child is more vulnerable to radiation, as its cells are dividing 
at a much more rapid rate than those o f  an adult. In the case o f thyroid cancer, the smaller 
size o f  the gland means that children receive proportionately higher doses than adults. 
Very young children are at even greater risk, owing to the potential contaminated milk 
intake o f each child.
The treatment o f thyroid cancer generally differs between Western and Eastern 
Europe. In the West, the whole thyroid is surgically removed to prevent any secondary 
cancers. Usually, in the East only partial thyroidectomies are performed, increasing the 
risk o f recurrence. This approach has probably been adopted because the authorities 
cannot afford the drugs which all patients would have to take for the rest o f their lives. 
One month’s supply o f  Thyroxin would cost $5-6 per person.®® As very few children 
contracted thyroid cancer before the Chernobyl accident,®® it is not known how this drug 
would affect them on a long-term basis. The drug could potentially cause other problems 
in later life.
The cost for the health care o f  these children is constantly increasing. The Vienna 
Conference o f 1996 jointly organised by the European Communities , and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, ^  appealed for fonds to help the 800 reported 
thyroid cancer sufferers. It estimated that a mere £30,000 was required.®"’
Other types o f cancer have also increased since the Chernobyl accident. While 
leukaemia rates in adults have been lower than anticipated, there has been an increase in 
children, indicating yet again that the young are more vulnerable to radiation than adults.®®
Between January and April 1990, the town o f  Slavutich (40 miles north-east o f  
Chernobyl) reported 13 cases o f childhood leukaemia.®® Clinic 14 in Kiev was treating 30 
new cases in the first six months o f  1989.®® According to Dr. Sergei Gololubov, under 
normal circumstances, taking into account that Kiev has 540,000 children, there should be
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
^ Professor Yevgeny Demidchik of the Thyroid Tumour Centre, Minsk, stated there were only 20 cases 
of thyroid cancer amongst children in Belarus between 1966 and 1986. In: ‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ 
Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Fairhall, D., ‘Funds sought for Cancer Battle,’ The Guardian. 13 April 1996, p 16.
Op. cit. p 16.
Marples, D., ‘Chernobyl Summer 1990,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 2, No. 26, 29 June 1990, pp 14-17. 
Chemobvl. Channel 4, 16 April 1994.
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a maximum o f 20 cases annually/® In the ten years after Chernobyl, there were 542 
reported childhood leukaemia cases in the Ukraine/^ Between 1981 and 1986 there were 
only 59 documented cases.®”
Today Dr. Alexandra Demenuk®’ is becoming increasingly concerned about the 
number o f children under five years o f age who are falling ill with leukaemia. She 
believes, “these cases o f leukaemia are determined genetically, which suggests that the 
parents themselves were exposed.”®® If this is true the peak death rate vfill not be reached 
for several generations.®® Dr. Alexander Rykhlya®"’ believes, “as time passes the medical 
aftermath will become worse.”®®
There is also growing evidence o f  increased birth defects in the FSU. Since the 
Chernobyl accident there has been a 40% increase in the incidence o f  birth defects in 
Belarus.®® It has become the leading cause o f infant mortality in the region. The situation 
will probably continue to deteriorate, as biochemical screening o f pregnant women has 
not been available since 20 December 1992, owing to lack o f finance.®® The situation is no 
better in the Ukraine : 13 out o f every 100 new-born children have some kind o f  
deformity.®®
The latest controversial research linking genetic fingerprints o f  parents subjected 
to radiation from Chernobyl with genetic mutations in their offspring suggests that all 
children have a twofold increase o f  being bom with a defect.®  ^Researchers from Leicester 
University (Alec Jeffrey), the Russian Academy o f Sciences (Y. Dubrov), and the 
Belomssian Research Institute for Radiation Medicine evaluated the DNA fingerprints o f  
79 families in the Bykhov, Cherikov and Krasnopolye regions o f  Belams by using a
^ Chemobvl. Channel 4, 16 April 1994.
Kapelyushny, L., ‘Ten Years with Chernobyl,’ Izvestiva. 23 April 1996, p 5.
Op! cit. p 5.
Dr. Alexandra Demenuk is Head of the Blood Transfusions at the First Children's Clinic in Minsk.
Mather, I., ‘Chernobyl Blights new Generation,’ The European. 5-11 November 1993, p 3.
It is believed that Chernobyl related diseases will continue over the next 7-10 generations, 
approximately 200 years. In : Tetushkin, Y., ‘The Genetic Consequences of Chernobyl will increase for 
200 years,’ Kommersant Dailv. 25 April 1998, p 11.
Dr. Alexander Rykhlyn is the Director o f International Scientific and Technical Co-operation.
Mather, I., ‘Chernobyl Blights new Generation,’ The European. 5-11 November 1993, p 3.
Marples, D., Radio Free Europe. Vol. X, No. 4, 16 February 1993, p 4.
Op. cit. p 4.
^ Lavrov, S.B., ‘Regional and Environmental Problems of the USSR,' Soviet Geographv. Vol. 31, 1990, 
pp 477-499.
Edwards, R , ‘Mutation Rates Doubled in Chernobyl Children,’ New Scientist. 27 April 1996, p 6.
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forensic technique developed by Alec Jeffrey o f Leicester University. For a family to 
qualify for the experiment, both parents were required to have lived in the Belarus Region 
since the Chernobyl accident and to have had a child /between February and September 
1 9 9 4  40 A control o f 105 uncontaminated couples in the United Kingdom w as used as a 
comparison.
If this analysis is correct, Yuri Dubrov o f the Vavilov Institute o f General 
Genetics believes, “the study provides the first experimental evidence that gene line 
mutation rates in humans can be increased by ionising radiation.”"”
Special Case - Clean-up Workers
The clean-up workers or ‘liquidators’ at Chernobyl experienced the highest 
exposure to radiation levels. 600,000 men worked at the disaster Site, predominantly 
between 1986 and 1989."^ ® It is very difiScult to monitor the casualties amongst these men, 
as they have dispersed throughout the FSU after returning home from duty. To date 
there is no complete register o f these men, making it impossible to quantify the problem."’® '
Clean-up workers were called up for 180 days in total. During 1986, when 
radiation levels were at their highest, men were only allowed to work for one month 
before taking leave. In 1987 this increased to two months and, 1988-1989, three 
months."" In theory these workers were volunteers, but they have been described by 
Pimenov, himself a ‘liquidator,’ as part o f a “voluntary compulsory procedure.”"’® Each 
worker was allocated iodine-bromide tablets"’® and issued with a work sheet to record 
radiation doses, while working shifts at the reactor site. Radiation doses were not 
accurately measured : therefore they could not be accurately recorded. Army recruits who 
removed debris from the reactor roof did not even have radiation badges."’® Their
Radford, T., ‘Chernobyl affects Children’s Genes,’ The Guardian. 25 April 1996, p 12.
Edwards, R , ‘Mutation Rates Doubled in Chernobyl Children,’ New Scientist. 27 April 1996, p 6.
Marples, D., ‘Chernobyl - Summer 1990,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 2, No. 26, 29 June 1990, pp 
14-17.
Op . cit. p 15.
^  Illesh, A., ‘What became of Ryazan’s Chernobyl Clean-up Victims?’ Izvestiva. 26 April 1994, p4.
Kilesso, N., ‘Everyone Dies Alone,’ Moskovskv Komsomolets. 24 August 1994, p 4.
Ironically, if  Chernobyl had occurred after 1993 these men would not have been issued with iodine 
tablets as the only plant which produced the appropriate ingredients was closed down in August 1993 
owing to high pollution levels during production. In : Aderekhin, A., ‘It has been Decided to Close 
Russia’s only Iodine Plant,’ Izvestiva. 17 August 1993, p 4.
Edwards, M., ‘Living with the Monster, Chernobyl,’ National Geographic. Vol. 86, No. 2, August
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superiors estimated the dose, which always fell below 25 roentgens/® For those who did 
have badges, it would sometimes take only a matter o f  minutes for this level to register, 
but the level o f 24.9rem. was the highest allowed to be recorded. This “administrative 
dose” meant that workers did not have to be replaced and that the authorities did not have 
to provide an extra 500 roubles per month for each person who registered over 25rem."^  ^
Official radiation figures were only taken at the end o f  a worker’s shift. No other 
measurements were taken while resting in living quarters, which initially were only tents 
erected in close proximity to the reactor.®” In total it is estimated that at least 250,000 
liquidators have reached their maximum lifetime radiation limits.®’ The only way in which 
to determine actual doses received is an expensive test on a sample o f tooth enamel.®®
In 1989 a new level o f 35 rems for a lifetime radiation exposure (based on 70 
years) was established®® in Russia. If this figure is deemed to be a guide to determine 
which areas are safe for habitation, it follows that the majority o f clean-ttpworkers will 
suffer from some form o f radiation-related illness in the future.®"’
In April 1991, four different sources predicted various death rates amongst the 
clean-up workers. Leonid Ilyin (Chairman USSR Committee for Radiation Safety) only 
quoted attributable deaths as those which occurred within the first few days o f  the 
accident. According to his official figures, 28 men died o f  acute radiation exposure and 
three as a result o f  extensive bums or falling debris.®® Yuri Shcherbak believes the death 
toll amongst the clean-up workers to be a minimum o f 7,000.®®
1994, pp 101-115.
^ Kilesso, N., ‘Everyone Dies Alone,’ Moskovskv Komsomolets. 24 August 1994, p 4.
Op. cit. p 4.
^ Illesh, A., ‘What Became of Ryazan’s Chernobyl Clean up Victims,’ Izvestiva. 26 April 1994, p 4. 
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Hearst, D., ‘Chernobyl Effects not Properly Studied,’ The Guardian. 6 February 1996, p 10.
Marples, D., ‘The Debate over Radiation Exposure in the Ukraine,’ Report on the U SSR  Vol. 1, No. 
40, 6 October 1989, pp 20-21.
Over the last fifty years the “safe” level of radiation for any given person has declined considerably. 
The maximum Soviet permitted dose per adult was 50 ro^gens per annum in 1949 when the first nuclear 
test was conducted. This fell to 25 roentgens by the late 1950s. Today the level is 0.5 roentgens. 
International scientists believe the limit should be lowered even further to 0.1 roentgens per annum as it 
is maintained that there is no completely harmless radiation dose. In ; Yemelyanenkov, A., ‘Radioactive 
Contamination knows no Bounds,’ Moscow News. 14-20 April 1995, p 11. and Radford. T., ‘No Safe 
Radiation Level,’ The Guardian. 16 October 1995, p 6.
Stein, G., ‘Controversy over Chernobyl Mortality Figures,’ Report on the USSR Vol. 3, No. 22, 31 
May 1991, pp 13-17.
On. cit. p 14..
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A. Chemosenko, a senior scientist at Chernobyl, believes the figures fall between
7,000 and 10,000,®® but admits that his estimates are subject to a number o f qualifications. 
The Chernobyl Union, which was set up to aid clean-up workers, also suggests 7,000 
fatalities, and that there is a minimum o f  50,000 men suffering fi*om radiation sickness.®®
Up to 2,000 o f the clean-up workers have been located in the Ryazan Province 
(Russia). It is estimated that, by the end o f the twentieth century, only one-quarter o f  
these men will still be alive. ®^ While some o f  the deaths already recorded in this region 
have been due to an increase in lung, bladder and kidney cancers, 58%®” have been 
suicides (especially alcohol ; poisoning).
Alexander Ivanovich Pimenov is the Chairman o f the Chernobyl Union. The Union 
works to secure budget fimds for the clean-up veterans. It helps to obtain medical 
privileges and in general gives assistance to the workers and their families. The 
Government has tried to ease the burden o f the veterans by providing allocated funds.
However, “barely half o f  the benefits and special dispensations established are actually
available.”®’ For example, one o f  the State benefits consisting o f  15 roubles per month®® is 
no longer paid monthly. It can only be claimed on a quarterly basis. Therefore, by the time 
the recipient obtains his or her pension the value has decreased considerably owing to 
rapid inflationary trends. Some victims are not receiving any o f  their rightful 
compensation. In the Tulsky Regions, monetary benefits have not been received since 
August 1995.®® They appear to be “the forgotten heroes o f the disaster.”®^
In theory, the Government provides each worker with money valued at seven 
times the minimum wage.®® However, in order to live at a basic level, Pimenov believes 
these men should be allocated 20-30 times the minimum wage.®® Unfortunately, at the end
Stein, G., ‘Controversy over Chernobyl Mortality Figures,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 22, 31 May 
1991, pp 13-17..
^ Op. cit. pp 14.
^ Kilesso, N., ‘Everyone Dies Alone,’ Moskovskv Komsomolets. 24 August 1994, p 4.
°^0p . cit. p 4.
Vasinsky, A., ‘Chernobyl, The Last Special Dispensation,’ Izvestiva. 9 September 1995, p 5.
Tolz, V., ‘This Week,’ Report on the U SSR Vol. 2, No. 36, 7 September 1990, p 3.
Hearst, D., ‘Chernobyl effects not Properly Studied,’ The Guardian. 6 February 1996, p 10.
Op. cit. p 10.
^ Kilesso, N., ‘Everyone Dies Alone,’ Moskovskv Komsomolets. 24 August 1994, p 4.
Op. cit. p 4.
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o f the day the main burden still falls upon the family. (It should be noted that the official 
poverty line in 1989 was 75 roubles per month).®®
Many clean-up workers will not die directly from radiation exposure, but it is 
believed that problems will arise owing to immune system alterations.®® In the long-term, 
individuals appear to be much more susceptible to illnesses ranging from severe cardiac 
conditions to tonsillitis. “Chernobyl Aids” may lead to premature ageing and an “overall 
reduction in life span.”®^ Doses o f 100-200 rads could shorten life by six-seven years.®”
While some ailments, such as leukaemia, have not been quite as prevalent as 
initially feared amongst clean-up workers,®’ the outlook remains uncertain. Murray 
Feshbach, an expert in the field o f  Russian-Soviet demography^ has estimated that the 
death rate amongst these men will be 46% higher than under normal circumstances.®® It is 
also estimated that the long term disability figures o f  this human sector will be 270% 
higher than the national average.®®
Conclusion
The health prospects o f people living in the FSU, especially those affected by 
radiation in the Ukraine and Belarus, are very grim. Children and clean-up workers are 
two elements within society which appear to have suffered the most. The most 
devastating problem amongst children is in the form o f thyroid cancer (and leukaemia).®"’ 
In 1990, Gorbachev issued a special decree to aid children’s health, stating that all young
Peterson, D.J., ‘Living Conditions. Some Observations,’ Report on the USSR No. 52, 29 December 
1989, p 18.
^ Shcherbak, Y., ‘Ten Years of the Chernobyl Era,’ Scientific American. April 1996, pp 32-37.
® Quoted by : K.K. Dushutin, Deputy director of Scientific Technical Centre of Pripyat Research and 
Industry Association. In : Marples, D., ‘Chernobyl - Summer 1990,’ Report on the USSR Vol. 2, No. 26, 
29 June 1990, pp 14-17.
™ Marples, D., ‘Chernobyl - Summer 1990,’ Report on the USSR Vol. 2, No. 26, 29 June 1990, pp 
14-17.
2' For every 200,000 liquidators, scientists expected an additional 200 cases of leukaemia. This does not 
appear to have occurred. In : Fairhall, D., ‘Funds Sought for Cancer Battle,’ The Guardian. 13 April 
1996, p 16.
Stein, G., ‘Controversy over Chernobyl Mortality Figures,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 22, 31. 
May 1991, pp 13-17.
Bateneva, T., and Chechin, O., ‘Thousands Living in Chernobyl Region, Feel Victimised anew in 
1998,’ Izvestiva. 25 April 1998, pp 1-2.
The rapid growth of cancers after the Chernobyl accident could partially explain the 12% increase 
of terminal cancers between 1980 and 1990. In: Golitsyn, G.S. ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS during 
the Transitional Period,’ RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 2, No. 2, 8 January 1993, pp 33-42.
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people within the contaminated areas should be given free school meals (uncontaminated 
food) and offered holidays away from the worst affected areas at special health farms/® 
Some children visit countries such as the United Kingdom for one month. It is believed 
that even four weeks in a clean environment’ can improve a child’s immune system for 
one-two years.®® Charities help support these visits, as each child, even when taking into 
account specially agreed terms, costs a minimum o f  £210 for airfare and insurance 
(1990).^
The clean-up workers are supposed to receive special pensions to help alleviate 
the problems which they are experiencing, but veiy little is forthcoming owing to the 
present dire financial situation in the FSU. The Chernobyl Union, while trying its best to 
help these men, only has limited resources to work with. In 1995 the Union received
1,169,887,000,000 roubles from the authorities. While this appears to be a large sum o f  
money it estimated that 14,752,287,000,000 roubles were required to meet all its 
commitments.®®
The authorities obviously try to provide appropriate medical attention, but the 
economic transition has led to a sharp decline in general health services and medical 
supplies, causing even greater suffering. Under the old regime, pharmaceutical costs were 
subsidised ; now each new state buys supplies at a much increased market rate. In 
Belarus, drugs cost at least 20 times the old price.®®* This has led to stocks o f  medical 
supplies dwindling by 50% in more recent years (1992-1993).®”
In 1993, Stephen Browne o f  the United Nations (UN) claimed that the Ukraine 
needed $800 million o f  medical supplies to treat its ailing population.®’ While the West 
does send aid to the FSU in the form o f  money, medical supplies and in some 
circumstances treats Soviet patients in its own hospitals, the negative trends in the health 
o f the population are not likely to improve for many years to come.
Rich, V., ‘Concern Grows over Health of Chernobyl Victims,’ New Scientist. 21 April 1990, p 23.
®® ‘More Chernobyl Children,’ Haslemere Herald. Vol. 101, No. 16, 23 October 1992 p 3.
®® Op. cit. p 3.
Morozov, A., ‘Overwhelming Majority of Clean up workers will be Disabled by 2000,’ Nezavisimava 
gazeta. 26 April 1995, p i .
 ^ Marples, D., Belarus,’ Radio Free Liberty. Vol. X, No. 4, 16 February 1993, pp 4-5.
Op. cit. p 4.
The Forgotten Children,’ World in Action. TVS, 5 April 1993.
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All o f these problems, coupled with a decrease in general living standards, have 
meant a negative population growth in some regions o f the FSU. The problem is severe 
enough for Marples to suggest,
“That the after-effects o f Chernobyl constitute a threat to the very 
existence o f the (Belorussian) Nation.”®®
Marples, D., ‘Belarus,’ Radio Free Liberty. Vol. X, No. 4, 16 Februaiy 1993, p 5.
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Chanter 5 
Can Health Statistics be Trusted?
Linking deteriorating health trends, especially deaths and cancer rates, to radiation 
accidents has been very controversial. Following the Chernobyl accident, newspapers in 
the West quoted attributable death figures, ranging from 6,500 to 1 million.’ Initially, 
Russia claimed that such high figures were just part o f “anti-Soviet hysteria in the hope o f  
driving a wedge in the Soviet Union’s relations with other countries.”® Whilst Russia 
accused the West o f  ideological propaganda, the West charged the Soviet Government 
with covert secrecy. The whole incident was viewed during a time o f  cold war rhetoric, 
therefore any quoted figures were questionable. It has been claimed by David Kydd,® that 
a decade after Chernobyl, “we seem to have got nowhere”  ^in establishing the real figures. 
Ironically, now it seems to be elements within the Former Soviet Union, who are
y
quoting high deteriorating health statistics. The initial confusion after Chernobyl, the 
fi-agmentation o f the Soviet Union into new states and surprisingly the West’s reluctance 
to accept Soviet statistics, worked well to hide the truth about the health o f the Soviet 
people. The following paragraphs will look at why health figures have either been 
distorted or mistrusted and who may have benefited fi’om such apathy towards the 
problems faced by thousands o f Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.
Past Soviet regimes have always withheld information linked to the nuclear 
industry, whether commercial or military, in the interests o f national security. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that health statistics linked to the Chernobyl accident were very limited. 
Not only did the Soviet authorities want the West to perceive that they were in control o f  
the incident, but they did not want to alarm their own people.
 ^ Dailv Telegraph. 26 August 1986 - 48,000 deaths. London Evening Standard. 26 August 1986 - 50,000 
deaths. Times. 23 August 1986 - quoted a report claiming that Russia believed eventual death rate to be 
6,530 over the next 70 years. New Scientist. 11 September 1986 - 1 million people would develop cancer, 
500,000 fatal. In: Mould, R.F., Chemobvl. the Real Storv. Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1988, p 82 
 ^ Quote by B.N. Yeltsin at the 8* Congress of the German Communist Party. In : Tn the Stmggle for a 
Peaceful Future,’ Pravda. 4 May 1986, p 4.
 ^ David Kydd is a spokesman for the IAEA..
Kydd, D., ‘Observance of the Tenth Anniversary of the Chernobyl Disaster,’ Keesing Records of World 
Events. Vol. 42, No. 4, April 1996.
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Glasnost, which had only been in place for a few weeks, faced one o f  its first 
major challenges when the explosion at Chernobyl occurred. Initially, as information was 
not forthcoming, the concept o f  “openness” failed. However, within a relatively short time 
information directed at the West became more available. Unfortunately, the Soviet people 
were still being denied such frank access at this stage. In terms o f health, Soviet articles 
maintained there was no risk to the public. A. Ye Romanenko, Ukrainian Republic 
Minister o f Health, stated, “The radiation level is not dangerous to health and is not an 
obstacle to regular labour activity.”  ^This helped imply that the only additional deaths that 
could occur would be amongst the initial emergency clean-up force, not the general 
public. The public was sceptical o f  such statements; some are reported to have taken 
home remedies to protect against radiation, several poisoned themselves, while queues 
developed at railway stations and airports to leave the perceived contaminated areas.®
With the progression o f time, it became obvious to people in the worst affected 
areas that not only had the extent o f the radiation contamination been kept a secret, but 
the health o f  the general public was suffering, especially with regard to thyroid cancers 
amongst the younger elements o f  their communities. In 1989, it was discovered by the 
Supreme Commission on Chernobyl that top-level Government policy had dictated that 
doctors could not directly link illness with exposure to radiation.® To this day, some still 
maintain that when the population as a whole is taken into consideration, the cancer rate 
has not risen and that there is no concrete evidence which can be linked to the Chernobyl 
accident. Professor Leonid Ilyin from the Institute o f Biophysics in M oscow is an 
advocate o f  this theory.® He does, however, maintain there are enormous effects on health 
which can be linked to the fear o f  radiation (radiophobia).^ He refers to social stresses 
which, when hyped up by media coverage, lead to an increase in heart, neurological and 
physiological conditions.’” Shcherbak suggests that this mental trauma does exist and has 
given rise to “psychological syndromes comparable to that suffered by veterans o f  wars in
 ^ Itkin, V., and Chernenko, L., ‘Chernobyl Facts and Fantasies,’ Selskava zhizn. 8 May 1986, p3.
® Op. cit. p 3.
 ^ Stein, G., ‘Controversy over Chernobyl Mortality Figures,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 22, 31 May 
1991, pp 13-17.
 ^ ‘History of the Atomic Bomb,’ Horizon. BBC, 8 June 1995.
 ^ Of 260,000 people examined since Chernobyl, 40% were suffering from physiological and social 
problems. In ; Edmonson, B., Nuclear Energv after Chernobvl. Graham and Trotman, London, 1988, p 
35.
‘History of the Atomic Bomb,’ Horizon. BBC2, 8 June 1995.
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Afghanistan and Vietnam.”“ He claims that the cause is a lack o f information and 
Government propaganda covering the Chernobyl incident. He does not, however, deny 
the claim that falling health trends can be directly linked to radiation exposure. The Health 
Minister for the Ukraine, Y. Spizhenko, also attributes some o f  the country’s health 
problems to stress, but firmly believes most o f the problems to be linked to the after 
effects o f  Chernobyl although he “cannot prove conclusively that this was the case.”^^ It 
should also be pointed out that similar ailments could have also been caused by growing 
unemployment and poverty during recent years in the F SU.
An element o f denial exists regarding health problems within the Soviet Union, 
which to a certain extent is still to be expected, especially as in hindsight “it is now clear 
that the political repercussions from Chernobyl accelerated the collapse o f the Soviet 
Empire.”^^ The health statistics linked to Chernobyl became variable figures, depending 
on their source and for whom they were intended.
The official response from the West has changed in recent years. Initially, high 
expected mortality rates were readily accepted, possibly in order to condemn the Russian 
nuclear energy industry. However, some reports have indicated that “the overall 
consequences and long-term effects within the Soviet Union would be much less serious 
than many fe a r e d .T h is  report, commissioned by the IAEA, became widely accepted by 
the major Western governments involved. The change o f  opinion appears to have 
corresponded with new evidence coming out o f Russia, indicating that thyroid cancer was 
rapidly increasing beyond any previous expectations. The IAEA paper is reported to have 
disregarded the new evidence, even though twenty slices showing thyroid cancer cells had 
been sent to America for independent analysis.
The report did not accept that this type o f cancer could be evident within such a 
short time. Most previous information, supposedly linked to radiation-induced cancers, 
had been based on the aftermath o f Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945). Victims who
Shcherbak, Y., ‘Ten years of the Chernobyl Era,’ Scientific American. April 1996, pp 32-37. 
Marples, D., ‘Eurochernobyl 2 ,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 13, No. 22, 31 May 1991, pp 18-19. 
Shcherbak, Y., ‘Ten years of the Chernobyl Era,’ Scientific American. April 1996, pp 32-37. 
Tucker, A., ‘The Fallout from the Fallout,’ The Guardian. 17 February 1996, pp 12-16.
Op. cit. p 13.
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eventually contracted thyroid cancer did not show symptoms o f the disease until two 
decades after the original contamination had occurred^^
The report did not take into account that the Chernobyl incident released radiation 
which was up to 300 times greater than the Hiroshima Bomb/^ and that the Soviet people 
had probably been eating contaminated food. A  British radiation biologist, Dr. John 
Hopewell, had also seen reports o f children with impaired thyroid functions as early as 
1988. While he stated this could lead to thyroid cancer at a later date, he believed that risk 
to be relatively low.^® Unfortunately, by 1992, sixty cases o f  thyroid cancers had been 
reported in Belarus alone.
The West perceived these figures as an indication o f  either:
a) - A  fabrication o f the evidence in order to gain sympathy and eventually
financial aid by promoting hysteria.
or
b) - Harvesting - which is an apparent increase because o f  better 
surveillance. After Chernobyl, high tech equipment was brought in to 
search for those suffering from cancer. The impending results were just 
revealing cases which were already th e r e .T h is  argument is flawed, as^  
many o f the cases found in Belarus were discovered during routine school 
check-ups. This was a system which had been in operation for many 
years.^ ^
Anti-nuclear groups had always stipulated that the Soviet authorities had covered 
up the true facts in order to “minimise their own culpability and to revitalise the nuclear 
power in d u s tr y .I t  could be suggested that the governments and the nuclear industry in 
the West have adopted a similar philosophy. All nuclear states have the problem o f
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Op . citi
Tolz, V., ‘This Week,’ Radio Liberty. No.21, 25 May 1988, p 6.
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Op. cit.
And Tucker, A., ‘The Fallout from the Fallout,’ The Guardian. 17 February 1996, pp 12-16.
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Stein, G., ‘Controversy over Chernobyl Mortality Figures,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 22,31  
May 1991, pp 13-17.
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convincing the public that nuclear energy is safe and will have no detrimental effects on 
health. It was hoped that the disaster would be, “buried in blurred statistics and 
contradictory arguments from which its legacy would never be convincingly unravelled.
Reports o f increasing thyroid cancer due to radiation contamination (iodine 131) 
could lead to repercussions in the West, especially in America and the United Kingdom. 
In the case o f  the United States, the US Government is facing civil actions by citizens 
who believe their health has been adversely affected by fallout from the Hanford Reactors 
in south-east Washington, and the Nevada Test sites. (During the 1950s experimental 
plumes o f  iodine 131 were released in order to research how well they could be tracked.) 
The Government and the industry have hampered investigations into these areas, as an 
unfavourable conclusion could result in vast compensation claims.^ ^^  Similar cases are 
pending in the United Kingdom as cancer clusters (usually leukaemia which has also been 
associated with radiation) are evident around Sellafield,^  ^Dounraey and Hinkley Point.
In November 1995, radiation experts gathered in Geneva to discuss thyroid cancer 
and radiation. The conference led by Williams and Baverstock now believes that there is a 
connection between the two variables and that the time spent arguing over the causes o f  
this cancer could be fatal for many children.
While the West now generally accepts the statistics on thyroid cancer, there is a 
new very similar debate over the effect o f  radioactive caesium on the people o f  the FSU. 
Yet again they will have to convince a sceptical West.
Many now associate higher cancer rates in the FSU with radiation from 
Chernobyl, but it still remains difficult to calculate the actual cancer and death rates 
attributable to the disaster. If the accident had occurred in the West, more people
Tucker, A., ‘The Fallout from the Fallout,’ The Guardian. 17 February 1996, pp 12-16.
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
Cancer clusters are evident at the Sellafield Plant, United Kingdom. Several studies believe that 
radiation is responsible. The Gardner Report 1994 links fathers who worked at the plant with leukaemia 
in their children. More recent studies dismiss tliis evidence especially The Health and Safety Executive 
Report, which believes that researchers are still no closer to finding the causes of these cancers. The 
Committee of Medical Aspects of Radiation (COMARE) 1996 stated that radiation discharges at 
Sellafield were not responsible for cancer clusters. In : ‘Nine o ’clock News.’ BBCl, 20 October 1994; 
Mihill, C., ‘Researchers best Efforts fail to link Cancer Cluster to Radiation,’ The Guardian. 15 July 
1996, p 2; and Brown, P., ‘N-Plant Cancer Clusters Unsolved as link with Fathers Discounted,’ The 
Guardian. 18 August 1994, p 6.
‘Fallout from Chernobyl,’ Horizon. BBC2, 26 March 1996.
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suffering from cancer may have survived, especially children. The medical profession in 
the FSU is in rapid decline. There is a lack o f equipment, drugs and blood to deal with 
these illnesses. In 1994 75%^  ^o f all children with (leukaemia) cancer in the FSU died. (In 
the United Kingdom 70% o f  children would have survived the same disease).^^ According 
to the British Medical Journal in Western Europe, 60% o f children survive all forms o f  
cancer thanks to modem tr e a tm e n t.I f  the child survives for over five years, this 
increases to 92%.^° As the FSU is suffering economic, political and social turmoil, the 
population is experiencing an increasingly unhealthy lifestyle. Many people have 
insufficient nutrition, eat contaminated food and suffer from stress caused by 
unemployment and housing problems. Many people consume excessive quantities o f  
alcohol and to b a c c o .I n  the case o f  the latter, it is now suggested that 15% o f  all 
childhood cancers (in the West) can be linked to fathers who smoke tobacco.^^ Some 
studies still conclude that there is no link between cancer and radiation, and that cancer, 
“might be a result o f an unidentified infection.”^^
As there is no definite link between cancer and radiation and there are several 
other possible causes o f the disease, it is not surprising that several governments and 
nuclear industry agencies have manipulated the situation arising from Chernobyl to 
disguise the real problem. In the long-term, the only ones who will really suffer are the 
people o f  the Former Soviet Union.^^
‘Chernobyl,’ Channel 4 News. 26 April 1994.
^ Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 1996.
^ Mihill, C., ‘More Children Survive Cancer,’ The Guardian. 15 July 1994, p 6.
Op. cit. p 6.
People who smoke 20 cigarettes a day for 30-40 years expose themselves to more than one in a million 
chance of contracting cancer every time they smoke a cigarette. This risk is perceived to be under control 
of the individual; this is not the case with nuclear energy. In : Price, T., Political Electricitv : What 
Future for Nuclear Energy?. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp 287-291.
Research conducted by Dr. Tom Sorohan at Birmingham University, based on 40 years of data collated 
at Oxford. In ; Radford, T., ‘Child Cancers linked to Smoking by Fathers,’ The Guardian. 17 December 
1996, pp 1-2.
Mihill, C., ‘Cancer Clusters not Radiation,’ The Guardian. 28 March 1996, p 9.
There have been many studies which have linked leukaemia to a multitude o f sources, ranging from 
viral infections to raw sewage. In June 1999, Toronto University in Canada claimed that there was a link 
between the disease and magnetic fields. According to Dr. L. Green, those at greatest risk were children 
under the age of six years. As there are so many different causes of leukaemia, it will always be hard to 
accurately estimate the number of cases directly attributed to radiation sources in the CIS. In : 
Derbyshire, D., ‘Toddlers Living near Electricity Cables at risk from Leukaemia,’ Daily Mail. 16 June 
1999, p 37.
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Chanter 6 
The Future of Nuclear Energy towards the Millennium
The Chernobyl accident raised problematic issues associated with nuclear energy. 
However, it is unlikely to prevent the expansion o f the industry in the future. It has merely 
slowed the process, as governments throughout the FSU consistently maintain that at 
present there is no other economically feasible alternative. A. Yablokov, former Minister 
for the Environment, questions this interpretation, suggesting that the nuclear industry is 
still surrounded by a series o f misguided myths associated with the safety o f the ‘new’ 
updated nuclear plants.^
After the accident at Chernobyl, it was confirmed that any future nuclear plant 
would be o f the W E R  design^ and that the existing RBMK types would be upgraded (in 
an attempt to dispel fears associated with nuclear energy). Ironically, o f the 165 
operational violations in 1991, only 58 incidents occurred at RBMK plants, the remaining 
107 were faults in the W E R  design, especially the W E R  2 3 0 / suggesting that both 
designs can be dangerous.^  ^According to Yablokov it would require $26 billion and take 
ten years to bring existing nuclear plants up to the safety standards operating in the West.^ 
Even then plants would not be safe, as only 30-40% o f accidents are due to technological 
faults.^
As most accidents are not due to technical problems, safety standards at nuclear 
plants should be paramount. Unfortunately, such standards continue to be compromised. 
Reports indicate that plants are poorly organised and staffed by unqualified workers who 
regularly have to rely on substandard materials.^ With the collapse o f  the Soviet Union,
 ^ Yablokov, A., ‘Today’s Nuclear Myths,’ Izvestiva. 30 September 1994, p 5.
 ^ Future development in nuclear energy was to be based on the W E R  design, as costs and construction 
times were less than those of the RBMK design. The decision was taken prior to the Chernobyl Accident. 
In : Petrosyants, A., (Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nuclear Energy), ‘The Utilisation of 
Nuclear Energy,’ Soviet News. 29 April 1987, p 150.
 ^ W ER -230 is the oldest Soviet water pressurised reactor. The US Energy Department study found they 
posed a significant safety risk. In : Hearst, D., ‘New Chernobyl as old Reactors Restart,’ The Guardian.
26 October 1995, p .l.
^ Rich, V., ‘Soviet Blackout looms as Nuclear Disquiet Deepens,’ New Scientist. 11 August 1990, p 20.
 ^ Yablokov, A., ‘Today’s Nuclear Myths,’ Izvestiva. 30 September 1994, p 5.
 ^ Op. cit. p 5.
 ^ Mihalisko, K., ‘Journalist who Forewarned of Chernobyl Disaster has Doubts about Power Plant
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the problems have worsened. The new independent states have found that many o f the 
original workers, who tended to be o f Russian origin, have returned home, leaving only 
basic-trained technicians behind. This is exacerbated by very low wages, which tend not 
be paid on a regular basis.
Unstable working conditions may have been responsible for the suspected theft o f  
two fiiel rods from the Ignalina Plant in Lithuania^ during 1992. Unpaid wages throughout 
several regions o f the FSU have also led to nuclear technicians taking industrial action. 
After three months without a paid salary, staff at the Sosnovy Bor Plant attempted a 
sit-in; some even resorted to a hunger strike.  ^As the plant is only 70 kilometres from St. 
Petersburg, and does not yet even have an outer containment shell, any accident could 
have catastrophic consequences.
The Russian State Committee responsible for ensuring safety standards in nuclear 
energy plants has had budget cuts in recent years. For example, the supervisory 
committee which once consisted o f  17 staff diminished to 12 in 1993; in response to a 
15% fall in Government expenditure. " The rate o f pay yet again is very low. It has been 
suggested that directors o f some nuclear plants may pay a “little extra” to these influential 
people in order to overlook safety violations and allow plants to continue operating.
The Russian Government was due to resume its nuclear programme in 1993; 31
new reactors were to be built by 2010, doubling the nuclear capacity. It was maintained
that there was no alternative, especially as under normal conditions such plants polluted
the atmosphere 10 times less than thermal power stations o f  similar generation capacity.
Yablokov disputes claims that nuclear energy is economically viable and cleaner in the
long term. He says first, that even a fully operational station emits some short-lived
radioactive gases. Secondly, the operational life o f  a plant is 30-40 years,. the
A
decommissioning and dismantling o f  a plant costs as much as its construction. Thirdly, the 
cost o f storage and the potential for future contamination o f plutonium (toxic waste) is 
Safety,’ Radio Liberty. No. 19, 12 May 1988, p 12.
® Bridge, A., ‘Lithuanians take pride in Reactor,’ The Independent. 26 April 1996, p 10.
® Meek, J., ‘Safety Fear as Nuclear Staff Strike,’ The Guardian. 7 December 1996, p 17.
Op. cit. p 17
“ Kolesnikov, A., ‘End of Atom Control,’ Moscow News. 9 July 1993, p 7.
Op. cit. p 7.
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp 36-56.
Petrosyants, A., ‘The Utilisation of Nuclear Energy, ’ Soviet News. 29 April 1987, p 150.
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extensive. Fourthly, there are costs attributed to clean-up programmes which take into 
account all social and medical problems after nuclear accidents. Finally there is also the 
cost o f  lost production in terms o f energy and land. "
Yablokov believes that Russia could rely more on gas turbine plants as an 
alternative to nuclear energy. In the long-run, it would be cheaper than upgrading existing 
nuclear plants as it would cost $6-7 billion (instead o f $26 billion to upgrade nuclear 
energy) and only take 5-6 years.A lthough this is perceived to be a less expensive option 
and a safer alternative, it would be o f  no benefit to Russia’s nuclear industry. Yablokov is 
convinced “that the construction o f new atomic power stations is being promoted by 
departmental and corporate interests and is not in Russia’s long-term national interest.”"
Although there are potential alternatives to nuclear energy, the industry will 
continue to grow as there are monetary benefits from domestic and international markets. 
The Russian nuclear power engineering sector exports its services and products to over 
26 countries throughout the world." Facilities are at present being built in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Cuba, India and China. In 1995, exports linked to the nuclear industry 
represented 5% o f  the federal revenue, raising $1.2 billion."
Yablokov, A., ‘Today’s Nuclear Myths,’ Izvestiva. 30 September 1994, p 5.
Op. cit. p 5.
Op. cit. p 5.
Voskresensky, G., ‘Minatom Broadens Co-operation as Demand for Nuclear Power Plants Grows,’ 
Novosti Dailv Review. 3 April 1996, p 10.
Op. cit. D 10..
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Is Nuclear Energy safe in Western Europe?
While Western Europe has reason to be fearfiil o f the Russian RBMK design, it 
should be noted that nuclear reactors throughout the world are also potentially 
dangerous.
It is now feared that accidents could occur across Europe as a ‘design fault’ has 
been discovered in the steel domes o f pressurised water reactors (P\\Tl). Hairline cracks 
have appeared in the domes, allowing radioactive steam to filtrate into other sectors o f  
the system.^® This fault was discovered during a routine check at the Lyon Reactor 
(eastern France) in 1991.^  ^ The steel-nickel alloy domes, although in theory able to
withstand excessively high pressures during explosions (i.e. accidents), have become
}
vulnerable to corrosion. France in total has 52 reactors o f  the PWR design.^  ^Up to 60% 
are showing signs o f  deterioration. One new dome takes three to four months to replace 
at a cost o f 50 million fi-ancs.^ Monique Send, a nuclear physicist, believes maintenance 
costs to be too great and that it would almost be cheaper to build new reactors. "^  ^France 
relies on nuclear energy for 75% o f its electricity; therefore this could present problems 
for the fiiture.^  ^The same design can be found in Switzerland(3), Germany(14), Spain(7), 
Belgium(7), Sweden(3) and Netherlands(l). Six faults have been discovered in German 
plants. The other reactors have yet to be checked.^^
In total, 31% o f electricity was produced by nuclear energy in western Europe in 
1992." Safety levels at nuclear plants are reported to meet guidelines: however, these 
vary from country to country. Despite a Single European Market, nuclear safety standards 
differ throughout the Union. For example, France has a lower safety level than the United 
Kingdom as exposure rates are based on adults, not children, (as in the UK)."
Rollnick, R., ‘Leaks alert over Nuclear Power Plants,’ The European. 7-10 January 1993, pp 1-2. 
Routine checks occur on average once every ten years.
Rollnick, R., ‘Leaks alert over Nuclear Power Plants,’ The European. 7-10 January 1993, pp 1-2.
Op. cit. p i .
Op. cit. p i .
International Atomic Enerev Agencv. Vienna, Press Release, 18 April 1990.
Rollnick, R., ‘Leaks alert over Nuclear Power Plants,’ The European. 7-10 January 1993, pp 1-2 
Nuclear energy production also varies between countries. For example in 1996 France produced 78.2% 
of nuclear power, Germany 12%, Belgium 60% and the Netherlands 4%. In: The Eurona World vear 
Book. Gresham Press, London, 1999, pp 627-1971.
^ Rollnick, R., ‘Leaks alert over Nuclear Power Plants,’ The European. 7-10 January 1993, pp 1-2
8 2 -
There are concerns that standards' may be breached as more plants become 
privatised to cut running costs, i.e. (AWE, Aldermaston UK). This could have been 
exacerbated by the European Community decision to end all nuclear subsidies in 1998." 
According to Steve Thomas o f Sussex University, this, combined with the age o f the 
Dungeness ‘A ’ plant, could lead to its closure by the turn o f the century.^®
Nuclear energy in the West has maintained that cancer, especially leukaemia, 
clusters around nuclear plants are not connected to the industry  ^ In the UK, reports 
(Gardner Report (1994), Roman Report (1993)), have suggested a link between workers 
and their families and increased cancer rates. However, this cannot be definitely proven." 
In contrast, the Comare Report (The Committee o f  Medical Aspects o f  Radiation in the 
Environment) has stated that radiation discharges cannot be held responsible for 
incidences o f  childhood leukaemia (Sellafield UK) and that some form o f  infection 
possibly linked to raw sewage is responsible." With such conflicting views, it is not 
surprising that test cases in the High Court have failed in the United Kingdom.
If nuclear energy is safe, it should be asked why in the UK, British Nuclear Fuels 
(BNFL) at Sellafield operate a “no fault” compensation scheme.^  ^ Since 1982, workers 
who contract cancer have been able to make a claim against the industry. Thirty workers 
have received payments, which total in excess o f £1 million, but owing to the scheme 
BNFL admit no liability,"
On health grounds, France appears to be “lulling people into a false sense o f  
security,”" with plans to distribute iodine tablets (known to protect the thyroid gland 
against radioactive iodine 131 exposure) to all those living within a five kilometre radius 
o f a nuclear power plant.^  ^When one considers that contamination from Chernobyl spread 
over 2000 km, this is totally inadequate.
‘South Today,’ Regional News. BBCl, 7 January 1993.
Op . cit.
Op. cit.
Mihill, C., ‘Cancer Clusters, not Radiation,’ The Guardian. 28 March 1996, p 9.
‘South Today,’ Regional News. BBCl, 7 January 1993.
Op. cit.
Duval, A., ‘Paris puts Faith in Nuclear Pill,’ The Guardian. 15 September 1996, p 12.
Science now suggests that iodine tablets are more successful if  they are taken prior to exposure. 
In : Patel, T., ‘Iodine First aid is not Enough,’ New Scientist. 27 April 1996, p 7.
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We can therefore see that Western Europe has similar problems with nuclear 
energy to those o f the FSU. Safety in nuclear energy throughout Europe should be taken 
very seriously. An accident in any part o f Europe could severely affect the rest o f the 
area. To help ensure standards, all reactors should meet recognised safety levels. With the 
end o f  the Cold War there is no need for one side to claim superiority over the other; both 
sides should work together to ensure the safety o f  the world population. This obviously 
includes the USA, which as the only remaining super power as well as a nuclear power, 
has witnessed accidents such as Three Mile Island in 1979."
There is even a difference of opinion between the USA and Western Europe (especially the United 
Kingdom) over the safety of nuclear energy. Richard Webb, American reactor physicist, claims that 
British Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGRs) could suffer a nuclear explosion on a greater scale than 
Chernobyl. British Nuclear Energy deny this. In : Milne, R., ‘AGR’s risk Chernobyl Style Explosion,’ 
New Scientist. 22 October 1988, pp 23-24.
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Part III 
The Military Nuclear Legacy
Chanter 7 
Semipalatinsk and Novava Zemlva
.
Introduction
The Arms Race is directly responsible for some o f the worst environmentally 
damaged areas in the World. In total there had been 2,169 nuclear weapon tests 
world-wide by 1995.' The Former Soviet Union was responsible for 936 o f these tests, 
predominantly at two ranges, Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya.^ This, combined with a 
series o f  secret cities designated for the development o f the nuclear bomb, nuclear storage 
sites and the illegal dumping o f  waste over forty years, has probably made radiation 
pollution the worst environmental problem faced by the Former Soviet Union today.
Under the Soviet totalitarian regime all aspects o f  the military nuclear programme 
were shrouded in secrecy. Retaining military parity and superpower status with the USA 
was paramount» Safety issues/standards which could have helped prevent environmental 
degradation and^declining health trends were blatantly disregarded causing the problems 
which the FSU vs witnessing at the and o f the 20'*' Century.
' Stccle. J., ‘Return o f the Nuclear N ightm are/ The Guardian. 10 June 1995. p 25. 
 ^ Op. cit. p 25.
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Nuclear Test Sites 
Semipalatinsk fSemey)
Semey, which is situated in north-east Kazakhstan, (Map 6, p 87) became the 
primary location for the Soviet nuclear weapons programme. The first bomb, nicknamed 
in the West Joe 1 , after Stalin, was detonated on 29 August 1949,^ a mere four years 
after Nagasaki and Hiroshima (1945). With the rapidly declining relationship between the 
two main super powers, this incident heightened Cold War tensions and initiated a 
40-year arms race, in an attempt to maintain the “balance o f  terror.”
Between 1949 and 1991, 467 bombs were detonated at Semey. '^ Until 1963, when 
the Limited Test Ban Treatv was established, all bombs were above ground, therefore 
atmospheric tests. Approximately 25% (118) o f  the total number o f bombs were classified 
as atmospheric.^ These caused the greatest damage to the environment and the 
population. The very first bomb released a radioactive dust cloud which passed over 
Semey, Ust-Kamenogorsk and Altai Krai.  ^ It is estimated that 100,000 people were 
contaminated.^ Over 40 years later (1992) soil samples taken at these locations showed 
radiation levels to be (up to) 2,000 times the norm.®
As these activities were military-based, therefore a well-guarded national secret, 
the local population was totally ignorant o f the situation. Until 1963, when atmospheric 
tests were halted, the military temporarily evacuated the relevant population while the 
explosions were carried out.  ^ No explanations were provided, and the population was 
oblivious o f  the dangers. The Soviet authorities always claimed the site to be safe, 
especially when testing only occurred underground. However, while they were safer, the 
underground explosions still caused shock waves, similar to earthquakes, which
 ^ B0hmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangefsk 
Counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, Oslo 1994, p 120.
“ Op. cit. p 120.
 ^ McElroy, C., ‘Forlorn Victims of Soviet Nuclear Tests,’ The Guardian. 19 March 1998, p 10.
® Martin, K., ‘Central Asia's Forgotten Tragedy,’ RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 3, No. 30, 29 July 1994, 
pp 35-48.
Op. cit. p 38.
® Op . cit. p 38.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press 
Oxford, 1993, p 202.
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measured up to six on the Richter scale."’ On many occasions radioactive clouds emerged 
through cracks in the ground, yet again causing atmospheric contamination. In theory, 
with the adoption o f  the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which limited the explosion 
yield to 150f^otonnes, the situation should have improved." However, as there was, on 
average, one blast per month in the region until the late 1980s, the radiation levels were 
always relatively high.‘^  For example, it is estimated that at least 1.3 million people still 
live in contaminated areas in Altai territories (Russia),'^ which were covered by 
radioactive fallout on at least 56 different occasions.
Many would argue that nuclear bomb testing has been totally unnecessary for 
many years. Scientists have had adequate information about its destructive properties for 
decades. This scenario could easily be accepted when, in the mid/late 1980’s, both Soviet 
and US officials witnessed nuclear tests at the Semey site and the Nevada Range (USA) in 
order to monitor and determine an accurate method o f  measuring blast which would be 
recognised by both s i d e s . I n  theory, this exercise was to enable the establishment o f a 
new treaty limiting the number and size o f  nuclear t e s t s . T h i s  may have been a 
prerequisite for the cessation o f  nuclear tests by the main political powers. However, if  
the Cold War had continued, it could have provided the opportunity for each side to 
accuse the other o f detonating bombs which violated the 1974 threshold treaty.
Health
Soviet records on health issues in radioactive contaminated areas have 
traditionally been secretive and poor. While this does make it difficult to directly link 
ill-health to radiation, it is apparent that the health o f  the population in the Semipalatinsk 
region is in decline. There are several indications o f  ill health. They are:
Martin. K.. ‘Central Asia's Forgotten Tragedy.' RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 3. No. 30. 29 July 1994. 
pp 35-48.
" Peterson. D.J.. Troubled Lands : The Legacy o f Soviet Environmental Destruction. W estview Press. 
Oxford. 1993. p 202.
O p. cit. p 203.
" Klimstov, V.. ‘Altai’s Radioactive remains after 40 years.' Rossiiskivc vesti. 22 October 1993. p 19.
"  Charles, D.. and Connor, S., ‘Seism ic m onitor Successfully M easures N uclear B last.' N ew S cien tist.
15 September 1988. p 30.
" Gorbachev indicated that both the US and Soviet Union should conduct only 2-3 tests per year with a 
power o f no more than one kilotonne. Radio Moscow 2. 11 June 1987.
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i) 'Semipalatinsk Aids’. It is estimated that 500,000 people in 
Semipalatinsk have been affected by severe radiation sickness/^ The 
symptoms that these people are showing are similar to that o f  the Aids 
virus, hence the name ‘Semipalatinsk Aids’.
As with most illnesses, the incidence o f the disease is correlated with the 
length o f time people have lived in the area and the proximity to the testing 
grounds. For example, the village o f Kainar, which is close to the test site, 
has a high rate o f  ‘Semipalatinsk Aids’. O f the 1029 patients examined 
between 1992 and 1993, 90% were diagnosed with the condition.
ii) Birth defects. Radiation can cause genetic DNA abnormalities. Hence it 
is not surprising that the region has a high percentage o f birth defects:
Since the nuclear tests began in 1949, one-third o f new-born babies have 
been d e f o r m e d . B y  1990, this had increased to 36%.^° For several 
decades, these deformed children have been sent to Clinic No. 4 for 
routine blood tests.^  ^ This could indicate that the authorities do have 
records o f  health issues linked to radiation; the findings have never been 
published. In 1989, the Semipalatinsk region also had the highest rate for 
infant mortality in the USSR.^^
iii) Cancer. The average national cancer rate o f  the Soviet Union in 1990 
was estimated as 129 per 100,000.^^ However, the incidence o f  cancer in 
the Semipalatinsk Region was found to be 70% greater than this in 1988.^ ^^
Overall the flare-up o f  oncological diseases is similar to data established 
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.^^ The cancer rates have therefore increased 
with time. For comparative purposes, the cancer rate in 1970 was 30%
Tolz, V., ‘Soviet Doctors say 500,000 affected by Semipalatinsk Test,’ Report on the U SSR  9 
November 1990, p 38.
Rollnick, R., ‘Soviet’s Deadly Legacy,’ The European. 5-11 March 1992, p 7.
McElroy, C., ‘Forlorn Victims of Soviet Nuclear Test,’ The Guardian. 19 March 1998, p 10.
Tolz, V., ‘Soviet Doctors say 500,000 affected by Semipalatinsk Test,’ Report on the U SSR  9 
November 1990, p 38.
Lavrov, S.B., ‘Regional and Environmental Problems of the USSR, A Synopsis of Views for the Soviet. 
Parliament,’ Soviet Geosraohv. Vol. 31, 1990, pp 477-499.
Rollnick, R , ‘Soviet’s Deadly Legacy,’ The European. 5-11 March 1992, p 7.
This Week Section, ‘Unhealthy Fallout,’ New Scientist. 26 August 1989, p 21.
Teplyakov, Y., ‘You’re still breathing,’ Moskovskive novosti. 4 March 1990, pp 8-9.
This Week Section, ‘Unhealthy Fallout,’ New Scientist. 26 August 1989, p 21.
Mirolevich, V., ‘About the Test Range,’ Izvestiva. 10 April 1990, p 4.
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above the national average.^ In total it is estimated that 100,000 people 
have died from radiation-induced cancer since 1949/^
iv) Other Health Problems. The region’s population also appears to be 
suffering from psychological and mental problems, which could possibly be 
linked to the fear o f  ill health caused by radiation. There are obviously 
many other factors which could be taken into consideration, but the fact 
remains that the Semey region has the highest suicide rate in the Former 
Soviet Unions The average suicide rate in the CIS is 45 per
100,000. In Semey this has reached 88 per 100,000.^^ Suicides are 
predominantly amongst young men. The worst-hit area is the Abay Region 
where 140 men committed suicide in 1990.^^
Semipalatinsk - Nevada Movement
The Semipalatinsk-Nevada Movement is regarded as a rare example o f  successful 
environmental activism in Central Asia. The Movement, founded by Olzhas Suleimenov (a 
writer) in 1989,^ obtained over one million signatures within its first year o f  existence, 
asking for the closure o f the nuclear test site.^  ^With growing nationalist tendencies within 
Kazakhstan, the Semipalatinsk Range became a “symbol o f  Russian abuse.”^^ This^in 
conjunction with Soviet financial problems and the agreed eventual move o f all nuclear 
testing to Novaya Zemlya, forced Gorbachev to announce a one-year moratorium in 
1990, with a view to total closure in the near future.^^
This Week Section, ‘Unhealthy Fallout,’ New Scientist. 26 August 1989, p 21.
Rollnick, R., ‘Soviet’s Deadly Legacy,’ The European. 5-11 March 1992, p 7.
^ Op. cit.. p 7.
Lavrov, S.B., ‘Regional and Environmental problems of the USSR, A Synopsis of Views from the 
Soviet Parliament,’ Soviet Geoeraphv. Vol. 31, 1990, pp 477-499 
Brown, B , ‘Semipalatinsk Test Site Finally Closed,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 37,13  
September 1991, pp 15-16.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, pp 202-206.
Brown, B., ‘Semipalatinsk Test Site Finally Closed,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 37, 13 
September 1991, pp 15-16.
Op. cit.. p 15.
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In 1991, Gorbachev announced that the military would conduct three more tests 
at Semipalatinsk prior to its closure. The Soviet government would give Kazakhstan five 
billion roubles in compensation and bring the closure date forward by one year to 1992.^ 
Initially the military wanted 27 tests during this transitional period and the compensation 
was to be a mere 250,000 roubles.^  ^ Of course, none o f this occurred, as the Moscow  
coup on 19-21 August 1991 intervened. With the formation o f  the CIS, the new Kazakh 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a decree permanently closing the test site on 29 
August 1991."  ^ Through extraordinary circumstances the Semipalatinsk-Nevada 
Movement has won its battle to close the test site. The Movement has since been in 
decline, especially after its head man was dispatched to Italy as an ambassador in 1996 by 
President Nazarbayev.
Brown, B., ‘Semipalatinsk Test Site Finally Closed,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 37, 13 
September 1991, pp 15-16.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destniction. Westview Press 
Oxford, 1993, pp 202-206.
Brown, B., ‘Semipalatinsk Test Site Finally Closed,’ Report on the USSR Vol. 3, No. 37, 13 
September 1991, pp 15-16.
McElroy, C., ‘Forlorn VictimscTSoviet Nuclear Tests,’ The Guardian. 19 March 1998, p 10.
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Conclusion
It is estimated that there are at least 700,000 ecological migrants from the 
Chernobyl area and the Semipalatinsk testing range.^  ^ Unfortunately, in the latter case, 
simply movmg from the site may not be adequate to prevent further radioactive 
contamination. Recent information has revealed that 38 nuclear explosions have occurred 
in Kazakhstan outside the Semipalatinsk Range. Seventeen tests took place in the Atyrau 
Province, and eight nuclear warheads have been exploded at a base in the Urals. The 
remaining 13 tests took place in Aktyubinsk, Akmolinsk and Mangistau,^^ all in 
Kazakhstan.
Many who moved from the region tended to migrate south. The population here 
now being affected by radiation plumes from the Lop Nor test site^ in the Xinjiang 
region o f China. China resumed nuclear testing at the site on 5 October 1993."^  ^ This initial 
bomb was approximately 95 kilotonnes,"’^  three times the size o f  the one used at 
Hiroshim a.China justified its refiisal to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 
claiming that its use o f  peaceful bombs will enable it to irrigate desert regions by creating 
a 500 mile underground canal from the Yarlung Tsangpo River to the Taklimakan Desert 
(the home o f the Lop Nor Site)."" It also believes that tests are needed to ensure the safety 
o f nuclear devices in the future.'’^
A  combination o f radiation sources in Kazakhstan suggest that the region will 
remain a dangerous area for many years to come. Unfortunately, an innocent population is 
having to deal with the consequences o f military actions during the Cold War. Even 
though the Semipalatinsk Test Site is now closed, the problem will live on for many 
generations to come.'’^
^ Beimet, O., ‘Millions cross ex-Soviet Borders,’ The Guardian. 23 May 1996, p 13.
Stefashin, O., ‘Nuclear Explosions in 27 places in Kazakhstan,’ Izvestiva. 28 October 1992, p 2.
Lop Nor test site is 1000 km east of Kazakhstan.
‘China Defies International Moratorium,’ BBCl News. 5 October 1993.
Op. cit.
Black, 1., ‘China Snubs World with Nuclear Test.’ The Guardian. 16 May 1995, p 13.
Fairhall, D., ‘Nuclear blasts to Irrigate the Desert,’ The Guardian. 15 May 1996, p 10.
China has approximately 300 nuclear devices.
Witli tlie unexpected closure of the site in August 1991, a 0.4 kilotonne nuclear bomb placed in an 
underground chamber in the Degelen mountains, near Semipalatinsk, during May 1991, has yet to be 
detonated. In 1994 a Russian/Kazakh group was working on defusing the problem. The longer the bomb 
is left the greater the chance of accidental deterioration. In: Martin, K., ‘Central Asia's Forgotten 
Tragedy,' RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 3, No. 30, 29 July 1994, pp 35-43.
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Novava Zemlva
Novaya Zemlya became the Soviet Union’s second nuclear test site by special 
decree on 31 July 1954/^ Owing to its remote location and limited population, the site 
was deemed more appropriate for testing larger nuclear bombs. Novaya Zemlya, which 
comprises two main islands and several small islands, became known as Installation 700 
on classified documents.^^  ^ Two test sites were established at Chernaya Bay (South) and 
Matotchin Bay (N orth ).T h e first detonation took place on the South Island, 100 metres 
below the surface on 21 September 1955.^®
From 1955 to 1990, a total o f  132 bombs were exploded, 86 atmospheric, 43 
underground and 3 underwater. While this represents only a small fraction o f  the number 
o f explosions at Semipalatinsk, the yield produced at Novaya Zemlya equates to 94% o f  
all the Soviet Union’s test explosions^^ (Tables 2-3 pp 94-95). The world’s most powerful 
hydrogen bomb was detonated here on 30 October 1961.^  ^ With a yield o f 58 
m egatonnes,it was 6,000 times greater than the explosion at Hiroshima in 1945.^^
Although from 1964 explosions were detonated 300-400 metres underground, 
radiation leaks occurred on many occasions.^^ This  ^combined with contamination from the 
86 atmospheric explosions, has severely affected the fragile ecosystem o f the northern 
territories. The original Nenets population, which had lived there from 1877, was 
deported to the mainland in 1955. These people were traditional reindeer herders and 
have been severely affected by these Soviet military activities. In 1959, the life expectancy 
o f the Nenets people was 61 years,- by 1990 this had fallen to 45 y ears. In
B0hmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkangefsk 
Counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, Oslo, 1994, pp 120-128.
^ Korsunsky, L., ‘Novaya Zemlya. An Arctic Chernobyl,’ Chaspik. 10 November 1992, p 3.
B0hmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkangefsk 
Counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, Oslo, 1994, pp 120-128.
Op. cit. p 120
Korsunsky, L., ‘Novaya Zemlya. An Arctic Chernobyl,’ Chaspik. 10 November 1992, p 3.
Op. cit. p 3.
B0hmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources o f Radioactive Contamination in Munnansk and Arkangefsk 
Counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, Oslo, 1994, pp 120-128.
Op. cit. p 120
The explosion at Hiroshima in 1945 was 15 kilotonnes.
These radiation leaks are known as ‘Ventilation’.
Lavrov, S.B., ‘Regional and Environmental Problems of the USSR, A Synopsis of Views from the 
Soviet Parliament,’ Soviet Geographv. Vol. 31, 1990, pp 477-499.
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Table 2
Atmospheric test explosions over Novaya Zemlya (1957-1962).
No. Date Time Explosive No. Date Time Explosive
force force ,
1 24th of September 1957 09.00 Mt -size 41 27th of October 1961 08.30 Small
2 6th of October 1957 08.58 Unknown 42 30th of October 1951 08.33 58 Mt
3 10th of October 1957 06.55 Small 43 31st of October 1961 08.29 Several Mt
4 23rd of February 1958 Mt -size 44 31st of October 1961 08.38 1 Mt
5 27th of February 1958 07.59 Mt -size 45 2nd of November 1961 08.41 Small
6 27th of February 1958 10.24 Large 46 2nd of November 1961 - Small
7 14th of March 1958 - >1 Mt 47 4th of November 1961 07.20 Several Mt
8 20th of March 1958 - Small 48 5th of August 1962 09.09 30 Mt
9 22nd of March 1958 - Medium 49 10th of August 1962 09.00 1 Mt
10 20th of September 1958 - 50 20th of August 1962 09.02 Several Mt
n 30th of September 1958 07.50 Medium 51 22nd of August 1962 09.00 Mt
12 30th of September 1958 09.55 Medium « 52 25th of August 1962 09.00 Several Mt
13 2nd of October 1958 08.00 Moderate 53 27th of August 1962 09.00 Several Mt
14 2nd of October 1958 09.01 Moderate 54 1st of September 1962 12.40 -
15 5th of October 1958 06.00 55 2nd of September 1962 - Mt
16 10th of October 1958 07.51 Large 56 8th of September 1962 10.18 Mt-size
17 12th of October 1958 07.53 Mt -size 57 15th of September 1962 08.02 Several Mt
18 15th of October 1958 07.51 Mt -size 58 16th of September 1962 10.59 Several Mt
19 18th of October 1958 09.51 Mt -size 59 18th of September 1962 08.29 A few Mt
20 19th of October 1958 07.27 Small 60 19th of September 1962 11.00 20 Mt
21 20th of October 1958 08.20 Mt -size 61 21st of September 1962 08.01 A few Mt
22 22nd of October 1958 08.21 Mt -size 62 25th of September 1962 13.03 25 Mt
23 24th of October 1958 08.03 Mt -size 63 27th of September 1962 08.03 > 30M t
24 25th of October 1958 08.20 Large 64 7th of October 1962 16.32 Medium
25 10th of September 1961 09.00 Several Mt 65 22nd of October 1962 09.06 Several Mt
26 10th of September 1961 - Some Kt 66 27th of October 1962 07.35 Medium
27 12th of September 1961 10.08 Several Mt 67 29th of October 1962 07.35 Medium
28 13th of September 1961 Small 68 30th of October 1962 - Medium
29 14th of September 1961 09.56 Several Mt 59 1st of November 1952 06.30 Medium
30 16th of September 1961 09.08 Medium 70 3rd of November 1962 08.31 Medium
31 18th of September 1961 07.59 Mt 71 3rd of November 1962 - Medium
32 20th of September 1961 08.12 Mt 72 18th of December 1962 - Medium
33 22nd of September 1961 08.01 Mt 73 18th of December 1962 - Medium
34 2nd of October 1961 10.31 Mt 74 20th of December 1962 Medium
35 4th of October 1961 07.30 Several Mt 75 22nd of December 1952 - Medium
35 6th of October 1961 07.00 Several Mt 76 23rd of December 1962 11.15 A few Mt
37 8th of October 1961 - Small 77 24th of December 1962 10.44 Unknown
38 20th of October 1961 Several Mt 78 24th of December 1962 11.11 20 Mt
39 23rd of October 1961 08.31 25 Mt 79 25th of December 1962 13.35 A few Mt
40 25th of October 1961 08.33 1 Mt
Mt=megaton(s) Source: Soviet Nudeor Weapons Databook, Volum IV
Kt=klloton(s)
Page 9 4
o
>
!Â
O  <jj
I s
LU 4 :
^  bd hz 
lh ^  en *=3* o  tnLA <T 00 <f tn
s .
♦-* 4-< bif +-'•*-*•♦-' +-'
fO bd bd bd Sd bdm o  m
00 T^ 00
or -
0
1 
§
JdOO
-Q
Ci
E
fO
3
H
mcbcn'<rcn(7^<T'<rmmobml A L n i A O O O r - r - o o o i t n
rj o  fri rsî u> oô ld «—o « —o o <5>o *—o t “ 'T- o  o
E
<u
N
m
>%
5
O
z
co
tf)co
în
-2
CL
X
Ci
ÿ
*oc
3
0
B
Ci
1 
3
a
m
Q
O
Z
o
>
8
a
X
LU
Cl
E
r~-
?£
I l
C l 'Ü  
3  0
^  \£Z*/» 4- '
%— <Ji
oor -
e n
oo
K QJ
JD
E
Ci
en o  oo en en
& 0 .  
<C VA
Oi Ci 
Xî
% ê
O  O
o  o  o  o
s z  - C  x :  X
o  00  «“1— 04 T— «—
04
OOen
<u
X
o
t ;
O
X
X
moom  ^  
m  •— 0 0  co u-en en d> ^  
-Q w
I I I
te 'tr tz  O  O  O
X X X  +- +-* 00 m in r -  04 CM
O'co 
^ 00
3
en
3  m
< s
0 3
" 2 6
04 O'
O
O
CD
i l
(U
X
£ou<u
û
M-
o
X
<u
X
o
u
o
<r
04
Q
C0
1
3
S
bovr,
3
O«A
en o «—0 4 <riAvoo'0 0 cnc0 T-o4 fA^r - r M f M O v i o 4 0 4 0 4 o s i 0 4 0 4 m f n m m f n
CT*
^{losjT^'cnT— f - L n r o o 4 < T s r o 4 ' r t ' " < r O ' v —
cno-enoixenencncncnencncnencn 
LAiALnooinininLnininiA en en tn 
O' tn rj- o  O' tn tn to to ^  <r oo t— 04 O' o o o » - - o o o o o » ~ o o » — 0 0
î i l
E  g  w
I I I
« Ô olA
te
Q
Oz
o  o  ^  
t î
00  O ' r -  
f— 04 04
0010 en 
en ^r— en
ÛJ v_
X  OJ
11
1 2
IIO' «—
«— 04 
v_ O' ÛJ en 
X
II
<u
m
O '
- p
V -  CT» ÛJ <i—
II
•Çf
m  t%— QJ
B E
C n < O n O < ^Ci
g g
tA <U3  X
e n  o
O
0 0 0 0 0 b  o  
x x x x x  — x  +-.4-> +-» +-' 4-' l_ to
O' 00 04 O ' en C m  'T—
040 4^ — 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4  
04
o 4 m ^ t n o ' O O c n T —o  m  «g- m  to
to
O 'en
ÛJ
X
o
U
O
»♦—
o
X
o
04
co
S
I
s i
a s
ÛJ o  
1 1
1993, this had fallen even further to 40 years/^ The rapid decline in health has been linked 
to the population’s main diet o f reindeer. The staple food o f reindeer comes in the form o f  
lichen and berries. Both o f these food supplies in the Soviet Arctic were severely affected 
by radioactive fallout. Hence, as the human population is the head o f  the food chain, 
health has been adversely affected.
The Leningrad Radiation Hygiene Research Institute has been monitoring the 
region since the 1960s in order to ascertain the implications o f  atmospheric testing. 
Statistics indicate that the reindeer herders, now populating the Kamchatka Peninsula, 
have the highest rate o f death from oesophageal cancer in the world, while liver cancer 
has increased tenfold.^  ^ In the village o f  Khailino, 80% o f  the population are reported to 
have stomach cancer. Overall, taking into account all forms, the cancer incidence in the 
region is three times the national average. Other health problems have become evident in 
the form o f chronic lung disease and TB.^^
Other sources o f  radioactive contamination in the region are caused by the Soviet 
Union’s systematic policies o f dumping nuclear waste at sea. (Barents, Kara, Japanese, 
Baltic Sea and Pacific Ocean) Maps 7, 8 & 9, pp 97-99, show the locations o f  illegally 
dumped liquid and solid waste around Novaya Zemlya. The Northern Fleet and the 
Murmansk Shipping company have sunk 17 vessels containing waste, 13 nuclear reactors 
from submarines, 6 with fuel aboard and three nuclear icebreakers in the Barents and Kara 
Seas.^  ^ In total Russia admits to dumping twice as much radioactive material at sea as all 
the other nuclear countries put together.^ According to the Yablokov Report in 1993, 2.3 
million curies o f radioactive contamination have been caused by these activities.^^ On 
several occasions M oscow has claimed that a lack o f  storage space for waste has meant 
that there was no viable alternative. This Government line was given to the Japanese
^ ‘Early Morning News,’ BBCl. 9 August 1993.
Rich, V., ‘Cancers abound near Soviet Union Test site,’ New Scientist. 2 September 1989, p 23.
^ Op. cit. p 23.
Pykhteyera, 1., ‘Stepchildren of the North,’ Pravda. 29 January 1992, p 3.
Massey Stewart, J., The Soviet Environmental Problems. Policies and Politics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992, p 228.
B0hmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkangefsk 
Counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, Oslo, 1994, pp 120-128.
^  Mackenzie, D., ‘Russia owns up to sea burial for nuclear waste,’ New Scientist. 17 April 1993, p 5.
^ Ivanov, I., ‘Nuclear Waste Dumped into Sea for Decades,’ The Moscow Tribune. 3 April 1993, p 2.
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Map 8
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Source : Bohmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Source of Radioactive Contamination 
in Murmansk and Arkangefsk Counties,’ Bellona Report Vol. 1, 1994.
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Government as late as October 1993, when Tokyo protested at nuclear liquid waste being 
poured into waters around the island o f Hukkaido.^^
One o f the most controversial nuclear threats in the region comes in the form of  
the Komsomolets, a Soviet ‘invincible’ weapon which sank on 7 April 1989. (The 
submarine was designed to cruise and launch nuclear missiles from a depth o f  1000 
metres, twice the depth o f its Western counterparts.®^) A design fault, poor safety 
standards and electrical equipment which was insufficiently fire resistant insulated, have 
been blamed for the loss o f  the vessel and its 42 crew.®  ^ Unfortunately, when the 
submarine hit the seabed an ordinary torpedo exploded ripping open the hull.®^  This could 
enable the salt water to erode the metal at a more rapid rate, possibly allowing greater 
radioactive contamination. In total, the Komsomolets contained 116 kilograms o f reactor 
grade uranium and 6 kilograms o f  plutonium 239 in the warheads.^® I. Spassky, one o f  the 
designers o f the submarine, became head o f the salvage party shortly after the accident. 
Two plans were put forward.
1) Dutch contract - The Hermoud Floating Complex
This would enable the Komsolets to be lifted from the sea bed at a cost o f
$220 million over a time span o f at least two years.
2) Russian Bid - This would enable the submarine to be lifted at a cost o f
30 million roubles (1990) in three months.
Spassky opted for the Dutch contract as the floating complex would be handed 
over to Russia after completion. A  salvaging business in theory could therefore be set up 
to earn hard currency. Unfortunately, not only was the cost prohibitive, but the Dutch 
company was not prepared to guarantee the safe retrieval o f  the submarine.
In 1993 T. Borisov replaced Spassky; he favoured pumping “special” substances 
into the holes in the submarine to prevent radiation leaks. However, this may have created
^ Gurdon, H., ‘Japanese nuclear warning to Russia,’ Daily Telegraph. 20 October 1993, p 12.
‘Russia’s Deep Secrets,’ Horizon. BBC2, 10 June 1995.
^ Rich, V., ‘Design Fault Sank Soviet Submarine,’ New Scientist. 26 May 1990, p 18.
‘Russia’s Deep Secrets,’ Horizon. BBC2, 10 June 1995.
Kurchatov, A., ‘Nuclear Arsenals for Terrorists,’ Moscow News. 5-11 September 1996, p 12. 
Op. cit. p 12.
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an explosion aboard the vessel/^ In 1994, Rear Admiral Tolokonnikov suggested 
removing the bow o f the vessel; this required a specialised saw from a Dutch company at 
a cost o f 25 million florints. The vibration from the saw could have set o ff a nuclear 
reaction/^ The most recent solution was to build a sarcophagus over the bow section/"^ 
The problem with this is twofold: underwater currents could destroy the tomb from above 
and the Komsomolets could collapse under the weight/®
A  solution will be required sooner rather than later. Although liigher radiation 
levels are only found in the immediate vicinity, this could change rapidly, affecting the 
ecosystem, especially marine life. If this did occur Northern Russia and Norway would be 
the most affected nations. In the latter case, the Norwegian fishing industry, which 
provides valuable income to Norway, could be adversely affected. Contaminated food 
could be found throughout the world as 80% o f  Norwegian fish is exported.^®
While the majority o f  radiation in the waters o f Northern Russia is largely caused 
by military actions in and around Novaya Zemlya, there are other sources. It is believed 
that radioactive pollution from the Chelyabinsk and Tomsk Reprocessing Plant may have 
reached Northern Waters via the River Ob, which eventually flows into the Kara Sea.^  ^
The Sellafield and Dounreay Plants in the United Kingdom may have also adversely 
affected the region via the flow o f the Gulf Stream.^  ^ P. Strand, a Norwegian research 
scientist, fears contaminated icebergs could be drifting further West into the Northern 
Atlantic region during springtime, potentially affecting a greater area than originally 
thought.^^
Kurchatov, A., ‘Nuclear Arsenals for Terrorists,’ Moscow News. 5-11 September 1996, p 12.
Op. cit. p 12.
‘Russia’s Deep South,’ Horizon. BBC2, 16 January 1995.
Kurchatov, A., ‘Nuclear Arsenals for Terrorists,’ Moscow News. 5-11 September 1996, p 12. 
Teplyakov, Y., ‘Black April,’ Moscow News. 6-13 December 1992, p 9.
Bohmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangel’sk 
Counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, Oslo, 1994, p 142.
Op. cit. p 142.
Edwards, R., ‘Hot ice could contaminate fish,’ New Scientist. 2 March 1996, p 7.
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Secret Cities
During the 1940s and 1950s, several nuclear military-industrial complexes were 
developed throughout the Former Soviet Union. Such sites as Chelyabinsk 65 and
Krasnoyarsk 26 became vast secret cities, which, under the pretence o f  national security 
during the cold war era, totally ignored environmental and health concerns. Today, the 
once secret cities have opened their gates to the world, showing the real legacy o f  the 
Soviet Nuclear Programme.
Chelyabinsk 65 (also known as Chelyabinsk 40 or Sorokovka).
Chelyabinsk 65 is 70 km north o f Chelyabinsk (Map 10 p 103) in the Southern 
Urals (2,000 km east o f Moscow). Until recently it was known as Postal District N o.65 
and merely called “the City,” by the 80,000 population.^ Built in the mid 1940s, it was one 
o f the key facilities for the production o f plutonium for nuclear warheads.
During its peak capacity, the Mayak (Beacon) Production Association operated 
five separate reactors.^ The first one, which took 18 months to build, started operating in 
1948. The plutonium generated by the reactor was used to detonate the first Soviet 
atomic bomb in 1949/ The second reactor (65 megawatts) led to the design o f the 
RBMK nuclear units. In historical terms, Chelyabinsk 65 has played a major role in the 
future o f nuclear energy; unfortunately it has also caused irreversible environmental 
devastation in the Urals.
Contamination o f the area can be linked to three different incidents. Firstly, the 
irresponsible dumping o f untreated nuclear waste directly into the Techa River between 
1947 and 1952. It was hoped that the river would carry radioactive waste to the ocean.
 ^ Veitch, A., ‘The Earth Supplement,’ The Guardian. June 1992, pp 26-27.
 ^ Perera, J., ‘Soviet Plutonium plant killed Thousands,’ New Scientist. 20 June 1992, p 10. 
 ^ Paine, C., ‘Secret Cities,’ New Scientist. 22 July 1989, p 22.
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therefore diluting it to so-called safe concentrations/ However, with a weak current (0.3 
km per hour)® the radioactive elements contaminated surrounding areas to such an extent 
that several villages had to be evacuated.® During this period, the Techa River is estimated 
to have accumulated two million curies o f radiation as a direct result o f an additional 76 
million cubic metres o f liquid waste entering the water system.^ The nuclear waste 
contaminated fresh ground water and to a certain extent the Arctic Ocean, as the 
radioactive elements have eventually flowed into the sea as originally expected.^
Realising these early mistakes, waste was later stored underground in 
double-walled stainless steel tanks. Unfortunately, a refrigeration failure led to one o f  
these tanks exploding in September 1957, creating the second major release o f  radiation 
contamination.^ Statistics linked to this incident, known as the Kyshtym Accident, vary 
dramatically. However, it is now accepted that the incident released 20 million curies o f  
radiation (half the strength o f Chernobyl) over an area o f between 15,000^° and 23,000" 
sq. km.
In response to the accident, 10,000 people were evacuated by the authorities." 
While 600 were moved within seven days, the remaining 9,500 had to wait between 8 and 
22 months before relocation." The fir^ t evacuees received up to 52 rems o f  radiation each. 
The internationally agreed exposure limit to the general public is 0.5 rems per year.^  ^
According to the Soviet regime decontamination measures over the following twenty 
years still only allowed 80% o f the affected lands to be restored to economic activity.’15
The third incident occurred in April/May 1967, when Lake Karachai (Map 10, p 
103), one o f eight artificial reservoirs (covering 25 hectares) used to store radioactive
" Azhgikhina, N., ‘Kyshtym; Effects of Nuclear Mishap Persist,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 13 May 1996, p 
6 .
 ^ Op. cit. p 6.
® Piyde, P., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, p 70.
 ^ Perera, J., ‘Soviet Plutonium plant killed Thousands,' New Scientist. 20 June 1992, p 10.
 ^ The River Techa is a tributary of the River Ob which flows to the Arctic Ocean.
 ^ MacKenzie, D., ‘Shades of Chernobyl Stalk Tomsk,’ New Scientist. 17 April 1993, p 8.
Dickson, D., ‘Kyshtym, almost as bad as Chernobyl,’ New Scientist. 23-30 December 1989, p 3.
" Perera, J., ‘Soviet Plutonium plant killed Thousands,’ New Scientist. 20 June 1992, p 10.
Pryde, P., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, p 70.
Dickson, D., ‘Kyshtym, almost as bad as Chernobyl,’ New Scientist. 23-30 December 1989, p 3.
Op. cit. p 3.
Sagers, M.J., ‘News Notes,’ Soviet Geographv. Vol. 30, 1989, pp 512-520.
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liquid waste, dried out during a severe drought.’® Radioactive matter was dispersed by the 
wind over an estimated 2,700 sq. km.," home to 41,500 people." Lake Karachai has now  
been filled with rocks and soil. It was aimed to eventually seal the area with a concrete lid, 
but in 1991 a Government Commission established that this would, “threaten to 
exacerbate the leaching o f radioactive isotopes into the groundwater.”" Today, the area is 
now considered to be the most radioactive place on earth outside the reactor core.^ ® 
Radiation levels here are 2.5 times that o f  Chernobyl.^’
Since .1949, the Mayak operations have released 150 million curies o f  radioactive 
substances^^ into the natural environment. Those in close proximity to the closed city have 
received high doses o f  radiation, those further away have received smaller but constant 
doses throughout their lives. 80% o f the population knew nothing about the 
contamination until the glasnost era o f  1988,^ when it was acknowledged by the Soviet 
authorities for the first time at a conference in Japan.^  ^ However, it was obvious that 
something was wrong by the strange changes seen in the natural habitat and the failing 
health o f the residents in the Chelyabinsk Region.
The Environment
The natural environment surrounding Chelyabinsk 65 has been adversely affected 
by radiation. A  research station headed by Dr. Gennady Romanov was set up in Novoe 
Metlino^® over 30 years ago to study the side effects o f the contamination. Since 1956, his
Charles, D., ‘Counting the Cost of a Lifetime’s Radiation,’ New Scientist. 27 June 1992, p 7.
Pryde, P., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, p 70.
Perera, J., ‘Soviet Plutonium plant killed Thousands,’ New Scientist. 20 June 1992, p 10.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands: The Leeacv of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 149.
Veitch, A., ‘The Earth Supplement,’ The Guardian. June 1992, pp 26-27.
Op. cit. p 27.
According to a report from the Institute of Biophysics at the former Health Ministry in Chelyabinsk. In 
; Perera, J., ‘Soviet Plutonium plant killed Thousands,’ New Scientist. 20 June 1992, p 10.
Azhgikhina, N., ‘Kyshtym : Effects of Nuclear Mishap Persist,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 13 May 1996, p
6 .
This refers to the Kyshtym accident. In the West the accident was first made public by Zhores 
Medvedev in an article in the New Scientist. 4 November 1976. Many were sceptical o f the article and the 
severity of the incident until the Soviet acknowledgement in 1988. Zhores Medvedev later published a 
book Nuclear Disaster in the Urals. Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1979.
Novoe (New) Metlino is a new town created for the evacuees of Metlino after it was severely 
contantinated by the 1956 explosion, which contaminated the water supply.
- 105-
research team has identified cell mutations in small animals such as mice/® In general, 
larger animals have not been as severely Effected, for they are able to move further afield 
for their food and water. It was also observed that, in 1956, nearly all the pine trees in the 
area died, while the birch trees survived. Consequent studies have revealed that the birch 
tree can withstand twice as much radiation as the pine tree." Dr. Romanov hopes the 
research centre may become internationally respected in order to attract hard currency, 
which could be used to decontaminate the area^  ^(estimated cost $40 billion)."
Health
Official Soviet figures state that only 935 people developed radiation sickness in 
direct response to the three major disasters,®® which exposed over 270,000 to potential 
dangers.®’ The subsequent health studies apparently did not reveal any significant health 
problems associated with radiation.®® The statistical results could be correct, but only 
because the control group used in the study was based on the population o f  Chelyabinsk. 
This city is one o f  the worst polluted urban centres in the F SU, owing to severe air 
pollution problems fi*om industrial factories; therefore the population’s health is very 
poor. The control group in the study would make any results biased.®®
UnofiBcial reports indicate that at least 8,000 have died and that 28,000 have been 
severely irradiated.®"’ The average life span for men in the area is 45 years, for women 47 
years.®® In contrast the national figures for 1994 were 57.6 years and 71.0 years
respectively.®® A medical survey in the Kyshtym area between 1980 and 1990 recorded
26 Veitch, A., Channel 4 News. 16 April 1992.
Veitch, A., Channel 4 News. 16 April 1992.
^ 1000 rems kill a pine tree: 600 rems kill a human being.
^ Veitch, A., Channel 4 News. 16 April 1992.
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Harding, A., ‘Where Children are the Litmus test,’ The European. 27 Febmary-4 March 1992, p 6. 
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some alarming figures. There have been increases in cancer (21%), birth defects (23.3%), 
asthma (43.3%), blood diseases (31%), stomach diseases (24.6%)." It has been estimated 
that the region has seen a 41% increase in leukaemia over the last 40 years.®^
Conclusions
The last military processing plant at Chelyabinsk 65 closed on 14 July 1990, five 
years before the scheduled deadline.®® As the military complex is not in operation,"’® the 
main threat now comes fi*om the radioactive waste contained in contaminated reservoirs."” 
A series o f  dams hold up to 500 million cubic metres o f radioactive water."’® Not only is 
there the threat o f  further seepage into underground water tables, but there is a real 
possibility that the water may burst the banks o f  the reservoirs. As the water is no longer 
used as a coolant during the nuclear processing procedure, the water levels are not being 
regulated."’® Yet again the dangers from the nuclear legacy are just as severe as those 
experienced during the Cold War.
Tomsk?
Tomsk 7 is over 3,000 km east o f M oscow in the Urals. Operations by the 
Siberian Chemical Combine started in 1958. Five reactors have been used to provide 
energy for the city o f Tomsk (population 1 million in 1990) and to produce plutonium for 
nuclear weaponry. An estimated 127,000 tonnes o f  solid waste and 33 million cubic 
metres o f liquid waste have been stored in underground locations at the plant."’^
the same period. In : Reuters, ‘More Russians Succumb to Drink than ever Before,’ The Guardian. 9 
August 1997, p 17.
32 Perera, J., ‘Dirty Habits plague Russia’s Health,’ New Scientist. 2 January 1992, p 10.
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While the military operations have ceased, Mayak still reprocesses spent fuel from civilian reactors. 
This aspect of the industry started in 1978.
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Tomsk 7 first hit the international headlines in April 1993. In the early hours o f 6 
April, an underground storage tank at the SCC exploded, shattering the concrete 
buildings directly above it and sending a radioactive plume into the atmosphere. Broken 
electrical wires caused by the explosion started a fire which reportedly took one hour to 
extinguish."’®
This incident has become one o f  the very first nuclear accidents in Russian history 
to be “accompanied by prompt extensive glasnost.”"’® The general public found out about 
the explosion within hours and reports were published in the government daily Izvestiva 
on 7 April, while television coverage was shown throughout Russia within days."’®
The speed with which the Russian media reported the incident may, however, not 
be totally due to glasnost. It has been pointed out that the Chief Administrator o f the 
Tomsk Province initially received news o f  the accident from sources in Moscow, not the 
plant site at Tomsk. As Tomsk 7 was a “sensitive area” during the Cold War, the USA  
has had a satellite positioned over the region for many years. When the satellite 
established that the structure at Tomsk 7 had lost its roo^ it contacted M oscow directly."’^
Prompt press releases in theory were to calm Russian fears o f  a Siberian 
Chernobyl. While this may have been the case in faraway destinations (see M oscow  
Questionnaire results 1993) the situation in and around Tomsk was slightly different. By 
11 am the following day, all iodine drops and tablets in Tomsk were sold out"’® and vodka 
sales had increased dramatically.®® Radio transmissions told people to close their 
windows, while children were sent home from school.®’ Media outlets, which implied that 
radioactive contamination was a real problem, have since been prosecuted under the 
criminal law for panic-mongering.®® (Yet again this could indicate glasnost is very limited 
and that Russian society has not really changed dramatically since the fall o f Communism.)
Mackenzie, D., ‘Shades of Chernobyl Stalk Tomsk,’ New Scientist. 17 April 1993, p 6.
Kostyukovsky, V., ‘Forty Years of Operation at the Chemical Combine in Tomsk 7 ,’ Izvestiva. 6 
October 1994, p 4.
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3^ Chelikov, V., ‘Nuclear Blackmail Substantially Real,’ Moscow News. 16 April 1993, p 10.
108-
Although the occurrence at the Tomsk 7 plant was acknowledged extremely 
quickly, there is evidence that the information given was not totally reliable. Initial reports 
by the Russian authorities stated that/ the radioactive cloud was three km long,®® the 
contaminated area was under 35 sq. km.®"’ and that subsequent radiation levels in a handfiil 
o f hamlets, such as Georgiyevka, were only slightly elevated.®®
On 14 April, the Commission for the Russian State Committee and Emergency 
Situation in Tomsk signed an official decree stating that “the situation can be deemed to 
present no danger to the population’s life and everyday activities.”®® This was published in 
Izvestiva for all to see. A press conference at the Kurchatov Institute (Moscow) gave 
extra credibility to the findings. Nikolai Ponomaryov-Stepnoi stated there was no reason 
not to trust the information provided, as it was coming directly from the SCC site, where 
a special commission was employed to investigate the situation without the constraints o f  
censorship.®®
Despite reassurances, other information has now become available, showing that 
the situation was much worse than initially described. Firstly, the cloud is now believed to 
have been up to 8 km long.®® Secondly, although there are still conflicting reports on the 
area o f  land contaminated, quotes now vary between 120 sq. km.®® and 200 sq. km.®® If  
the latter figure is accepted, at least ten communities, with a total population o f  10,000, 
have been directly affected by radioactive fallout.®’
Russian sources also indicate that recorded radiation levels range from 40 to 480 
micro-roentgens per hour.®® Greenpeace states that the worst two villages affected by 
radiation, Nazezhdino and Georgiyevka, have registered levels o f  4,000 micro-roentgens
Mackenzie, D., ‘Shades of Chernobyl Stalk Tomsk,’ New Scientist. 17 April 1993, p 6.
Illesh, A., and Yakov, V., ‘So Far no Plutonium Found in Discharge,’ Izvestiva. 13 April 1993, p 5. 
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per hour/® They believe both areas should be evacuated immediately. N o action has yet 
been taken.
The contents o f  the tank which exploded is now being questioned. The Russian 
authorities maintained the tank was a nuclear waste tank in storage. According to 
Yablokov, while it did contain plutonium and other waste materials from previous years, 
when Tomsk 7 was in frill operation, it was not being used for reprocessing.®^ However, 
the Russian Minister for Nuclear Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, has told Greenpeace that the 
accident occurred while the tank was being filled with nitric acid.®® This is the first stage in 
the reprocessing procedure. The Russian State Emergency Committee also stated that the 
exploding tank contained paraffin and tributyl-phosphate, solvents used during the 
reprocessing procedure.®® This indicates the tank had already been through at least one 
round o f  reprocessing and was just about to start another.®®
The level o f radioactive contaminants in the cloud would be dependent on how 
many cycles the waste container had been through. As the true composition o f  the tank is 
not known, the real figures o f radioactivity within the cloud may never accurately be 
established from the diverging statistics which are available. If there were traces o f  
plutonium in the cloud, people who have been contaminated potentially have a bleak 
future.®® Plutonium is fatal if  inhaled in large doses, smaller doses can cause cancer at a 
later date. According to Lidiya Popova (nuclear scientist working for the 
Socio-Ecological Union)^since plutonium has a half-life o f 24,000 years, affected areas 
would be unsafe for 240,000 years.®®
The health o f the population has been adversely affected. The Genetic Department 
o f  the Siberian State Medical University has conducted a series o f tests on those living in
“  Booth, C., ‘Confusing Consequences of Nuclear Accident,’ Moscow Tribune. 9 April 1993, p 5.
MacKenzie, D., ‘Shades of Chernobyl Stalk Tomsk,’ New Scientist. 17 April 1993, p 6.
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the contaminated areas. Results show that chromosomal changes have occurred in the 
population o f Saami, indicating that they have been significantly affected by radiation.®® 
These findings were confirmed by a second test in which dental enamel was examined. 
This international research conducted by scientists fi*om Russia, the United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Austria and Hungary also determined that the allowed “norms” o f radiation 
had been significantly breached.®’
While the April 1993 incident was responsible for some o f the contamination in 
the area, the SCC had at least 23 other unreported accidents during the Soviet era.®® The 
worst accident occurred in 1963, when a spontaneous chain reaction lasted for over 18 
hours. The health situation has been monitored since 1975 by the M oscow Institute o f  
Biophysics. Unfortunately, the information obtained on the area “will be kept classified 
for at least 30 more years.”®®
Tomsk 7 is no longer in fiill operation. Only two o f the nuclear reactors are in use. 
One is the source o f  electrical power for the city o f  Tomsk.®"’ The production o f  
weapon-grade plutonium at the SCC is reported to have ceased in 1994.®® The Russian 
Government now aims to expand the facilities for processing radioactive materials, and 
designate the area as a storage site for nuclear warheads. Under the Start II Agreement, 
several warheads have already been transported to Tomsk 7 via the Trans-Siberian 
Railway.®®
Attempts to overhaul the Tomsk 7 site started in 1992 (prior to the accident). 
Unofficial sources claimed that the Russian Power Industry was in negotiation with the 
USA to obtain fimds o f  approximately $300 million to construct a new waste storage 
facility at the site.®® The planned new construction would have been 500 metres long, 12 
metres high and store 100,000 units o f plutonium.®® If this type o f initiative had been 
taken earlier, the incident in April 1993 might have been averted._______________________
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The accident at Tomsk 7 did initiate a new stand by the Russian Government on 
nuclear installations. Three days after the accident, President Boris Yeltsin ordered that all 
installations should be inspected by 1 December 1993.®® This included secret military 
cities for the first time®®. In theory lessons could be learned from the Tomsk situation. 
Unfortunately there are reports that the Ministry o f Defence is still obstructing the safety 
inspectors’ work in these areas.®’
Other Secret Cities
Sillamae - North-east Estonian coastal city.
The secret city situated at Sillamae operated plants to process enriched uranium 
for the Soviet nuclear power and weapon industry. The nearby working town has a 
population o f  20,000.®® Until 1990, the plants’ activities produced vast amounts o f  waste 
located in a specially built 1.5 mile long lagoon.®® Although the walls were three metres 
wide, they were only made o f mud. With time they started to disintegrate. Therefore, 
potentially the four million tonnes o f  radioactive debris contained in the lagoon could 
directly contaminate surrounding areas. Radiation levels around the lagoon are already 
excessively high. Levels 500 metres away from the perimeter are up to 200 times the 
norm.®^
With independence in 1991, Estonia has inherited this problem, which is adversely 
affecting the health o f the population in the region. Evidence o f deformities and anaemia 
is mounting, as are unexplained cases o f illness.®® For example, 300 local kindergarten 
children lost their hair in 1989. Investigations later revealed that the school premises were 
built on a disused dumpsite.®®
3® Van Der Laan, N., ‘Atom Plant Still Unsafe,’ Moscow Times. 29 April 1993, p 2.
^ Op. cit. p 2.
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Financial difficulties in Estonia and Russia have made it difficult to decontaminate 
the area. As contamination could ultimately enter the Gulf o f Finland, expertise and 
assistance have been forthcoming from Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden and 
Finland.®®
Number 19
This particular secret city has no name, it is known as Number 19. It is located in 
a forest near to Penza, 500 miles from Moscow, with a population o f 60,000 people.®® 
The plant is concealed by a 15 metre high concrete and steel wall around its 100 mile 
perimeter.®® Armed guards are located at the main access routes, suggesting the area is 
still regarded as closed territory.
Like all other secret cities, potential problems linked to radiation are seen by the 
effects on the health o f the local population. Statistics indicate that a third o f the 
population expect to die from cancer.®® Blood cancers, especially leukaemia rates, 
amongst young women have reached epidemic proportions, as have the number o f  birth 
defects and limb abnormalities.®’
Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p 103.
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^ Op. cit. p 13.
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Chapter 9 
Other Potential Threats from Russia’s Nuclear Legacy
While the threat o f  nuclear war initiated by the two superpowers has receded 
during the 1990s, the problems associated with nuclear peace have grown ever more 
urgent. There is now great concern over the chaotic state o f  the military nuclear industry 
in the Former Soviet Union. . The perceived problems fall into two main categories.
Firstly, the lack o f  financial stability could lead to a mass exodus o f  scientists fi*om 
enterprises linked to the nuclear industry.
Secondly, declining security standards could facilitate the theft o f nuclear 
materials. Sitiuggled materials, combined with the expertise o f  former Soviet scientists, 
could allow politically volatile countries to establish their own nuclear weaponry.
Under the Soviet regime, scientists, especially those linked to the nuclear military, 
were part o f the most privileged class in society. The Government ensured that they had a 
very comfortable lifestyle in return for their expertise and uncompromising loyalty. With 
the end o f the Cold War, many Soviet scientists have effectively been made redundant. It 
is feared that they “may soon roam the globe as nuclear mercenaries aiding clandestine 
nuclear efforts.”’ William Potter o f  the Monterey Institute o f  International Studies in 
California estimates that 100,000 people in the F SU have access to some form o f sensitive 
nuclear information.® This is probably not an exaggeration when it is estimated that six 
million people were associated with the production and development o f  weapons in 
Russia.® Even the population o f the top ten former secret cities in the FSU exceeds
700,000."’ Viktor Mikhailov, the former Soviet nuclear programme chief, has however 
pointed out that only 10-15,000 scientists hold “secret information,” 2-3000 o f  whom are 
classified as exceptional scientists and are members o f  the “Golden Fund.”®
 ^ Charles, D., ‘Nuclear Mercenaries name their Price,’ New Scientist. 16 November 1991, p 12. 
3 Op. cit. p 12.
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Meek, J., ‘Poverty puts Nuclear Materials on the Market,’ The Guardian. 15 August 1994, p 6. 
3 Op. cit. p 6.
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The brain drain may not be as severe as initially feared. Although, in general, 
Russian citizens have been able to travel more freely under relaxed Government rules, 
scientists have found that their movements remain restricted. Some o f those working 
within the nuclear weapon industry still do not have full passports.® M oscow has also 
considered proposals to ban nuclear experts from foreign travel for at least five years.® 
Yevgeny Primakov, one-time head o f  Russia’s external intelligence services (former 
branch o f the KGB) and then Prime Minister, defends this Russian policy o f limiting exit 
rights o f individuals who possess state secrets.® While it may retain nuclear secrets within 
the FSU, it is not a progressive move towards freedom and democracy.
In order to maintain its role as a superpower during the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union had an unbalanced economy in terms o f Government expenditure on the 
military-industrial complexes. For example, in St. Petersburg, 75% o f  all enterprises'were 
engaged in this type o f  production in some way.® With the reduction in arms policies 
accepted by both superpowers, it is not surprising that at least one third o f Government 
scientists will be removed from the payroll in the near future."
Those who find themselves unemployed or unable to live on low Government 
wages have tried to find work in other areas. In 1992, Professor Boris Babayon, who was 
the creator o f super computers used in the Soviet space programme and the design o f  
nuclear weapons, earned 2,000 roubles per month, ($20 a month) from Government 
sources.” In order to boost his income significantly he has entered into an agreement to 
carry out research in Moscow for Sun Microsystems, a Californian Company."
Scientists based in Moscow are having greater entrepreneurial success than those 
in more isolated regions. The Akademgorodok Scientific Village, 30 km outside 
Novosibirsk, Siberia, houses twenty research institutes ranging from nuclear physics to 
mining. 30,000 scientists reside here on an average monthly wage o f 1,400 roubles." 
Although they are no longer tied to the area by internal passports, they remain very
 ^ Charles, D., ‘Nuclear Mercenaries name their Price,’ New Scientist. 16 November 1991, p 12.
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restricted in their attempts to find alternative employment. Not only is there a general 
shortage o f accommodation, making it difficult to move, but the cost o f travel is 
prohibitive. An air ticket to M oscow could represent between one third and a half o f a 
month’s salary." Realising the potential problems, Akademgorodok has sought foreign 
investment to fund joint research projects in the village. To date, Germany and the USA  
have pledged $40 million to occupy Soviet scientists linked to the nuclear industry."
Foreign aid has also come in the form o f an International Science Centre to 
finance non-military scientists. This nuclear job centre has attracted an additional $25 
million from American sources and $63 million from the European Union."
The main objective is obviously to prevent Russian nuclear specialists from selling 
their expertise abroad, but as Yevgeny Primakov shrewdly pointed out, America to a 
certain extent could be facing similar problems with its own scientists. The arms 
reductions have also affected the USA, so 15,000 o f the nuclear workforce have already 
lost their jobs." There is no guarantee that American scientists would not be coaxed to 
foreign parts in return for financial rewards. Any non-nuclear state wishing to purchase 
nuclear knowledge would probably still approach scientists in the FSU, before the USA, 
as they would command a relatively low salary, placing them in greater demand.
In general, as the financial position o f  the Russian nuclear workforce deteriorates, 
the potential danger for abuse increases. Several cases o f nuclear theft have been detected 
in recent years. Examples o f  internal cases include;
i) June 1994; three Russians arrested in St. Petersburg for stealing
seven pounds o f enriched uranium fi’om a M oscow factory.’18
ii) March 1996; containers o f radioactive substances found under a 
manhole in Izobilny, South Russia. Culprits never found."
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MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Radford, T , ‘H eavy m etals too hot to handle The Guardian, 17 A ugust 1994, p  7.
iii) Fuel rods have gone missing from nuclear submarines in the
Northern Fleet at least twice/®
International seizures o f radioactive substances are also on the increase. Four 
incidents occurred in Germany in 1994®’ (see ‘This year’s nuclear catch’, above). Russian 
officials deny that the contraband originated from their country. They believe that 
Germany is trying to initiate an anti-Russian propaganda campaign to show that Russia no 
longer has control over its nuclear arsenal.®®
In order to stem international fears o f smuggling, a Nuclear Security Summit was 
held in M oscow in April 1996. Russian nuclear agencies portrayed the situation as a 
‘petty theft’ problem amongst unpaid workers, trying to obtain extra money on the open
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market/® The feared concept o f  nuclear terrorism was dismissed by Mr. Sutyagin.® ’^ The 
hazards o f nuclear theft were therefore still portrayed as theoretical. It was pointed out 
that most cases involved uranium o f  low quality. Incidences where more dangerous 
materials had been discovered were in very low quantities and reportedly had not found a 
place on the open market. No buyer had been found during the ensuing investigations. It 
has been recognised that, to date, the materials seized are insufficient to manufacture a 
nuclear weapon. However, these incidents could be regarded as “samples” for potential 
customers.®® Unless Russia establishes a reliable system for accounting and controlling 
the stock o f nuclear materials, the problems o f theft can only increase.
It is estimated that there are 1,400 metric tonnes o f  bomb-making substances in 
the Former Soviet Union®®. This will increase with the continuing production o f  plutonium 
in areas such as Tomsk 7 and Krasnoyarsk 26, owing to the decommissioning o f  
warheads. A small proportion o f  these potentially lethal materials could create vast human 
and environmental devastation anywhere throughout the world. Russia with all other 
nuclear states has to ensure total security o f  these materials®®. Although the superpowers 
have ended the Arms Race, the nuclear threat will continue as long as nuclear materials 
can potentially be bought on the open market.
Profit from Nuclear Waste
The estimated total radioactivity level o f  nuclear waste in Russia could be as great 
as four billion curies.®® As this is potentially 80 Chemobyls,®® the storage o f  nuclear waste 
is o f  great concern. The main storage sites in Russia are ill-equipped to hold the nuclear 
waste already created by the Cold War and the subsequent decommissioning o f nuclear 
weaponry in the 1990s. As existing sites are fiill to capacity and the RT2 plant at
33 Williams, C., ‘Petty Theft main Threat,’ The Guardian. 13 April 1996, p 16.
3"^ Head of Moscow nuclear security. Source, Op. cit. p 16.
33 ‘Conunent Page,’ The Guardian. 17 August 1994, p 17.
33 Williams, C., ‘Petty Theft main Threat,’ The Guardian. 13 April 1996, p 16.
33 Stockpiles in - UK = 40 tonnes plutonium a.
FSU = 120 tonnes plutonium, 700 tonnes uranium 
In: a. Radford, T., ‘Heavy metals too hot to Handle,’ The Guardian. 17 August 1994, p 7. 
b. Bluth, C., ‘What do you do with a Nuclear Arsenal?’ New Scientist. No. 1830, 18 July 
1992, pp 26-3Ô.
3® Vaganov, A., ‘The Planet is Poorly Equipped for Burying Radioactive Waste,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 
13 September 1993, p i .
3^  On. cit. p 1.
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Krasnoyarsk 26 is “still under construction” why, in September 1995, did Russia lift the 
ban on accepting foreign atomic waste material for reprocessing?®®
By legally allowing the import o f  nuclear waste into Russia, it is feared the 
country may become a “raw material appendage o f the West.”®’ Unfortunately, the 
perceived potential profits fi’om tins industry are great. With the danger involved and the 
technical knowledge required for the processing o f  nuclear waste, the industry can charge 
large sums o f  money for the service.
Russia aims to use the money obtained though this industry to finance the new 
RT2 complex. While Western specialists believe it will cost $5 billion to complete the 
complex,®® the Russian Ministry estimates a lower cost o f $2 billion, as labour and 
construction materials in Russia will be relatively less expensive®®. During the completion 
o f the complex, the authorities have no problem with stockpiling the waste for up to 50 
years.®  ^The waste will be transported to the site by train or sea for eventual underground 
storage (Map 11, p 120).
Unfortunately, the theory behind this idea has not proved successful. In practice 
the only countries that are sending spent fuel to Russia are the newly independent states 
(i.e. former Soviet Republics) and east European countries. For example, the Ukraine 
with five reactors, which witnessed severe storage problems directly after independence, 
has now resumed the export o f spent fuel to Krasnoyarsk.®® The Russian Government 
charged 400 million roubles for the process, but only received 50 million.®® The shortfall 
was paid for in materials and sugar. This does not provide Russia with the hard currency 
to complete the RT2 site.
3° Yemelyanenko, V., ‘Source of Profit or Disaster,’ Moscow News. 21-27 March 1996, p 6.
3* Baiduzhy, A., ‘Yablokov Surveys Russia’s Environment Woes,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 24 March 1995, 
p3.
33 Yemelyanenko, V., ‘Source of Profit or Disaster,’ Moscow News. 21-27 March 1996, p 6.
33 Op. cit.. p 6.
3" Bolsunovsky, A., ‘Russia becomes a Nuclear Dump,’ Moscow News. 21-27 March 1996, p 6.
33 Meek, J., ‘Once Bitten Ukraine does not shy from a Nuclear Future,’ The Guardian. 25 March 1995, p 
12.
33 Bolsunovsky, A., ‘Russia becomes a Nuclear Dump,’ Moscow News. 21-27 March 1996, p 6.
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Western countries have yet to take up the Russian offer. There are two main 
reasons for this:
1) West European countries, such as the UK and France, have their own 
reprocessing industries.
2) Western Europe has been experiencing increased public pressure 
over the transportation o f nuclear waste. The perceived danger o f  
transporting waste by road and rail has led to protests throughout Europe.
For example, protests occurred at Burghfield (UK) on 15 March 1993®® 
and Gorleben, Germany on 1 March 1997.®®
Russia does desperately need the complex at Krasnoyarsk 26. Its own attempts to 
finance it have been unsuccessful. At present, foreign aid is the only answer. If the 
situation is not resolved, there could be dire ecological consequences. As the storage sites 
reach full capacity, there could be the temptation for the Russian Government to resort to 
illegal dumping on land and at sea. While there is no real ecologically friendly way to 
dispose o f  nuclear waste, at least the international community can help to reduce the 
danger by contributing t^ S istru ction  o f  a new complex.
32 Meridian News. 10.00 p.m., 15 March 1993.
3^  Traynor, I., ‘Nuclear row hits Meltdown,’ The Guardian. 1 March 1997, p 15.
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Conclusions
The end o f the Cold War has brought forward dramatic reductions in both 
conventional and nuclear forces. Under the Start II treaty, Russia has agreed to dismantle 
over 10,000 warheads.®  ^By the year 2003 it is agreed that neither the United States nor 
Russia will have more than 3,500 nuclear warheads, that all intercontinental ballistic 
missiles with multiple warheads will be dismantled and that submarine-launched missiles 
will not exceed 1,750 warheads on each side."" Further reductions would follow. Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin referred to this treaty as a “treaty o f  hope.’"’ In theory, any 
reduction in nuclear arms is o f benefit. Unfortunately, the monetary cost coupled with the 
problem o f storage for weapon grade plutonium could mean that the nuclear arsenal 
represents more o f a potential environmental crisis than ever before.
The United States has enabled 2,800 Russian warheads to be dismantled with a 
financial aid package o f $1.3 billion.^® However, this represents only a fraction o f the 
work to be done. For example, Russia is supposed to decommission 150 nuclear 
submarines by the year 2000.^® Many submarines awaiting decommission are taken to 
Severodvinsk. The Zvyozdochka (‘Star’) Enterprise responsible for this process hoped to 
sell on the redundant metal from the vessels. Unfortunately, the profit from this does not 
cover the cost o f dismantling a nuclear submarine. In 1994, the cost o f  dismantling one 
submarine was 23 billion roubles." During the same year nine others were awaiting 
decommission. The Government could not afford this. At the present rate o f  
decommissioning it will take 50-70 years to complete the agreed 150 vessels."
Former Environment Minister, A. Yablokov describes these vessels as “Floating 
Atomic Bombs.”" Each one costs a minimum o f two billion roubles per annum in order to 
keep it afloat in the harbour." In an attempt to ease the burden o f scrapping some o f these 
nuclear submarines, the Russian Ministry o f  Defence in conjunction with the nuclear
3^  Hearst, D., ‘Disarming Strains Russian Purse,’ The Guardian. 26 October 1995, p 13.
^  Lloyd, J., ‘Treaty of Hope Signed by Bush and Yeltsin,’ Financial Times. 4 January 1993, p 1. 
Op. cit. p 1.
"3 Hearst, D., ‘Disarming Strains Russian Purse,’ The Guardian. 26 October 1995, p 13.
‘*3 Filipov, D., ‘Nuclear Submarines Call for help,’ Izvestiva. 24 May 1995, p 4.
^ Op. cit. p 4.
*^3 Litovkin, V., ‘Nuclear Submarines are Waiting to be Scrapped,’ Izvestiva. 9 July 1993, p 6.
Yablokov, A., ‘Now there’s a real Nightmare,’ Izvestiva. 17 March 1995, p 1.
*^3 Filipov, D., ‘Nuclear Submarines Call for help,’ Izvestiva. 24 May 1995, p 4.
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safety inspectorate has extended the time period for which spent fuel can be stored in 
reactors. Initially, the safety period was deemed to be ten years, but now it is recognised 
as 30 years." A  similar situation is occurring in the United Kingdom. Discarded Royal 
Navy nuclear submarines will be stored in Rosyth and Devonport until 2012." In theory, 
the spent fuel will be sufficiently cooled by this time to store underground. The fact that 
the Nirex Sellafield Complex in Cumbria is at present not ready to take the waste is 
apparently not an issue. According to Pryde (1995), “disposing o f all this military detritus 
may become one o f the major environmental challenges o f  the 1990s.”®®
The fall o f Communism obviously created new problems for the nuclear military 
industry. Newly independent states, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, had 
nuclear weapons based on their lands. This could have been used as a threat or a 
bargaining card against Moscow. Fortunately, all three o f  these new states agreed to 
transfer ex-USSR nuclear weapons back to Russia. In the case o f  Belarus, the parliament 
voted to adhere to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in February 1993. They became 
the first state in history to give up their nuclear arms.®’ Kazakhstan has the additional 
problem o f the Semipalatinsk Range. Although the area was shut down prior to the 
formation o f the CIS, the fact still remains that Kazakhstan now has to finance a vast 
clean-up operation. Although Moscow created the problem, Kazakhstan has the daunting 
task o f  attempting to solve it.
The eventual adoption o f the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is
perceived to be one o f the most important arms control agreements in the post-Cold War 
era. Both the USA and Russia want zero yield testing.®® This in itself must eventually 
improve the areas around Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya; therefore the fall o f  
Communism has ultimately improved the outlook for the Russian environment in terms o f  
nuclear testing. The motives behind the CTBT are not purely environmental. The cost o f  
the Arms Race could no longer be met by Russia during the 1990s. On average the
Filipov, D., ‘Nuclear Submarines Call for help,’ Izvestiva. 24 May 1995, p 4.
Fairhall, D., ‘Submarines to be stored until 2012,’ The Guardian. 13 June 1996, pl2.
3° Piyde, P., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, p 16.
3‘ Op. cit. p 10.
33 Black, I., ‘N-test ban talks make Progress,’ The Guardian. 28 March 1996, p 16.
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USSR spent 25% o f its GNP on the military industry/® Advanced technologies have also 
meant that simulation techniques can be used instead o f actual explosions. This is 
especially the case for the United States which was able to improve its computer 
techniques with the French decision to explode nuclear bombs in the Pacific Ocean in 
1996. While the United States condemned the French action, it actually benefited from the 
incident. It is now feared that the United States^advanced computer technologies have yet 
again divided the nuclear countries into “unequal states.”" Taking into account past 
actions during the Cold War, this could lead to problems in the fixture.
Events during 1999 have shown how potentially sensitive the present arms 
reduction programme can be. During the Kosovo crisis, Russia indicated that NATO 
ground troops in Yugoslavia would not be tolerated. Yeltsin stated that Russia would 
back Yugoslavia in creating a European if  not a world war.®® The situation was defiised 
through lengthy talks. We will never know if  Yeltsin’s threat would have been carried out 
or whether he was appeasing a domestic audience, especially hard-liners in his own 
Government during a time when his political position was insecure. We do, however, 
know that Russia still has enough military weapons at its disposal to create a war. 
Financially, Russia could not afford a military conflict; however, such conflicts can boost 
economics (economics o f war) in terms o f military production. During the crisis, NATO 
representatives were expelled from Moscow.®® Even in the short-term, this could have 
slowed the process o f  previously agreed nuclear reduction policies. Any delay could lead 
to a nuclear accident within the FSU, as safety levels surrounding nuclear installations are 
not up to Western standards.
Finally, while safety standards are an issue in nuclear installations, it was feared 
that the main threat at the turn o f the century would be in the form o f the Millennium 
Bug. The computer bug could not only affect the civil nuclear industry, but the nuclear 
weapons industry as well. It was feared that satellite technology controlling nuclear 
weapons would become dysfunctional, creating chaos. Russia did not have enough time 
or money to solve this problem alone. In March 1999 it approached the United States for
33 This compares to 5% of GNP in the USA. In: Golitsyn, G.S., ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS during 
the Transitional Period,’ RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 2, No. 2, 8 January 1993, p 33.
3"* Boltovsky, I., 'Dangerous Nuclear Card Game,’ Pravda. 19 September 1996, pp 1-3.
33 ‘Six o'clock Evening News,’ BBCl. 9 April 1999.
33 Op. cit.
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urgent help in this area.^  ^ At the turn o f  the 20* century scientists from Russia and the 
United States convened in Washington to observe the situation and rectify any potential 
problems/^
‘Early Morning News,’ BBCl. 17 March 1999.
^ ‘Early Morning News,’ BBCl. 10 November 1999.
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Part IV
Case Studies
Chapter 10 
Moscow
Today, M oscow is recorded as the third most polluted city in Russia^ The decline 
in air quality can be linked to the “advent o f  the Five-Year Plans in 1930.”  ^ Over the 
following decades extensive industrial growth did not take into account the rational use o f  
raw materials and gave inadequate consideration to environmental protection.
Attempts to curb the development o f the city in 1935 and 1975 were unsuccessful. 
During the Second World War, industrial centres emerged in eastern Russia as a result o f  
the evacuation o f Moscow. However, after 1945, the industrial heart o f M oscow resumed 
its growth at an even greater pace.^ Hence, by the 1960s airborne emissions such as 
nitrogen oxide and sulphur dioxide had reached lethal levels. Steps were urgently required 
to improve the situation.
Moscow, the capital o f  the old USSR and o f Russia, was far more successful in 
securing financial investment for environmental protection than any other major city. It 
represented the “main point o f entry for the large majority o f foreign visitors.”  ^Therefore, 
the Soviet Government was keen to show the Western World a “Show Case City.” In 
order to accomplish this, Moscow became the “scene o f a massive clean-up campaign 
during the 1960s.”^
* Vakhrusheva, A., ‘Hotline,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 54.
 ^ Goldman, M.I., The Spoils of Progress. Cambridge University Press, London, 1972, p 123.
 ^ Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow: a Mirror of Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 1993, 
P 1
Jancar, B., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1987, p 197.
 ^ Singleton, F., Environmental Misuse in the Soviet Union. Praeger, New York, 1976, p 12.
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By 1972, air pollution in the city had been reduced by approximately one-third. 
This was predominamrHy owing to a change in fuel emphasis and the installation o f limited 
pollution abatement facilities in industry. Prior to 1970, only 14% o f industry in Moscow  
operated such facilities.^ A fiirther improvement came prior to the 1980 Moscow  
Olympics. By this time, there were 44 square metres o f greenery per citizen. While new 
industrial enterprises had to adopt air pollution controls, older industries which constantly 
polluted the atmosphere were shut down to improve local air conditions.^
However, in the 1990s this does not really present a true picture o f  M oscow’s air 
quality. The capital still has problems with stationary (industrial) pollution, radiation and 
to a greater extent transport emissions. The following paragraphs will discuss the main 
sources o f  air pollution in Moscow, briefly showing the effects on the local population, 
and analyse the residents’ perceptions o f  the ecological situation in the city.
Industry
M oscow contains nearly 10% o f Russia’s industry.* In total, it has 27,000 
establishments which use natural resources; 10,000 o f  these are industry based and 60% 
are known to be environmental polluters.^
In 1987, stationary sources accounted for 30%^° or 367,100 tonnes" o f air 
pollution emissions into the atmosphere over Moscow. The worst pollution sources 
originated from the refining and petrochemical industry, the chemical industry and the 
iron and steel industry. In particular, a medium-sized petrol refinery complex is known to 
release 31,000 tonnes o f hydrogen sulphide per annum. This represents 91% o f  this type 
o f pollution in Moscow. The Foton Plant which produces electronic equipment creates
® Ponting, C., A Green History of the World. Penguin Books, London, 1991, p 364.
Jancar, B., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1987, p 198.
® Trofimova, Z., ‘Moscow Province is no Place to Vacation,’ Seeodnva. 16 August 1995, p 12.
® Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow: a Mirror of Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 1993,
p 1.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Leeacv o f Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 33.
" Sagers, M.J., ‘News Notes,’ Soviet Geography. Vol. 30, 1989, pp 512-520.
Op. cit. p 514.
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100% o f  M oscow’s mercury emissions." The Lenin Komsomol Motor Works also creates 
pollution in the south-eastern section o f Moscow. Up to 19.6% o f M oscow’s stationary 
pollution can be found in this area.^ "^  Not all o f it, however, originates here. Predominantly 
easterly winds blow bad air in this direction.
A  change in fiiel emphasis has helped pollution levels in Moscow. A prime 
example o f this is the adoption o f natural gas to fuel heat and power. By 1985, nearly 
80% o f M oscow’s power was derived from this source. This has meant that particulate 
emissions have fallen by 60% and sulphur dioxide by 39% between 1975 and 1985." 
Despite these measures, 12% o f M oscow’s stationary emissions still came from power 
plants in 1992."
In order to rectify this, the M oscow authorities passed a programme o f ecological 
measures directly aimed at the power industry in 1993. The policies in theory will fiirther 
reduce emissions o f nitric oxides, sulphur dioxides and virtually eliminate suspended 
particle emissions by 2010." The implementation o f the scheme may prove difficult as 
purifying devices in the power industry are capital intensive. In the West these devices 
account for nearly 40% o f the cost o f  the plant."
If all o f M oscow’s industry is taken into account, only 30% had effective purifying 
equipment in 1990." There was initially an increase in total stationary emissions o f
149,000 tonnes during the first six months o f  1990.^° The capital had the highest sporadic 
surges o f nitrogen dioxide (28 times the allowed limit), phenol (45 times the limit) and 
formaldehyde (57 times the limit) o f any ' . ' city in Russia.^  ^ Even though total airborne 
pollutants from stationary sources have declined in M oscow during the 1990s^  ^ (250,600
Op. cit. p 518.
McKay, B., ‘Local Greens,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 57.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 33.
15 Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow: a Mirror of Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 
1993, p i .
1^  TASS, ‘Moscow Air to become cleaner by 2010,’ Moscow News. 27 August 1993, p 9.
1® Op. cit. p 9.
1® Feshbach, M. and Friendly, J.R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 94.
Op. cit. p 94.
1^ Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
The decline of emissions from stationary sources in Moscow was caused by i) economic depression 
leading to a fall in output; ii) further conversion of fuel emphasis; iii) shift of industry, especially power 
stations, away from the centre.
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tonnes in 1992)" the percentage o f more harmful substances has continued to increase. 
The situation will not easily be improved. Statistics indicate that a lack o f repair and the 
establishment o f  new technological pollution devices in industry have meant only 21% of  
pollution systems were operational in 1992.^ "^
This indicates that either a lack o f money has prohibited the installation and 
maintenance o f cleaning devices or that the policing o f the situation and consequent fines 
are inadequate to deter industrial polluters. The M oscow Emergency Ecological Service 
headed by A. Zhemchugov was set up in the early 1990s to help with this problem." In 
total, 27 staff take up to 70 calls a day about industrial enterprises which create 
pollution." In 1993-1994, two million roubles had been collected in fines." This money 
goes to Ecofond which acts as an ecology friendly saving and loan enterprise. Industries 
can borrow money to install new environmental devices. As a safeguard, enterprises are 
checked for their progress. If the money has been used for other purposes, the industry 
has to pay the original sum o f money back with an additional high interest rate payment.^*
In theory, the Ecological Service should help prevent pollution, but relying solely 
on fines may be inadequate. In times o f financial difficulties it is hard to enforce payments. 
In the three years o f operations only ONE case has led to a court case where a 
person/violator has actually been charged and sentenced to jail."
A more recent attempt to enforce environmental protection came in January 1997. 
The Criminal Code now contains specific articles on pollution, but there is still a need for 
a body to enforce them. Hence, there has been the creation o f an Environmental Police 
Administration in Moscow, within the structure o f M oscow’s Internal Administration for 
Public Safety. Initially, there were 200 staff; if  the experiment proved to be successful, the 
number was to increase to 1,100 in 1998.^°
Bridges, O., and Bridges, J.W., ‘Comparisons of Air Quality in the UK and Russia,’ The 
Environmental 15. 1995, pp 139-146.
Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow: a Mirror of Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 
1993, p i .
5^ Vakhrusheva, A., ‘Hotline,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 54.
5^ Op. cit. p 54.
Op. cit. p 54.
^ Op. cit. p 54.
Op. cit. p 54.
5° Varchenya, A., ‘Environmental Police to be created in Moscow,’ Segodnva. 25 September 1997, p 12.
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Transport
Transport accounts for a large proportion o f airborne pollutants in the Moscow  
Region. In 1988, 72% o f all emissions were directly caused by transport, representing
801,000 tonnes o f harmful substances.^^ By 1990 this had increased to 80%" or 840,000 
tonnes" o f atmospheric pollution.
Government attempts to reduce pollution from non-stationary sources in Moscow  
occurred with the implementation o f  the Clean Air Programme in the mid-1980s. In 1987, 
50% o f vehicles produced emissions which were above the recommended norms." This 
fell to 20% in 1988". In theory, vehicles were relatively cleaner, but it should be noted 
that the Soviet authorities doubled the norm for the maximum rate o f carbon monoxide 
from 1.5 to 3% o f exhaust gases in the same year."
Despite financial difficulties in the country, the number o f  vehicles on the road has 
continued to increase at a rapid rate. In 1990 there were 800,000 vehicles in Moscow.*^ 
By 1994, this had increased to 1.5 million." The overall figure is greater as it is estimated 
that between 120,000 and 150,000 additional vehicles enter the region for business 
purposes." This could account for relatively high levels o f  lead emissions. Although 
M oscow has banned leaded petrol, commuters from outside the region could still be using 
traditional leaded fuel.^
As M oscow’s car fleet increased by 300,000 in 1994"^  ^ and is estimated to grow by 
25%^  ^ per annum in the future, it is not surprising that the city is experiencing gridlock
Sagers, M.J., ‘News Notes,’ Soviet Geography. Vol. 30, 1989, pp 512-520.
Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
55 The USSR Commission for UNEP, Environmental Management in the USSR Issue 8, Moscow, 1990. 
5'^  Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 48.
55 Op . cit. p 49.
55 Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R., Ecocide in the U SSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 96.
5^  Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993
5^  Bridges, O., and Bridges, J.W., ‘Comparisons of Air Quality in the UK and Russia,’ The 
Environmental 15. 1995, pp 139-146.
5^  Conversation with K. Nikonorova on 17 April 1993.
Zeigler, C.E., Environmental Policy in the USSR Frances Pinter Press, London, 1987, p 109. 
Krutilina, O., ‘No Easy Answer to Traffic Jams,’ Moscow News. 3-9 February 1995, p 6.
■^5 Baiduzhy, A., ‘Yablokov Surveys Russia’s Environmental Woes,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 24 March 
1995, p 3.
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situations, especially during the rush hour period. 24% o f  cars still fail basic exhaust tests; 
therefore, the motor car in M oscow is creating vast environmental problems."^ ^
In order to improve air quality the local government has taken the following steps 
to decrease vehicle emissions:
i) Heavy trucks have traditionally created vast amounts o f  airborne 
pollutants. Therefore, there have been attempts to convert them from 
petrol and diesel to natural gas." The process has unfortunately been slow.
By 1989, 100,000 trucks had undergone fuel conversion, but this only 
represents 1.4% o f  the overall fleet."
ii) Goods vehicles have restricted access to the city centre. Fifteen 
parking areas have been established on the outskirts o f  the city." An article 
in Moskovskava pravda. by Professor F. Shipunov calls for at least 
one-fifth o f the city to be converted into traffic ft"ee zones, to alleviate 
traffic congestion and pollution."
iii) The local authority plans to limit the number o f cars in the city by 
creating a pass system. Each car will require a pass costing 200,000 
roubles per annum (1995 prices). This cost will not, however, keep many 
car owners from the city centre."
Overall, the costs o f  car ownership do not seem to be deterring Muscovites from 
purchasing cars. For example, many foreign cars have been imported at substantial costs; 
M oscow contains 10% o f  all foreign cars in Russia." In 1993, 100,000 foreign made cars 
were registered in the cap ita l.In  theory, these cars, even if  they are secondhand, will be
Bridges, O., and Bridges, J.W., ‘Comparisons of Air Quality in the UK and Russia,’ The 
Environmental 15. 1995, pp 139-146.
Jancar, B., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1987, p 199.
Peterson, D.J. Troubled Lands : The Legacv of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 49.
"5 Bridges, O., and Bridges, J.W., ‘Comparisons of Air Quality in the UK and Russia,’ The 
Environmental 15. 1995, p 145.
Newton, M., ‘USSR TWs Week,’ Radio Liberty. 3 August 1988, p 5.
Krutlina, O., ‘No Easy Answer to Traffic Congestion,’ Moscow News. 3-9 February 1995, p 16. 
Chemyakova, N., ‘Russian Business Prefers Foreign Cars,’ Business World Weekly. 2 April 1993, p 8. 
5° Op. cit. p 8.
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more environmentally friendly than their Soviet counterparts. However, every car pollutes 
the atmosphere to a certain degree.
The price o f  petrol has also rapidly increased in Russia. In Moscow, prices were 
raised by over 80% on 7 April 1993.^  ^ This has made travelling by car very expensive in 
comparison with the cost o f a metro ticket,^  ^but it has not deterred the growing trend o f  
car ownership. Russian attempts to increase the use o f  public transport in M oscow would 
prove difficult. For example, the Metro System, which is 244km long, is the busiest 
system in the world. It already carries 3,184 million passengers a year." This, however, 
does not stop the authorities from purchasing new technology for the public transport 
systems, reducing this particular air pollution source.
An indication o f how important car ownership has become in M oscow could be 
indirectly linked to the increasing number o f car thefts. During 1992, 40 cars were stolen 
every day. Police predicted this would increase to 100 a day in 1993. Two-thirds o f cars 
are never found. They are quickly re-registered to a new owner, suggesting vehicles could 
be stolen to order."
The current infra-structure in M oscow could create additional pollution problems. 
The Garden Ring (Sadovoye Koltso) is a prime example. Although it is regularly patrolled 
by six permanent police crews, traffic congestion and accidents are frequent occurrences.
The Garden Ring and other main highways need updating to take account o f the 
traffic flow. The GAI ' feel that the construction o f  a third ring
road around Moscow would probably be o f the greatest benefit. This is costly and is 
therefore unlikely to occur for many years."
51 Business Update Russia. No. 73, Vol. 2, 9 April 1993.
55 Prior to the price rise, petrol was already relatively expensive in comparison witli tlie cost of tlie Metro. 
In 1991, one litre of petrol was 40 kopeks. The cost of public transport which was heavily subsidised was 
5 kopeks. In : Cooper, C.R., and Schipper, L., ‘The Soviet Energy Conservation Dilemma,’ Enerev 
Policy. Vol. 19, No. 4, May 1991, pp 344-362.
55 Ed. Buckley, R., ‘Avoiding Gridlock,’ Understanding Global Issues. October 1997, pp 1-18.
5" Mosovshchikov, S., ‘How People Steal the most Valuable tilings a Soviet Person has,’ Izvestiva. 2 
August 1992, p 8.
55 Krutilina, O., ‘No Easy Answer to Traffic Jams,’ Moscow News. 3-9 February 1995, p 16.
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other Sources of Air Pollution in Moscow 
Waste
Household rubbish and waste from non-industrial enterprises are adding to the air 
pollution problem in Moscow. There are six million tonnes o f rubbish created annually." 
It is growing at approximately 5-6% per annum." In theory, 90% o f all rubbish is taken to 
official city dumps and 10% o f this is incinerated at two different plants.^* Unfortunately, 
there is no basic sorting o f  the waste, therefore the gases which escape into the 
atmosphere during the incineration process are often poisonous. M oscow incinerators 
were privatised in 1991." Hopefully, this should lead to an improvement in the processing 
o f waste. However, increased charges will lead to even greater illegal dumping.
Unofficial illegal dumpsites are problematic. In 1992, there were 111 such sites 
throughout Moscow." Over 50 o f  these contaminated the local air and water supplies 
with over 500,000 tonnes o f waste.^^
The refiise problem can only get worse. A  potential consumer boom in the future 
could lead to even more household waste. Unless more disposal sites are established and 
environmentally controlled, noxious emissions into the atmosphere can only increase. A  
change in public perception is required. There is very little recycling in Moscow. The only 
real exceptions are newspapers, which can be exchanged for other reading materials, and 
empty bottles which fetch between 2-8 roubles each."
55 Peterson, D.J., ‘The State of the Environment : Solid Waste,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 2, No. 19, 11 
May 1990, pp 11-14.
55 Op. cit. p 13.
5^  Kudiyashov, N., ‘Garbage, Garbage everywhere,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 55.
5^  Bridges, O., and Bridges, J.W., Losing Hope : The Environment and Health in Russia. Aldershot and 
Vermont, Ashgate Publishing, 1996, p 130.
5° Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow : a Mirror of Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 
1993, p i .
5^ Kudryashov, N., ‘Garbage, Garbage Everywhere,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 55.
55 Op. cit. p 55.
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Buildings
There is an additional source o f heavy metal contamination in the historical centre, 
which is not linked to industry in the city. Zinc, lead, copper and nickel pollution have 
been caused by the deterioration o f the exteriors o f  old buildings. The paint work on some 
buildings is o f  a mineral base, therefore contains a mixture o f heavy metal oxides and 
salts. Extensive weathering accelerated by a cold climate," and other forms o f air 
pollution have occurred. Although such surfaces should last 40 years, many need 
attention within half this time period. It is estimated that 70% o f the older buildings need 
repairing at present. The contamination has predominantly affected the soil, but it could 
have also heightened heavy metal traces found in the atmosphere."
Forests
The Greenbelt areas o f M oscow are suffering from the ill effects o f  atmospheric 
pollution. Parklands, although designed with leisure pursuits in mind, have been 
detrimentally affected by such recreational activities. Overall, M oscow’s forests are 
ageing and degenerating. Under present circumstances there is little hope o f regeneration.
Unfortunately, while the local authorities planted 1,000 new trees in 1992, over
50.000 were felled." The Losinsky Ostrov National Park located south o f M oscow is an 
example o f  a declining forest. Being a city park it is relatively small at only 10,067 
hectares." In January 1992, Mayor Yuri Luzhkov permitted the felling o f 35,000 trees in 
the park," to make way for a gas pipeline. In February the park was reduced by a fiirther
1.000 acres in order to build summer cottages for retired generals.®* On a smaller scale, 
local people are illegally felling small sections o f  the wood in order to grow such crops as
55 Average temperature in Moscow in winter (November - March) is -2°C.
5'^  Dronin, N., and Motovilova, M., ‘Living in Central Moscow is Hazardous to Your Health,’ Izvestiva. 
24 May 1995, p 9.
55 Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow : a Mirror of Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 
1993, p i .
55 Pryde, P., Environmental Management in the Soviet Union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1991, p 158.
55 Gorokhov, V., ‘Insidious Murder,’ Moscow Weeklv News. 19-26 April 1992, p 14.
5* Gray, S., ‘Moscow fights for its Forest,’ The European. 9-12 April 1992, p 6.
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potatoes. The authorities could have prevented this, but it was felt that these particular 
sections o f the forest could be used to fiilfil previous pledges (by Gorbachev) o f private 
allotments for every person in Moscow.®^
Thirty years ago, the development o f M oscow called for the maintenance o f  a 
“green ring” around the city to filter pollution created by an expanding industrial base and 
increasing population.^*  ^ Today the shortage o f green space, combined with a population 
o f 300 people per square kilometre, has aggravated the air pollution problem.^  ^ M oscow  
now consumes ten times more oxygen than the surrounding vegetation can produce.
Radiation
Russia’s capital does not have a nuclear power station on a par with Chernobyl or 
Ignalina (Lithuania) for electricity generation, and is situated many miles from such areas 
as Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya. With this in mind, M oscow should be relatively 
radiation free. Many would therefore be surprised to learn that the RADON Scientific 
Production Enterprise collected waste from over 1,300 sources within the city during 
1990.53 This collection service from medical and industrial enterprises transports the 
waste to Zagorsk,^^ enabling the authorities to keep radioactive background levels in 
M oscow at an average 10-20 microroentgens per hour,^ ® a limit deemed not to be 
dangerous to the local population.^®
Although the local authorities have attempted to keep levels low, “hotspots” have 
been discovered using specialised aerial gamma photography. In recent years 1,200 sites 
o f radiological contamination have been discovered and cleared (see Map 12, p 136 and 
Diagram 2, p 137)^  ^ by the Moscow Scientific and Industrial Association.
5® Gray, S., ‘Moscow fights for its Forest,’ The European. 9-12 April 1992, p 6.
5° McKay, B., ‘Local Greens,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 57.
5^ Trofimova, Z., ‘Moscow Province is no Place to Vacation.’Segodnva. 16 August 1995, p 12.
55 Op. cit. p 12.
53 Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 144.
5" Op. cit. p 144.
55 Reuters, ‘Atomic Moscow,’ Moscow News. 14-20 April 1995, p 11.
55 Recognised Russian safe dose is under 300 microroentgens per hour.
55 Henni, F., and Overchuk, A., ‘Moscow Radiation Hunters,’ Moscow News. 14-20 April 1995, p 14.
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A Map of Moscow Showing Radiation Sites.
Source : Peterson. D. J., Troubled Lands : The Legacv of Soviet 
Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, Oxford, 1993, p 143.
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Cases include:
a) 54* City Hospital (East Moscow)
The hydrotherapy building registered readings o f  72,000 microroentgens per hour.
In general, x-ray departments are chief offenders in hospitals throughout Russia.
b) The Institute o f  Mineral Raw Materials dumped contaminated ore
on nearby land in 1988.
c) Two terrorist incidents. The latest occurred in  1993, when the
manager o f the Kartontara Firm was killed.^*
Ironically, one o f the areas in M oscow which consistently has high levels o f  radiation is 
Red Square. Very little can be done as the levels are caused by large quantities o f  mildly 
radioactive granite used in the construction o f the Kremlin and other buildings."
Research institutes in M oscow cause the greatest concern in terms o f radiation. 
Several institutes such as the Kurchatov Institute (see Map 13, p 139), which has 27 
research nuclear reactors, are now deemed to be problematic." The Kurchatov Institute, 
in the north o f the city near the Sokol Metro Station, dates back to the 1940s. Originally 
the site was outside the city limits; however, with post-war expansion, the Institute is now  
part o f  a residential area, a mere eight miles from the city centre. Until recently, it was not 
obliged to open its doors to safety inspections, as were commercial/civil nuclear plants in 
Russia. Therefore, the danger levels were never really known.
In December 1992, two units at the Kurchatov Institute, with outputs o f  forty and 
eighty megawatts respectively, were closed down as their safety could not be 
guaranteed.*' A  year later there were reports that they may be restarted. According to 
Vladimir Kuznetsov, former head o f Gosatomnadzor (the State Atomic Watchdog), “this 
would have represented a serious danger to the city.”*^  In his opinion, all the reactors at
5^  Henni, F., and Overchuk, A., ‘Moscow Radiation Hunters,’ Moscow News. 14-20 April 1995, p 14.
5^  Lowe, C., ‘Moscow Sitting on Ecological Time Bomb,’ Moscow Tribune. No. 111(658), 16 June 1995,
p 16.
^ Kolesnikov, A., ‘Nuclear Sites in Moscow,’ Moscow News (No. 12), 12 March 1993, p 15.
Van der Laan, N., ‘Reactors Called Unsafe,’ Moscow Times. 1 April 1993, p i .
^  Op. cit. p 1.
- 138
Map 13
Milligrays 
per year
1-5 
2
Kurchatov Institute M m
of Nuclear Research MMa
Ismilova 
residential; 
area
The 
Kremlin
Shosse Entuziastov 
area (Chemical 
Weapons 
Research Institute)
r; Nuclear Research ... Institute 
(Leninsky 
Prospekt)
.7^
A Map of Moscow showing three of the research institutes  ^
which have caused elevated radiation readings.
Source : Perera. J., ‘Dirty Habits Plague Russia’s Health,’ 
New Scientist, 2 January 1993, p 9.
Page 139
the Institute built in the 1950s and 1960s which had not been updated, should be shut 
down permanently. The Deputy Director (Yakovlev) at the Institute claimed it was 
essential to restart these reactors in order to continue research into the safety o f ageing 
nuclear reactors." Today, the two units remain closed. However, round-the-clock work 
controlling the ventilation, fuel and water o f the reactors es still needed. There were 
plans to move the Institute outside M oscow by up to 100 km in 1985." Cash shortages 
have delayed the programme indefinitely.
In general, lack o f finance represents a great problem. In 1996, the Institute only 
received a third o f its annual budget.*® The 60 million roubles was just enough to pay the 
wages and cover emergency repairs. By 1997, money allocation did not even cover the 
wage bill. One third o f the work force had left, while the rest usually had to wait several 
months before receiving any money. With an average salary o f  £62.50 a month, far less 
than a driver is paid in the commercial sector, it is debatable how long staff at the 
Kurchatov Institute will remain loyal to their work. As the Institute has over 100 different 
sources o f radioactivity, it could potentially be “Chernobyl” in M oscow’s backyard.*®
In a historicial context, radioactive waste was not considered particularly 
dangerous and was haphazardly buried in inadequate containers in the grounds o f  
research institutes, at a depth which today could easily cause radiation levels to exceed 
recognised norms. Professor Gagarinsky fi’eely admits that waste containers are scattered 
through the grounds o f the Kurchatov Institute.*^ In total, it is estimated that there were 
80 dumpsites used by the research institutes in M oscow during the 1950s and 1960s. As 
very few maps o f these locations were kept and have remained unpublished, several 
disused sites have been built on in recent years.**
The Physics and Engineering Institute, located on the bank o f the M oscow River, 
is an example o f  how accidental contamination can occur. In July 1992, the main reactor 
was shut down because o f a fault which needed urgent repair. In order to carry out these 
repairs, radioactive water o f  medium activity used during normal operations had to be
^ Van der Laan, N., ‘Reactors Called Unsafe,’ Moscow Times. 1 April 1993, p i .
Op. cit. p 1.
^ Hearst, D., ‘Russia’s Lethal Timebomb,’ The Guardian. 3 March 1997, p 9.
5^ Op. cit. p 9.
^ Reuters, ‘Atomic Moscow,’ Moscow News. 14-20 April 1995, p 11.
^ Perera, J., ‘Dirty Habits Plague Russia’s Health,’ New Scientist. 2 January 1993, p 9.
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emptied into alternative containers. These containers were constructed o f concrete and 
redfire clay brick. As the reactor is on an elevation with the M oscow River flowing 
underneath, the structure o f the alternative containers was inadequate to prevent seepage 
o f radioactive water straight into the river."
In total, M oscow has over 50 nuclear installations," several outdated medical 
facilities and industrial enterprises which handle radioactive materials. There is not only a
r
potential danger to the local population, but also to the surrounding areas, as radiation 
does not respect man-made imaginary boundaries.
Health
With the current state o f air pollution in Moscow, the capital is a dangerous place 
to live in. In terms o f transportation, those living in the vicinity o f the Garden Ring are at 
most risk. It is estimated that on average children fall ill three times more often than those 
in other areas o f the city. '^ If the incidence o f respiratory complaints is analysed 
separately" children in the Garden Ring vicinity will succumb to such problems six times 
more than the national average." Industrial pollution can affect health in numerous ways. 
It can cause anything fi-om respiratory problems and allergies to cancer. As M oscow does 
have several radiation sources it could lead to increasing numbers o f  malignant tumours.
^ Kolesnikov, A., ‘Nuclear Sites in Moscow,’ Moscow News. No. 12, 12 March 1993, p 15.
Op. cit. p 15.
Yablokov, A., ‘Russia’s Environment,’ Earthwatch. March/April 1993, pp 2-3.
^ Respiratory problems have increased by over 600% in urban c2J\tres in the FSU over the last 15 years.
In : Golitsyn, G.S., ‘Ecological Problems in the CIS During the Transitional Period,’ RFE/RL Research 
Report. Vol. 2, Ho. 2, 8 January 1993, pp 33-42.
It should be noted that in the case of asthma, that the disorder, while aggravated by pollution levels 
especially traffic fiimes, is NOT caused by declining environmental conditions. Asthma cases have 
doubled worldwide over the last 20 years, but research has shown that pollution is not the cause of the 
allergic response. The fall o f the Berlin Wall gave scientists an appropriate test ground to test these 
results. If asthma was caused by pollution, then those living in East Germany, which was more polluted, 
should suffer more than those in West Germany. The opposite has actually occurred. Children in West 
Germany were 2Vz more likely to suffer from asthma, indicating that other factors caused the problem. It 
is suggested that the children in West Germany came into contact with fewer serious germs during their 
childhood (thanks to modem medicine and immunisation); therefore their actual immune systems were 
not as strong as those in Eastern Germany, where childhood diseases were still relatively prevalent. In : 
Radford, T., ‘Rise in Asthma Cases Linked to Decline in T.B.,’ The Guardian. 3 January 1997, p 5; AND 
‘Tmst Me, I’m a Doctor,’ BBC2, 11 December 1996.
Baiduzhy, A., ‘Yablokov Surveys Russia’s Environmental Woes,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 24 March 
1995, p 3.
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This could be problematic in the future as a recent study showed that 90% o f all children 
in M oscow are iodine deficient." Iodine is known to protect the thyroid gland from 
excessive radiation levels. If there is an iodine deficiency indirectly caused by inadequate 
amounts o f iodine in the soil, there could be complications in the form o f increased 
thyroid cancers. Overall, o f  the 100,000 children born in M oscow every year, only 28% 
are healthy." tj^all childhood diseases can be linked to ecological problems
(inclusive o f water pollution). The general decline in health o f M oscow’s young people is 
shown by a fall in average weight and height o f children during their natural growth 
patterns over the last decade."
The life expectancy o f  the indigenous population in M oscow has fallen by ten 
years since 1970." The capital is now ranked at 70* amongst the world’s 90 largest cities 
in terms o f  average life span.^* This, combined with a declining birthrate, means that 
M oscow has an ageing population ; 18.3% o f Muscovites are over the age o f  60." With 
this in mind, statistics can only decline. As with all health trends there are other 
influences, such as bad diet,'" excessive drinking and other forms o f  pollution (such as 
water contamination), which should be taken into consideration.
Kostyukova, O., ‘Russians don’t get Enough Iodine,’ Segodnva. 4 August 1997, p 3.
Baiduzhy, A., ‘Yablokov Surveys Russia’s Environmental Woes,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 24 March 
1995, p 3.
5^ Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow : A Mirror o f Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 
1993, p i .
5^ Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 9.
Op. cit. p 9.
^ Baiduzhy, A., ‘Moscow t/VMirror o f Russia’s Ecological Crisis,’ Nezavisimava gazeta. 12 August 
1993, p i .
For example, 80% of the milk bought in Moscow in 1993 did not meet safety standards. Op. cit. p 1.
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Chapter 11
Moscow Survey
A. Yablokov perceives pollution in the Former Soviet Union to be a catastrophic 
problem. In terms o f ranking the different types he feels that radiation contamination 
should take precedence. This is closely followed by water pollution and then air 
pollution.' Public perception is however different. In June 1990, a survey o f 96,000 
people in 850 cities showed that Russians feel that air pollution is the most problematic, 
followed by water and then radiation.^
In order to ascertain public perceptions regarding air pollution and radiation 
contamination, this researcher (Rebecca White), made an environmental survey, between 
March and April 1993, in which 75 inhabitants o f  M oscow took part. Taking into account 
the limited time and financial resources available the survey was random in nature. The 
results were as follows (see pp 143- 173)®.
General Questions on Air Pollution 1-14
See Appendix (p 222) for a fiill list o f  questions.
Question 1
The questionnaire provides three definitions o f air pollution. The first definition 
encompasses an overall description indicating that changes in the atmosphere can be 
caused by both natural and artificial elements. The second implies air pollution is 
predominantly fi'om an industrial source, therefore man-made. The third definition is very 
limited, suggesting that air pollution is only sulphur emissions.
 ^ Yablokov, A., ‘Russia’s Environment,’ Earthwatch. March-April 1993, pp 2-3.
5 Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 76.
 ^ The use of graphs in chapters 11, 12 and 13 provide visual aids to the survey results. They also contain 
the complete set of statistical results to certain questions, which are not necessarily in written format 
within the text. This will enable any future researcher to analyse the results in greater depth.
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The majority o f  those surveyed (93.33%) indicated that they believed the best 
description to be either the first or second definition. Many actually acknowledged both o f  
these statements. While 6.66% did not answer the question, nobody considered the third 
definition to be adequate.
Question 2
The initial point o f this question was not to ascertain if the inhabitants o f  M oscow  
could correctly state which country/block created the most pollution on a sliding scale o f  
1 to 3, but to detect if residents still believed pollution was purely a problem o f capitalist 
societies. If this was the case, the ranking would be America, Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe. Unfortunately, the question was misunderstood as only one area was indicated, 
therefore the above analysis does not work. The actual results showed that:
i) 17.33% perceived Western Europe created the most pollution.
ii) 13.33% perceived United States created the most pollution.
iii) 57.33% perceived Eastern Europe created the most pollution.
iv) 12% did not answer the question.
When split into gender categories, the results are slightly different;24.13% o f  men 
believed the United States created the most pollution compared with 6.5% o f  women. 
10.34% o f men and 21.73% o f women perceived Western Europe to be the main culprit. 
However, over half o f each category (52% men, 62% women) believed the Eastern block 
to be the main polluter.
Although it could be argued that those who felt the USA created the most 
pollution still believe the old communist ideas outlined previously, it would be an 
inappropriate analysis as, in terms o f total stationarv airborne emissions, the United States 
and the former USSR (therefore Eastern Block) are nearly on comparable terms. In 1987, 
the USA had 57.2 million tonnes o f emissions, while the USSR emitted 57.4 million 
tonnes.^ Levels o f different types o f  pollutants do, however, vary dramatically between
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 35.
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the two countries. For example Graph 1, page 146 shows the different levels o f carbon 
dioxide emissions from several countries. It indicates that air pollution is a problem o f  
industrialised countries irrespective o f political background.
While I cannot prove by these results that some Russians still hold misguided 
interpretations o f air pollution sources, owing to almost a lifetime under a totalitarian 
regime, it should be noted that two elderly gentlemen (about 65 years o f  age), refused to 
answer the questionnaire on the ground that it was anti-Communist to suggest that 
M oscow could have a pollution problem.
Question 3
The population density o f Russian urban areas has grown dramatically since the 
end o f  the Second World War. In 1995, 68.1% o f  the population lived in large towns or 
cities; by the year 2025 this is estimated to increase to 80.4%.® As M oscow houses ten 
million people, question 3 tried to ascertain if  the residents believe air pollution is only an 
urban problem.
The results show that 74.66% o f Muscovites surveyed realise that air pollution is 
not just an urban phenomenon, but a general problem. A further 17.33% incorrectly 
answered while 8% left the question blank. Unlike the Murmansk response, there was no 
real gender split as both 72.41% o f men and 76% o f women felt that air pollution was not 
purely an urban problem.
Question 4
In total 93.3% o f the sample group believe air pollution to be severe or very 
severe, 5.3% quite severe and a mere 1.3% not severe. The high percentage o f  people 
who regard the problem as serious reinforces a previous 1990 M oscow Poll which 
indicated that 98% o f people were worried about pollution above rising crime, 
international conflict and food shortages.® Yet again the differences between the two 
genders is slight. For example, 37.93% of men and 39.1% women classified Russia’s air 
pollution problem as severe.
5 World Urbanisation Prospects. United Nations, 1993.
5 Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the USSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 76.
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Question 5
In M oscow 93.33% o f the sample group felt that air pollution had increased over 
the last ten years, 1.33% felt it had decreased, while 5.33% felt there had been little 
change. This could be in response to the growth o f motor vehicles in the capital. Local 
people will have witnessed the problem first hand in lengthening commuter times and 
gridlock situations on the highways. Public information about polluting industries will 
have become more available in the last ten years, therefore giving the perception o f  an 
increase, even when stationary emissions have actually decreased owing to a fall in 
output.
The results from this survey show an increase in the number o f  people who felt 
that air quality had worsened between 1985 and 1990. The June 1990 poll in the Former 
Soviet Union showed only 66% felt air quality had declined.^ This could indicate that by 
my 1993 poll, the public felt that the fall o f Communism had actually led to an increase in 
air pollution, suggesting that the old Soviet contention that capitalist society creates the 
most pollution still had its adherents.
Question 6
While the residents o f M oscow appreciate there is an air pollution problem in the 
city, they do not realise the balance between emissions from transport and industry. In the 
1990s, transport accounts for 80% o f pollution, while industry accounts for 
approximately 20%. Graph 2 page 148 shows that only three people believe pollution 
from industry represents 0-20% o f M oscow’s air pollution problem; this is a mere 4%. 
Only five people or 6.66% recognise that transport creates 80-100% o f M oscow’s air 
pollution. This either indicates that the population does not know the correct breakdown 
o f pollution sources or that the question was misinterpreted. The latter could well be true, 
because if only three people felt that industry created 0-20% o f  M oscow’s pollution, then 
only three people should have indicated that transport created 80-100% o f  the city’s 
pollution, not the five shown on the graph. The figures do not adjust to 100%.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 76.
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Question 7
The survey indicated that 32% o f the sample group believed foreign investment 
would lead to an increase in pollution. 30.66% believed it would decrease and 3%% felt 
there would be no change, 5.33% did not answer the question. When split into genders 
the results were similar. However, if  the age groups are looked at separately there are 
some different results. When taking the 16-25, 46-55 and 56-65 age groups the results 
are;
Age Group
Response 16-25 46-55 56-65
Increase 55.7% 21.4% 0
Decrease 16.6% 35.6% 33.33%
No Change 27.7% 43.0% 333394
No Answer 0 0 33.33%
Table 4 H ow  D ifferen t A s e  G rouys Perceive F o re isn  Investm ent 
w ill a ffec t P ollu tion  Levels.
It is surprising that such a high percentage o f  young people believe pollution levels 
will increase when compared with the older age groups. M oscow has it^fair share o f  
foreign investment already, e.g. MacDonalds, Pizza Hut, etc., and it is possible that this 
generation linked the perceived increase in emissions over the last ten years with the 
introduction o f  these retail food outlets. Some would expect such results to come from 
the older age groups, especially the 56-65 category. In fact, as the Table shows, the 
opposite has occurred. This could show that even the younger elements o f Russian 
society, owing to the educational system and society in general, still believed some o f  the 
anti-capitalistic propaganda employed by the previous tptalitarian regime.
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Question 8
A  Gallup poll based on the Russian Federation in February 1993 showed that 65% 
o f the population felt information linked to environmental issues was insufficient.® When 
my survey asked how well environmental issues were reported, only 9.33% felt that they 
were covered well, 54.66% believed they were satisfactory, while 36% regarded such 
issues to be reported badly.
Question 9 - Can You Trust Environmental Information 
Provided by Russia?
a) Television - the survey reveals that 45% o f  the sample group does not 
trust environmental information provided by television, 44% ds^ trust this source, while 
the remaining 11% did not answer the question. Graph 3, page 151, shows the difference 
between the two genders.
b) Radio - the sample shows that 42% ^  trust the information provided by 
the radio, an equal amount do not trust radio transmissions, while 16% refrained from 
answering, therefore suggesting that they do not know whether to trust the information or 
not.
c) Newspapers - 42% o f the group believe the contents o f  newspapers, 42% 
do not, while 16% left the question blank.
d) Government Statements - this section shows a greater difference than the 
others. Only 29.33% feel they can trust environmental information provided by the 
Government; 61.33% still do not trust the Government’s integrity. Graph 4, p 152, shows 
the respective differences between the two genders. It shows that in general the female 
population believe government sources more than their male counterparts. Graph 5, p 
153, shows the percentage o f  each age group which trusted Government information. The 
biggest anomaly is seen in the 56-65 age group. While only 28.5% o f the females in this 
age group trust this source, a staggering 100% o f men do.
 ^ Kochurov, B., ‘European Russia.’ In: Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the 
Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, Oxford, 1995, p 57.
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Question 10
By 1993 there were over 100 environmental groups in M oscow / Examples 
include :
i) Bitsa. a residents’ association in South West Moscow, which
opposed the construction o f  an amusement park in Bitsevsky Park/®
ii) Studenets, formed to try to prevent the International Trade Centre
from encroaching into the neighbourhood park.”
It should be noted that most groups are small and deal with individual issues 
which directly affect the local population.
The Socio-Ecological Union (SEU) formed in 1988 is also based in M o s c o w .I t  
acts as an independent clearing house which co-ordinates environmental activities 
throughout the former Soviet Union for over 150 affiliated organisations.^^
If the number o f environmental groups is an indication o f an environmental 
consciousness in Moscow, some results o f  the survey are unexpected. Obviously, Green 
Peace is an international organisation, therefore, it is not surprising that 89.33% o f the
sample had knowledge o f  the group. Green World originated in the Ukraine, but it
publishes an environmental paper which can be obtained at various outlets. Occasionally, 
they are referred to in such newspapers as Izvestiva. An example o f  this is an article by K. 
Smirnov, ‘What we are Breathing,’ Izvestiva, 4 November 1992, which stated that Green 
World was publishing a “best seller,” the State Report on the Condition o f the 
Environment in Russia. Unfortunately, only 37.33% o f  Muscovites had any knowledge o f  
this organisation.
® McKay, B., ‘Local Greens,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 57.
Op . cit. p 57.
“ Op. cit. p 57.
TASS Report, 27 December 1988.
Suokko, K., ‘After the Fall,’ Earthwatch. Januaiy/Februaiy 1993, p 20.
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The M oscow Ecological Federation was founded in M oscow in 1988/^  ^As it is an 
organisation set up for environmental issues in the city it is disappointing that only 
25.33% o f the sample group had ever heard o f the organisation.
Question 11
This question is designed to evaluate how active the local population is in 
environmental circles. The results show that only 21.33% o f the sample group had signed 
an environmental petition. A  mere 1.33% had demonstrated about an environmental 
issue. The reliability o f  the latter answer could be shown by the fact that only 150 people 
turned up to a demonstration (organised by the M oscow Ecology Federation) in Gorky 
Park during June 1993. It is estimated that 120 o f  these people were well-known 
activists.”
A survey by the USSR Institute o f  Sociology in May 1990 indicated that 79% o f  
the population were willing to help the ecological movement by donations.” However, in 
1993, when asked if  they had contributed to an environmental campaign, the response 
was very different, at only 14.66%.
The wording o f  a question can lead to very different responses. As an example, in 
1990, 76.6% stated they would not tolerate environmental pollution for the sake o f  
economic development.”  Yet only 10% would have polluting enterprises shut down.”
Question 12
Russia has experienced a decline in life expectancy in recent years. In general 89% 
o f  people in the Russian Federation feel environmental problems have affected their 
health.” Question 12 attempts to ascertain if  the residents o f M oscow feel their health has 
detrimentally been affected by five different sources.
McKay, B., ‘Local Greens,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 57.
Op. cit. p 57.
Lupandin, V., and Denisovsky, G., ‘The Greens Earn Public Trust,’ In: Riordan, J., Soviet Social 
Reality in the Mirror of Glasnost. St. Martins Press, London, 1992, p 121.
” Op . cit. p 121.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the USSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 81. 
Piyde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, p 34.
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Causes Yes No No Response
i) Stress 66.66% 32% 1.33%
ii) Industry 65.33% 33.33% 1.33%
iii) Transport 68%& 30.66% L33%
iv) Own Behaviour 38.66% 60% 1.33%
v) Living Standards 50.66% 48% 1.33%
Table 5 In fluences on Health.
The results from section (ii) Industry and (iii) Transport are very similar. There 
were very few differences between genders or separate age groups. It could indicate that 
people perceive pollution from the two sources as being equally problematic, therefore 
they still do not appreciate that nearly 80% o f pollution comes from transportation. Fewer 
people, 38.66%, feel that their own actions have detrimentally affected their health. With 
ever increasing incidences o f  alcoholism and drug abuse this figure could increase in the 
future. As an example, in 1997, 12% o f conscripts were regarded as alcoholics, while 8% 
were drug addicts.^® 50.66% o f  people feel living standards have affected their health. 
Moscow is a crowded city with a population density o f  300 per sq. km.,^^  therefore this 
response in combination with economic problems over recent years is not surprising. A  
Gallup Poll in 1993 in the Russian Federation showed that only 20% o f people would like 
to move.^  ^ While this could show the above figures on living standards to be an 
exaggeration, one should take into account social ties, work commitments etc. In the case 
o f Moscow, the difficulty in moving into the region (i.e. obtaining an apartment), should 
also be taken into consideration
Question 13
As with question 2, this question was misinterpreted. Many did not answer the 
question at all. Those who did just ticked several boxes relating to one o f the following; 
inflation, food shortages, political instability, radiation, housing problems, air pollution.
Verda, A., ‘Russia’s Demographic Cross,’ Nezavisimava eazeta. 15 May 1997, pp 1-2.
Trofimova, Z., ‘Moscow Province is no Place to Vacation,’ Segodnva. 16 August 1995, p 21.
Kochurov, B., ‘European Russia.’ In: Piyde, P., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the 
Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, Oxford, 1995, p 57.
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Not one person ranked these categories in order o f  severity 1 to 7; therefore the response 
was inadequate to make any judgements.
Question 14
Source Good Satisfactory Bad No
Answer
Industry 0 28% 69.33% 2.66%
Transport 0 24% 72% 4%
Nuclear Installations 4% 42.66% 44% 9.33%
\
Agriculture 2.6% 42.66% 50%^ 4.33%
Research Institutes 9.33% 49.66% 37% 4%
Table 6 H ow  E ffective  are G overnm ent S teps to Curb Pollu tion?
The results show the majority o f  the sample group do not believe that Government 
steps to curb pollution are effective. The perception o f  attempts linked to industry and 
transport are more negative than the other groups. This is probably because they perceive 
transport and industry to have a greater effect on their lifestyle in M oscow than 
agriculture and nuclear installations. This survey took place in March/April 1993. The 
Tomsk Accident occurred on 17 April 1993, therefore the results for section (iii) nuclear 
installations, can be divided into two categories, before and after the incident. Graph 6, p 
158, shows the different responses. Surprisingly, it shows that while 0% felt Government 
steps were very good before the accident, 4% felt they were very good after the incident. 
A smaller percentage felt measures were satisfactory after the incident than before, while 
a similar percentage regarded measures to be bad throughout. The response could 
indicate that Tomsk was too far away to represent a problem, therefore the sample group 
did not consider it when answering the survey. It could also suggest that people believed 
reports connected to the accident stating that the situation was not dangerous. This, 
however, would not be totally supported by the results from question 9 as many do not 
trust information provided.
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As described earlier, Moscow does have a radiation problem. The following 
questions, 15-20 were designed to ascertain the awareness o f the inhabitants o f the city.
Question 15
Graph 7, p 160, shows how close people perceive their homes to be to a nuclear 
energy plant. The majority 40% feel that the distance is IOO-l25+km. This could take 
into account the Obninsk power plant which is approximately 125 km. south west o f  
Moscow. However, there are several small nuclear plants in Moscow itself. Those at the 
Kurchatov Institute are only fZ  km. from the city centre, therefore many people could 
live much closer than they actually think. This either indicates"'that people do not know 
about the research institutes’ nuclear facilities or that they thought the question was 
referring to a commercial nuclear power plant which would be over 125 km. away.
Question 16
Response Percentage
Yes 30.66%
No 46.66%
Don’t Know 21.33%
No Answer 1.33%
Table 7 P rior to the C hernobyl A cciden t d id  you C onsider N uclear P lants to he
P olentia llv  D anserous?
Table 7 (above) indicates that 46.66% o f the population did not perceive nuclear 
energy to be dangerous before the Chernobyl Accident. When split into genders (Graph 8, 
p 161) more females than males perceived nuclear energy to be safe; 52% o f  females did 
not see any danger compared to 38% o f men.
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Question 15 - Moscow 
How Close Is Your Home To A Nuclear Energy Plant ?
30-
25-
20 -
l “ -
10-
y /
t
V 1 m j Z
0 - 25 25 - 50 50 - 75 75-100
Distance in KM
T
100 - 125 No Answer
Distances in km Number of People
0 - 2 5 6
2 5 -5 0 5
50-75 3
75-100 10
100-125 30
No Answer 21
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Owing to Soviet propaganda, nuclear energy was portrayed as safe, therefore the 
older the participants, the more unlikely they would be to perceive nuclear energy as 
dangerous pre-Chemobyl. The results from each age group do not totally support this 
theory (Table 8). As the 16-25 age group would have been between 9 and 18 at the time 
of Chernobyl, the results from this particular section would have been limited; therefore, 
they have not been listed.
Age Group Percentage
26-35 30%
36-45 60%
46-55 33%
56-65 66%
Table 8 Percentage o f  E ach  D ifferen t A s e  Group, who d id  no t Perceive N uclear E n ersy
to be D anserons before 1986.
Question 17 - Seven Years After Chernobyl would You Knowingly 
Eat Food Grown in the Exclusion Zone?
The results are:-
65.33% stated they would not eat the food.
13.33% stated they did not know
14.66% would only eat the food as a last resort.
1.33% gave no answer.
surprising 5.33% said they would eat the food grown in the zone, suggesting that 
they believe the zone to be relatively clean. Perhaps they believe Government attempts to 
solve the radiation problem in and around Chernobyl have been successful.
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Question 18
Graph 9, p 164, shows that the majority, 87%, believe Russia’s radiation problem 
to be severe or very severe, 9% perceive the situation to be quite severe, while 4% believe 
it is not severe. When split into genders (Graph 10, p 165), it became obvious that it is 
only the male element o f  the survey which perceives there is not a real problem. 10% of  
males believe radiation in Russia is not severe. In general, the female section regards the 
severity to be greater than their male counterparts. In total, 96% o f  the polled females 
believe the problem to be severe or very severe; this compares with 73% o f men.
Question 19
While the majority believe there is a radiation problem in Russia, only 8% would 
like to see the country abandon its nuclear energy programme, 54% would move away 
from nuclear energy if  an alternative was found, suggesting that they do perceive such 
energy to be potentially dangerous. While 11% did not know if  the nuclear programme 
should come to an end, 27% obviously felt the industry had a future in Russia. This 
section possibly believes that nuclear energy is the only way to produce sufficient amounts 
o f power, without producing vast amounts o f  Greenhouse gases. When split into 
genders, we see in Graph 11, (p 166) a vast difference o f opinion. In percentage terms 
over half the men would not want to abandon the nuclear programme. This compares to 
10.87% o f women. The other main difference comes under the alternative energy section. 
Nearly 68% o f  women would abandon the nuclear programme if  an alternative energy 
source was found, while only 34.4% o f men would. The reluctance to give up nuclear 
energy even if  an alternative energy is devised could be linked to the extensive costs 
involved in developing new energy sources. When taking into consideration clean-up 
costs after nuclear accidents, this could however be short-sighted.^^ Within the male 
section the older the person, the more reluctant they were to abandon the nuclear 
programme; 71% o f the 46-55 age group wanted to keep the nuclear programme. This 
increases to a staggering 100% o f the 56-65 age group.
Yablokov believes the cost to rehabilitate radioactive polluted areas in Russia to be between 300 and 
500 billion US dollars. In ; Suokko, K., ‘After the Fall,’ Earthwatch. Januaiy/Februaiy 1993, p20.
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Question 20
Graphs 12-17, pp 168-173, show that overall the vast majority feel the 
Government is withholding information about all sections o f  nuclear activities. In general, 
the female population is more cynical than its male counterparts. When asked about 
fallout from Chernobyl, 83% o f  women do not believe the Government is totally 
forthcoming with information, compared with 58% o f  men (p 169). A  similar response is 
shown with section (d), radiation dumpsites (p 172).
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Question 20a - Moscow Females 
Fallout From Chernobyl
Female
Yes 38
No 8
Total 46
Question 20a - Moscow Males 
Fallout From Chernobyl
No Answer 
14%
Male
Yes 17
No 8
No Answer 4
Total 29
Page 169
Question 20b - Moscow
Radiation Surrounding Nuclear Weapon Sites
No Answer
5%
Question 20c - Moscow 
Radiation Surrounding Research Institutes
No Answer 
8%
Page 170
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Question 20d - Moscow Females
Radioactive Dumpsites
No No Answer 
4% Female
Yes 42
No 2
No Answer 2
Total 46
Question 20d - Moscow Maies 
Radioactive Dumpsites
No Answer
7%
Male
Yes 20
No 7
No Answer 2
Total 29
Page 172
Question 20e - Moscow 
Contaminated Food Supplies
No Answer
5%
Question 20f - Moscow 
Number Of Deaths Attributed To Radiation
No Answer 
8%
Page 173
Conclusions
The state o f the environment in Moscow is mirrored in many Russian cities. 
Pollution from all sources has meant that only 720,000 o f  the 9 million population (1989) 
live in ecologically acceptable areas.Aj-tph o f all illnesses amongst the population can be 
attributed to bad environmental conditions.^"^
Although economic output has declined and there has been an overall fall in air 
pollution emissions throughout Russia as a whole, M oscow’s problems are not radically 
improving. While industrial emissions and radiation contamination continue to pollute the 
atmosphere to a lesser extent, the main problem comes in the form o f transportation. An 
ever increasing car fleet, o f  old poorly maintained vehicles, causes 80% o f  the city’s air 
pollution problem. In terms o f public concerns over environmental problems in Moscow, 
the economic downturn has taken its toll. In 1990, 98%^ o f those polled in the capital 
were concerned about the pollution problem; by 1996 this had fallen to 80%.^^
In 1990 the authorities planned to triple industry in Moscow. This in turn would 
increase transport and housing by approximately one-third.^  ^According to L. Rubinchuk, 
a member o f the M oscow Ecology Federation, the city is already overcrowded. M oscow  
can only comfortably house seven million people, therefore there is already a surplus o f  
over two million residents.^  ^ Such an expansion o f the city, combined with a consumer 
boom in the future, could have catastrophic implications for the environment, unless 
measures are put in place to alleviate the problem now.
It is evident from the 1993 survey that the level o f knowledge linked to the issues 
surrounding industrial and transportation pollution is similar across the two genders. 
Differences occur when analysing the nuclear pollution section as it indicates that when 
compared with their male counterparts women did not actually perceive nuclear energy to 
be as potentially dangerous (pre-Chemobyl). It also shows that since the Chernobyl 
accident women perceive radiation to be a greater problem than do men and are far more 
likely to agree to a transfer from nuclear energy production to other energy sources.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J.R, Ecocide in the USSR Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 94.
Op. cit. p 88.
Varchenya, A., ‘Environmental Police to be created in Moscow,’ Segodnva. 25 September 1996, p 12.
McKay, B., ‘Local Greens,’ Moscow Magazine. June/July 1993, p 57.
^ Op. cit. p 57.
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If the female population perceive pollution to be more severe than their male 
counterparts and, in general, are more distrustful o f Government environment sources, it 
could be argued that future environmental movements may come from this sector o f  
society. This would follow the trend in Western societies, where minoritv women’s 
groups are renowned for environmental activism. Greenham Common, near Newbury in 
the United Kingdom, is a prime example. Even after the nuclear missiles were removed 
from the US military base in 1989, a small contingent o f women remained outside the old 
main entrance to the base in order to ensure that the land was returned to the local 
people.
This type o f  women’s movement has not yet materialised in Russia. It could well 
be that the current economic and social demands on Russian women are too great to 
allow them time, energy and material resources to devote, to environmental campaigns. 
Most Russian women have to contend both with family duties and with their role as a 
major breadwinner, especially during the on-going post-communist economic transition 
period. Furthermore, in as much as it takes time for attitudes to change (emanating from 
previous totalitarian rule), it is unlikely that women will play a major part in 
environmental issues in the near future.
A general upsurge o f a public environmental consciousness involving both genders 
is also unlikely at present. While there was the establishment o f small environmental 
groups in Moscow during the late 1980s and early 1990s, they have been predominantly 
short-lived owing to economic hardship and the fact that administration and organisation 
o f such groups tended to be inadequate. A general lack o f experience is evident in such 
groups which would previously have been forbidden under the old totalitarian regime.
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Chapter 12 
The Kola Peninsula
A four-week visit to Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula in 1994 provided me with 
first hand experience o f a region with diverse environmental problems. The two main air 
pollution sources are linked to nuclear activities in and around Murmansk, and the 
smelting works based at the industrial centres o f Monchegorsk and Nikel.
Murmansk
The Kola Peninsula is situated in the Polar Circle. It covers 144,900 sq. km,  ^ has 
borders with Finland and Norway, and has a population o f approximately 1.1 million.^ 
Murmansk is the largest city on the Peninsula. Although it was officially founded in 1916, 
the city’s expansion did not occur until after the Second World War. Today, the city 
spreads out on three natural terraces leading away from the docks and has a population o f  
approximately 460,000.^
Photographs 1 and 2, p 177, taken by the researcher fi*om a window on the third 
floor o f The Meridian Hotel, Vorovsky Street, give an indication o f  the size o f  the port 
facilities. The area is o f great concern as the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC), 
based at “Atomflot”, two kilometres north o f  Murmansk central harbour is the main 
operator o f civil nuclear vessels. The company has eight nuclear icebreakers which have 
enabled Russia to operate increased levels o f shipping along the northern coast o f Siberia 
during the winter months for many years."^  The original icebreaker (1959) Lenin is now  
permanently out o f operation and based at Atomflot as a museum.^ (The nuclear reactors 
have been dismantled and stored on the Lepse.y  The Arktika and Sibir are currently in 
dock for extensive repairs at a cost o f ten billion roubles, as they do not reach
‘ Timofeev, A., ‘Muman,’ Guidebook. MIA Contact, 1992.
 ^ Bohmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and ArkhangeTsk 
counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, The Bellona Foundation, Oslo, 1994, p 13.
 ^ Op. cit. p 76.
MacKenzie, D., ‘Whole Reactors Lurk under Barents Sea,’ New Scientist. 13 February 1993, p 9.
 ^ ‘Russia’s Deep Secret,’ Horizon. BBC2, 16 January 1995.
 ^ Bohmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and ArkhangeTsk 
counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, The Bellona Foundation, Oslo, 1994, pp 76-92.
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Views of Murmansk Harbour
Photo 1
Photo 2
Photos : R. White
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international safety standards/ (Photos 3, 4 and 5, pp 179-180 taken o f  the harbour, 
during a boat trip in October 1994, show decaying ships and icebreakers, moored at 
frequent intervals.)
The Murmansk Shipping Company is experiencing great economic problems. The 
Russian Government is now only part owner o f the industry, as structural changes in 1993 
privatised 51% o f  the company.^ Even with the Government contributions, the MSC has 
large debts, as the cargo transportation business has declined dramatically. In order to 
finance the wages o f  the icebreakers’ 2,000 strong workforce, the ships have become 
floating tourist hotels. A  three-week cruise to the North Pole costs in the region o f  US 
$2ï^0fr*
Nuclear icebreakers are based on pressurised water reactor (PWR) systems. The 
fuel assemblies need replacing every four years." The work is mainly carried out at 
Atomflot, although some general maintenance occurs at dry docks in Murmansk central 
harbour. The largest vessels have to be maintained at Severomorsk, a military base for the 
Northern Fleet situated in the Murmansk Fjord. The spent fuel rods are stored on service 
ships or at a processing plant at Atomflot.'^
In total MSC also has five service and storage boats for nuclear waste and used 
fuel rods. They include the Imandra. Lotta. Serebrvanka. Volodavskv and the Lepse. All 
are based at Atomflot. The most problematic ship is the Lense. This ship was designated 
as the service ship to the Lenin in 1966, during an accident which killed 30 crew 
members.*^ Between 319 and 321 fuel assemblies from the Lenin reactor were transferred 
to the Lepse. The fuel assemblies were not sufficiently cooled, therefore would not fit into 
the specialist containment area on the Lepse without using the force o f  a sledgehammer.^"  ^
Radioactive fragments were dispersed over the ship. The incident was inadvertently 
discovered by the West in the early 1980s, by which time the Soviet
 ^ Bohmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and ArkhangeTsk 
counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, The Bellona Foundation, Oslo, 1994, pp 76-92.
 ^ Op. cit. p 76.
® Op . cit. p 79.
Op. cit. p 79.
" Op . cit. p 79.
" Op. cit. p 80.
" Op . cit. p 80.
" Op. cit. p 80.
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Photo 3
Ships, Icebreaker in Murmansk Fiord
Photo 4
Photos : R. White
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Government was attempting to remedy the problem by covering the storage section with 
cement, a form o f sarcophagus/^
Today the Lepse contains 650 spent fuel rods, which are cracking and leaking/^ It 
is still based at Atomflot. The immediate problem is to prevent it from flipping over and 
sinking. It will represent a highly radioactive problem for the next 300,000 years. Other 
service ships, such as the Imandra, have reached their full capacity and are waiting for 
their contents to be transported to Chelyabinsk 65" for reprocessing. As the MSC are in 
financial difficulties, they have been unable to pay Chelyabinsk 65 for these services. In 
the case o f the Imandra, this means that some o f her 1,200 spent rods have been stored 
for over four years; thev should onlv be there for six months.^ ° The Imandra is still in 
service. While she never leaves Murmansk harbour, she is used to transport fish from the 
quayside to larger cargo ships, potentially contaminating the water, air and fish cargoes.^’
The Russian Government is not in a financial position to solve these problems. 
The European Union is planning to finance a clean-up operation in the Northern territories. 
A few EU ministers have visited Murmansk to witness the problem first hand. A  
mini-conference was held on the Lenin in Murmansk harbour in October 1994, with the 
Greek ambassador to the EU.^  ^More recently, Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary,
visited the region in early March 1999. 23
The main environmental problem in Murmansk comes from the threat o f  nuclear 
radiation leaks. There are not only problems from the Atomflot base, but from the military 
base found farther upstream. In total there are 118^ nuclear vessels stationed in
‘Russia’s Deep Secrets,’ Horizon. BBC2, 16 January 1995.
Edwards, M., ‘Pollution in the former USSR,’ National Geographic. Vol. 186, No. 2, August 1994, pp 
70-100.
‘Russia’s Deep Secrets,’ Horizon. BBC2, 16 January 1995.
Edwards, M., ‘Pollution in the former USSR,’ National Geographic. Vol. 186, No. 2, August 1994, pp 
70-100.
Bohmer, N., and Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and ArkhangeTsk 
counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1, The Bellona Foundation, Oslo, 1994, pp 76-92.
Edwards, M., ‘Pollution in the former USSR,’ National Geographic. Vol. 186, No. 2, August 1994, pp 
70-100.
Op. cit. p 80.
Conversation with Frederic Hauge, head of Bellona, Murmansk ofirce, October 1994.
Harding, A., ‘Murmansk,’ Earlv Morning News. BBCl, 3 March 1999.
MacKenzie, D., ‘Whole Reactors Lurk under the Barents Sea,’ New Scientist. 13 February 1993, p 9.
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the Murmansk Fjord, which potentially could create a disaster.^ This, combined with the 
wider problems o f radiation contamination o f  Novaya Zemlya and surrounding oceans, 
(refer to Chapter 7), means that the Northern territories have become an ‘Arctic 
Chernobyl.
Nikel and Monchegorsk
The other main sources o f  air pollution on the Kola Peninsula are caused by the 
heavy metal industries at Nikel and Monchegorsk. M oscow enforced high quota levels 
without financing the relevant ecological measures. As a result, the environment and the 
people o f  the Kola Peninsula have suffered dramatically.
Nikel
The Pechenganikel plant, situated at Nikel, is jointly owned by the Norilsk Nickel 
Corporation and the Russian Central Government. The nickel smelting factory has three 
250 ft high chimney stacks which belch out yellow/grey fumes into the atmosphere.^^ The 
same fumes are visible from cracks, broken windows etc. in the dilapidated, ageing 
buildings which house the industry.
It is estimated that 250,000^^ tonnes o f  sulphur dioxide are emitted per annum in 
order to produce 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  tonnes o f low grade nickel.^" Although the levels o f sulphur 
emissions have fallen slightly in the 1990s (1992 - 276,000 tonnes, 1993 - 256,506 
tonnes),^° the figures do not correlate with the fall in the production o f  nickel over the 
same period. During these 12 months, emissions only fell by approximately 8 %, while 
production decreased by 35%."
In October 1995, the electricity supplies to the nuclear submarine base in Murmansk were cut because 
of unpaid bills. Armed troops forced the electrical company to reconnect the supplies in order to prevent a 
nuclear accident.
It should be noted that Murmansk has other pollution-related problems. They include a) water supply 
b) global wamung which can lead to a significant melting of the polar ice-cap. In that case, Murmansk as 
a low-lying area will be subjected to increased flooding. In : Hearst, D., ‘Disarming Strains Russian 
Purse,’ The Guardian. 26 October 1995, p 13.
Vidal, J., ‘Nikel and Dimes,’ The Guardian. 9 November 1994, pp 2-3 
'" Oo. c it .p 2 .
Op. cit. p 3.
" Phillipov, S., ‘Pechenganickel,’ unpublished, provided by Bellona, Murmansk, October 1994, pp 1-3.
" Op. cit. p 2.
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The industrial emissions in Nikel have had severe consequences for the 20,000 
population/^ Reports indicate that most people suffer from headaches and sickness. 
According to Dr. Kolmakov, at the local hospital 90% o f the patients have damaged 
lungs." There are also high incidences o f  cerebral palsy, eczema and asthma in children." 
If at all possible, people try to stay indoors with their windows and doors closed on the 
days when pollution levels are at their highest. It is claimed that drinking milk alleviates 
some o f the symptoms. While children may be encouraged to drink milk, reports indicate 
that many adults, especially men, prefer vodka."
Declining health in the city has led to a fall in life expectancy to an average o f  
46-47 years for men and 55 for women. This (male) is comparable to the rate around the 
Semipalatinsk Range affected by severe radiation contamination. The true life expectancy 
figure for Nikel could actually be less. Peterson believes it could be as low as 42 years for 
men.^  ^The figures can only be estimated as in the past most people only came to the area 
for a few years and then moved on. Under the communist regime workers were 
encouraged to come to the region by high wages, which in theory were to compensate for 
bad working conditions and an inhospitable climate. Today with hyper inflation, wages 
and savings have become almost worthless. People have problems purchasing basic 
foodstuffs, especially as perishable goods on the Kola Peninsula are relatively more 
expensive than in other regions owing to higher transportation costs. A  decline in the 
standard o f living, especially diet-related, will also have had a detrimental effect on life 
expectancy.
The industry at Nikel pollutes the atmosphere severely; 700 sq. km. around the 
plant have become a man-^ade desert.^* Flora and fauna do not survive and the health o f  
the population has declined significantly, yet the plant, which is known to exceed MPC
Black, I., ‘New Dangers in Frozen Wasteland,’ The Guardian. 21 March 1997, p 15.
Vidal, J., ‘Nikel and Dimes,’ The Guardian. 9 November 1994, pp 2-3.
Inereases in eczema and asthma were confirmed during conversation with Dr. P. Lubov in Murmansk, 
October 1994.
Phillipov, S., ‘Pechenganickel,’ unpublished, provided by Bellona, Murmansk, October 1994, pp 1-3. 
^ Alexei Rogenko, ‘Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic.’ In : Massey Stewart, J., The Soviet 
Environment. Problems. Policies and Politics.’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p216.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacv of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 21.
^ Vidal, J., ‘Nikel and Dimes,’ The Guardian. 9 November 1992, pp 2-3.
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pollution levels on at least 30 days every year," has only been shut down once in the last 
40 years/®
One o f  the solutions to the pollution problems in Nikel is quite simple: shut the 
plant down and rebuild the industry with modem technology. This would incur a great 
financial cost, not only in terms o f  replacement, but in lost revenue during the transitional 
period. It is estimated that this plan would cost $1.5 billion.^  ^ There would also be an 
additional social cost, with the dislocation o f  the local working population. The 
Pechenganikel plant laid off over 1,000 workers in 1993, so people are already fearfiil for 
their jobs."^  ^ If the plant closed, the whole Kola Peninsula would be facing even greater 
economic hardship insofar as the plant provides substantial contributions to the local 
budget revenue, via taxation." This particular solution, while beneficial to the 
environment, is not viable in economic terms at present.
Another potential solution would be to install new filters. At present, existing 
scmbbers only remove 10% o f sulphur emissions; new equipment fi*om the West could 
cut pollutants by 85%." Unfortunately, this would cost $300 million." As the Norwegian 
border is only 35 km from Nikel, and has been affected adversely by the plant, the 
Norwegian government has offered £26 million for this purpose." M oscow promised to 
match this, but to date the money has not materialised. Yet again the industry at Nikel 
cannot afford this financial outlay. Like many other industries in Russia, they are in 
economic crisis. Part o f their problem is caused by the Russian Central Government 
acquisitioning 50% o f  the output at the Russian domestic price" which is 47% below  
world prices." The financial position is further complicated as payment is in roubles, a 
worthless currency in international markets.
Phillipov, S., ‘Pechenganickel,’ unpublished, provided by Bellona, Murmansk, October 1994, ppl-3. 
Vidal, J., ‘Nikel and Dimes,’ The Guardian. 9 November 1992, pp 2-3.
Op. cit. p 3.
Phillipov, S., ‘Pechenganickel,’ unpublished, provided by Bellona, Murmansk, October 1994, ppl-3. 
" Op. cit. p 2.
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 21.
Vidal, J., ‘Nikel and Dimes,’ The Guardian. 9 November 1994, pp 2-3.
Black, I., ‘New Dangers in Frozen Wasteland,’ The Guardian. 21 March 1997, p 15.
Vidal, J., ‘Nikel and Dimes,’ The Guardian. 9 November 1994, pp 2-3.
" Op. cit. p 3.
- 184
Monchegorsk
Monchegorsk is suffering the same fate as Nikel. The local copper-nickel deposits 
became the base for the Severonikel works at Monchegorsk. Even when these deposits 
were completely exhausted in the late 1970s" raw materials were shipped in from Norilsk. 
This is when pollution levels increased substantially as the materials were o f  different 
qualities. Ore from Norilsk, which is listed as Russia’s worst polluted city, is made up o f  
30% sulphur.^®
The surrounding area has been blighted. The natural habitat has been destroyed. 
Igor Paraketsov, an environmentalist, believes it will take at least 400 years for the soil to 
cleanse itself.Photograph 6  (p 186) shows what the area should look like in the month 
o f October. Photograph 7 (p 186) shows the reality. The remains o f  the trees after 
devastation by acid rain can easily be snapped in two with bare hands. As you get closer 
to the industrial complex, the trees turn into charred stumps, the smell in the air becomes 
quite nauseous, leaving a strange taste in the mouth. The scene when you turn into the 
main road at Severonikel is bleak. The skies are filled with smog. In photograph 8  (p 187) 
it might be assumed that on this particular day, it was extremely cloudy. However, 
photograph 9 (p 187), clearly shows that there was actually a brilliant blue sky.
Ironically, Monchegorsk is situated amongst a series o f  lakes and would be 
pleasing to the eye if  Soviet heavy industry had not destroyed the natural environment. 
The term ‘Monche’ means ‘beautiful’ in Saami (Lapp). Unfortunately, mankind has 
turned it into a dull, unpleasant area. I asked my guide, Nadezhda Malysheva, why people 
worked at the industrial complex when they knew it was damaging their health. She 
pointed out that even cleaners at the complex earned up to three times what a teacher 
would earn in the residential area o f Monchegorsk. Workers would receive a bigger 
pension at an earlier age than in other regions o f  Russia. With declining health, it is 
debatable whether the workforce would actually live to benefit from early retirement!
Edwards, M., ‘Pollution in the former USSR,’ National Geographic. Vol. 186, No. 2, August 1994, pp 
70-100.
Op. cit. p 85.
Op. cit. p 85.
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What The Tundra Region Should Look Like
Photo 6
Severely Damaged Spruce Trees Around The Severonikel Plant,
Monchegorsk
Photo 7
7?
Photos : R. White
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The Severonikel Plant
Photo 8
Photo 9
Photos : R. White
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Survey - Murmansk 1994
During my visit to Murmansk a survey very similar to the one I made in M oscow  
and Vilnius was distributed. The results are as follows.
General Questions on Air Pollution
See Appendix (p 2 2 2 ) for a frill list o f questions.
Question 1
Despite the fact that industrial activities on the Kola Peninsula produce vast 
quantities o f  sulphur dioxide, not one respondent o f  the survey perceived air pollution to 
come from this source alone. As with the M oscow survey, many (91%) felt both the first 
and second definition were more appropriate.
Question 2
Unfortunately, although this question originally required the individual to list the 
regions which created the most pollution in order 1-3 in terms o f severity, it appears to 
have been misunderstood. Only one region has been acknowledged on each survey. The 
results are:
i) 78% perceive Eastern Europe creates the most pollution
ii) 7% perceive Western Europe creates the most pollution
iii) 0% perceive America creates the most pollution
iv) 159o did not answer the question.
As these people live on the Kola Peninsula, where sulphur emissions are double 
that o f the whole o f Finland,^  ^it is understandable that most perceive that Eastern Europe 
creates most air pollution.
Alexei Rogenko, ‘Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic.’ In : Massey Stewart, J., The Soviet 
Environment Problems. Policies and Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp 216-235.
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Question 3
The survey indicates that in total 65.2% realise that air pollution is not only an 
urban problem, but a general problem. When split into gender categories, the answers 
differ considerably. While only 14% o f females see air pollution as an urban problem, this 
increases to 44% for men. This is possibly because more men than women work at the 
highly polluted industrial cities on the Kola Peninsula.
Question 4
I k <2.  sample group believe that the air pollution problem is either severe or
very severe. Overall 43% perceive the problem as serious, 57% believe the situation to be 
verv severe. The difference between the two genders is almost a mirror image, as 77% o f  
men and 22% o f women saw the problem as severe and 78% o f women and 23% o f men 
saw the problem as very severe.
Question 5
The questionnaire was distributed in October 1994. Therefore, when asked if  
levels o f air pollution had changed over the last ten years, in theory this could indicate 
people’s perception o f increases or decreases, before and after the fall o f  Communism.
CvcrWi)74% o f  the sample indicated that pollution has increased over the ten-year period, 26% 
felt there had been no significant change. Not one person believed air pollution levels had 
' decreased. These findings could be a direct consequence o f  glasnost. As the general 
public in theory now has greater knowledge o f  environmental issues, it may perceive the 
problem to have increased, when in fact the level o f emissions released into the 
atmosphere has slightly fallen, in response to a decline in production.
Question 6
Owing to the misinterpretation o f this question in Moscow and Vilmys, it was 
omitted from the Murmansk survey.
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Question 7
The people o f Murmansk appear to be sceptical about foreign investment and its
WKilz/
effect on air pollution levels.^ 30% believe air pollution would increase, . ; 44% feel
there would be no change. Only 26% felt foreign investment would be beneficial in 
reducing air pollution levels. It is possible that some o f  the sample group are still 
distrustfiil o f  foreign input into their society. Perhaps it is perceived that foreign 
investment would purely be on a profit basis, therefore the investors would not care about 
the environment in Russia. With rising unemployment, it is possible that these people do 
not want foreign investment, which could include the mother company bringing in some 
o f its own workforce. Workers at established workplaces on the Kola Peninsula may want 
work contracts themselves to secure employment levels. Examples o f this can be linked to 
the Lepse ship. Western companies are obtaining work contracts and study grants from 
the EU to look at ways to cleanrup the radiation problem on the ship." Russian institutes 
have tried to obtain the same contracts, but have lost out, exacerbating nationalistic 
feelings." The Murmansk region already has some foreign investment. BP is establishing 
off shore drilling co n tra cts .If  the sample group has not perceived a decrease in pollution 
levels in recent years, it could partially answer why people believe foreign investment will 
not have any effect on pollution levels.
Question 8
Reporting on environmental issues in Russia is a relatively new phenomenon. 
Unfortunately, only 4% consider the topic to be covered well, while 48% o f  those polled 
regarded such issues to be reported badly.
Question 9
The standard o f  reports on environmental issues would be irrelevant if  one has no 
faith in the source. The sample group was more inclined to trust information given by the 
media sources o f television and radio; 52% felt reports on both TV and radio would be 
honest accounts. Only 30% would totally believe a newspaper report, while a mere 17%
MacKenzie, D., ‘Green Group fall foul of Russian Security Police,’ New Scientist. 28 October 1995, p7 
" Op. cit. p 7.
Conversation with Les Morley^BR worker in Murmansk, October .1994.
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would trust information from government sources. A  staggering 83% obviously have no 
faith in the Government’s integrity. The Government’s past record on environmental 
secrecy will be very hard to dislodge.
Questions 10 & 11
These were designed to evaluate the knowledge o f  environmental groups and the 
level o f  participation in environmental issues.
10. With the radioactive problems o f  the Kola Peninsula and its location with 
regard to Novaya Zemlya, it is not surprising that 96% o f those surveyed had heard o f  
Greenpeace. During an attempt to enter the waters o f  Novaya Zemlya, a Greenpeace boat 
put into Murmansk harbour in 1990." Even if  its activities were not fully disclosed to the 
general Russian public, the residents o f Murmansk would have seen the name Greenpeace 
scrawled in red paint across the Court House wall situated on the main high street (Photo 
10, p 192). In contrast, only 43% had heard o f Green World and 30% had any knowledge 
o f the M oscow Ecology Federation. This confirms the opinion that most environmental 
groups in Russia are predominantly small, short-lived and linked to specific issues which 
affect the local area (NIMBY - Not in my back yard).
If the question had asked about knowledge o f an environmental group called 
Bellona, the response probably would have been more positive. Bellona, a Norwegian 
group, has an office in Murmansk and is relatively well known for its environmental 
concerns. When its boat. The Genius, was moored in Murmansk up to 3,000 visitors a 
day showed interest in its work." Bellona has been very active in establishing and 
exposing the nuclear problem in the region to the whole world. Although the Russian 
authorities have become more tolerant o f  environmental groups, the Bellona offices in 
Murmansk and St. Petersburg were raided on 6  October 1995." Files, cameras, 
computers, etc., were confiscated and the group was prosecuted for “releasing
Edwards, M., ‘Pollution in the former USSR, Lethal Legacy,’ National Geographic. Vol. 186, No. 2, 
August 1994, p 84.
Dyson, J., ‘European of the Year ; He uncovered Russia’s Deadliest Secret,’ Reader’s Digest. February 
1997, pp 62-66.
" Mackenzie, D., ‘Green Group fall foul of Russian Security Police,’ New Scientist. 28 October 1995, p 
7.
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‘Greenpeace’ Graffiti,
On Courthouse WalK Murmansk
Photo 10
m
I
Photos : R. White
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information ranked amongst state secrets. This would not be upheld in the West as the 
information obtained by Bellona was taken from public sources, newspapers, conferences, 
etc. A  key Russian member o f the group, Alexandr Nikitin, a previous captain on nuclear 
submarines and a naval radiation inspector in Moscow, was arrested for treason, a crime 
which carries the death p e n a l ty .F o r  months he was imprisoned (isolation) in St. 
Petersburg, without access to a lawyer. Amnesty International described him as a prisoner 
o f conscience. Nikitin was eventually released in mid December 1996.^^
11 If being an active rnember o f environmental groups can still lead to 
imprisonment, many will be reluctant to participate. This may be why 74% o f  those polled 
had never signed a petition and 83% had not demonstrated on environmental issues. 
While 74% had never financially contributed to an environmental campaign, one must 
take into account the dire economic problems in Russia.
Question 12
There is a multitude o f reasons for ill health; some causes are natural, others 
man-made or self-inflicted. The survey asked if  the individual’s health had been affected 
by five different problems. The results are:
Causes Yes No
i) Stress 52% 48%
ii) Industrial Emissions 65% 35%
iii) Vehicle Emissions 52% 48%
iv) Own Behaviour 52% 48%
v) Living Standards 70% 30%
Table 9 In fluences on Health, M urm ansk.
^ Mackenzie, D., ‘Green Group fall foul of Russian Security Police,’ New Scientist. 28 October 1995, p 
7.
Dyson, J., ‘European of the Year : He uncovered Russia’s deadliest secret,’ Reader’s Digest. February 
1997, pp 62-66.
Interfax, ‘Alexandr Nikitin Released,’ Seeodnva. 15 December 1996, p 1.
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Categories (i), (ii) and (iv) (Table 9) showed no real differences between the two 
genders or the different age groups. The only noticeable difference was found in category 
(v). Jh W  o f  the females polled, irrespective o f age, felt that their living standards 
adversely affected their health, whereas only 2 2 % o f men regarded this to be the case. 
The overall percentage could be directly linked to the fact that some sections o f  
Murmansk have extremely basic living standards/conditions. Some districts, which consist 
o f wooden houses, do not even have indoor plumbing or electricity.®^
Question 13
Unfortunately, as with question 2, the sample group in Murmansk did not list the 
areas in order o f  concern 1-7. Many just ticked several boxes indicating that a 
combination o f  the areas, which included inflation, radiation, food shortages, political 
instability, housing problems, air pollution, etc., were o f  concern. It is therefore difScult 
to formulate a reliable result.
Question 14
Source Verv Good Satisfactorv/Av
erage
Bad No
Answer
Industry 0 43.5% 43.5% 13%
Transport 0 30.5% 52% 17.5%
Nuclear Installations 8.5% 30.5% 43.5% 17.5%
Agriculture 0 48% 30.5% 21.5%
Research Institutes 8.5% 43.5% 26.3% 21.7%
Table 10 H ow  E ffective  are G overnm ent S teps to Curb A ir  Pollu tion?
From the table it is clear that most people do not believe that Government steps to 
curb pollution are effective. Surprisingly, the only two categories where the response was 
favourable (i.e. very good) fall in the nuclear realm. Perhaps people believe that, after the 
Chernobyl Accident in 1986, the Government has taken positive action to improve the
Conversation with Nadezhda Malysheva.
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nuclear position especially when there has been world wide media coverage o f  the 
problem and, to a certain extent, foreign aid and expertise.
Nuclear Questions 15-20
The radiation problems o f the Northern territories were predominantly caused by 
military activities during the Cold War. The Kola Peninsula does, however, have a nuclear 
power station situated 200 km from the Norwegian border and 15 km west o f  Polyamye 
Zori on the shores o f  Lake Imandra.®  ^ The plant was the first to be constructed north o f  
the Polar Circle; 60% o f its electricity is supplied to local heavy industry, while 40% is 
exported to Karelia, St. Petersburg and Finland.®  ^In total, the Kola Power plant has four 
water pressurised reactors, two W E R  440/230 and two W E R  440/213. The original 
reactors, W E R  44/230, are considered to be as unstable as the RBMK design. 
According to G7 reports, they should be shut down as soon as possible. The plant 
experienced eight different incidents between 1987 and 1991;®® therefore it does represent 
yet another potential nuclear catastrophe for the Kola Peninsula.
Question 15 - How close is vour home to a nuclear plant?
For the purpose o f analysis, it is assumed that the people who answered the 
questionnaire in Murmansk actually live in the city. The results indicate that 4% believe 
the nearest nuclear reactor is less than 25 km from their home^ 9% believe the distance is 
25-50 km, 4% 75-100 km, while 83% correctly perceive the distance to be greater than 
125 km.
Question 16
From the pie chart on p 196 (graph 18), it is evident that nearly 40% considered 
nuclear energy to be potentially dangerous before the Chernobyl Accident occurred. This 
is despite the fact that the Government maintained it was completely safe, indicating that
Bohmer, N., and. Nilsen, T., ‘Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkangel’sk 
counties,’ Bellona Report. Vol. 1. The Bellona Foundation, Oslo, 1994, pp 108-110.
Op. cit. p 110.
Op. cit. p 110.
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some o f the public distrusted Government sources under the old Soviet regime. The pie 
charts on p 198 (graph 19) show a substantial difference between the male and female 
response. While 65% o f women did not consider nuclear energy to be dangerous, 67% of  
men perceived a potential danger before 1986.
Question 17
As nobody in the Murmansk survey was prepared to state outright that they 
would eat food grown near the exclusion zone, it suggests they still believe the foodstuffs 
would be contaminated. 8 .6 % did not know if  they would eat the food, 61% would not 
eat the food, while 30.4% would only consume the products as a last resort.
Question 18 - How severe is Russia’s Radiation Problem?
Very Severe 39%
Severe 52%
Quite Severe 4.5%
Not Severe 4.5%
Wa- radiation as a serious problem. In general, women tend to
perceive the problem to be greater than do men. This is indicated by 64% o f  women 
ticking the ‘Very Severe’ box, while 77% o f  men ticked the Severe box.
Question 19 - Should Russia Abandon the Nuclear Energy 
Programme?
With all the radiation problems in Russia it is surprising that only 8.5% felt the 
nuclear programme should be abandoned. All those who believed this fell in the youngest 
age category/group o f  16-25 years. would want an
alternative form o f  energy in place before discarding nuclear energy. There are two 
possible reasons for this. Firstly the Kola Peninsula quite often experiences temperatures 
as low as -30°C in wintertime. Secondly, the nuclear plant at Polyamye Zori provides 
considerable amounts o f electricity to industry. Without power industry
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would not function, leading to mass unemployment. The remaining 22% felt that the 
nuclear energy programme should not be abandoned. This may indicate that nuclear 
power is perceived to be safe or that alternatives (e.g. Coal or gas power station) would 
pollute the atmosphere in the region even more. !
Question 20 - Do you feel that the Government is still withholding 
information about
Source o f Radiation Yes No
a) Levels o f fallout from Chernobyl 82% 18%
b) Levels o f  radiation surrounding Nuclear Weapon Sites 82% 18%
c) Levels o f  radiation surrounding Research Institutes 78% 2 2 %
d) Radioactive Dumpsites 91% 9%
e) Contaminated food supplies 87% 13%
f) Number o f deaths attributed to radiation sources 87% 13%
Table 11 A re  the G overnm ent W ithholding Inform ation?
The results above show that the vast majority feel they have not been given all the 
information linked to each category o f nuclear contamination.
Conclusion
The results from the Murmansk survey suggest that yet again women perceive 
pollution (especially nuclear) to be more severe than do their male counterparts. While 
they also believe it to have a greater effect on health, they are no more or less active in 
environmental issues than men. Life in Murmansk is much harsher than in many Russian 
metropolitan and provincial towns owing to its climate and decaying military installations. 
Therefore, although knowledge about pollution is increasing, the ability and willingness to 
act is for the time being limited.
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Chanter 13 
Vilnius. Lithuania 
Tgnalina and its role in Independence
Lithuania is an example o f  changing views towards nuclear energy. Under the 
Soviet nuclear energy programme the Ignalina Plant was to house four 1,500 mw 
reactors o f the RBMK design.^ The plant would be the largest in the world, situated only 
80 km from the capital Vilnius (Map 14, p 201). The local population was assured that 
nuclear energy was safe in the Soviet Union: so no one openly questioned the wisdom o f  
the old regime.
The first reactor went into production in 1983 on what was a recognised 
earthquake fault line.  ^ After a series o f small fires and, more importantly, the Chernobyl 
accident o f 1986, the safety o f the plant was questioned.^ Although a second reactor came 
on line shortly after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the planned third reactor was never 
completed.^ Public awareness and an effective anti-nuclear movement, accusing M oscow  
of “ecological colonialism,”  ^ apparently led to the abandonment o f the third reactor in 
1988.^ While the cost o f the completion o f the complex may have had some influence on 
this decision (an additional 300 million roubles) the growing trend towards nationalism in 
the Baltic States was a major factor.^
The growing strength o f nationalism eventually led to Lithuania’s independence in 
March 1990. This turning point in its history led to a re-evaluation o f nuclear energy in 
the region. Ignalina became a symbol o f “at least partial-energy independence”, as
‘ Piyde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, p 131.
 ^ Jarvis, H., ‘The Tall Shadow of Ignalina,’ Lithuania in the World. Vol. 2, No. 2, March/April 1994, pp 
12-13.
 ^ Perera, J., ‘Lithuanians Protest at Soviet Nuclear Plans,’ New Scientist. 8 October 1988, p 6.
Jarvis, H., ‘The Tall Shadow of ignalina,’ Lithuania in the World. Vol. 2, No. 2, March/April 1994, pp 
12-13.
 ^ Peterson, D.J., ‘Environmental Protection and the State of the Union,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 
12, 22 March 1991, p 7.
 ^ Twenty thousand people formed a human ring around Ignalina in September 1988.
 ^ Jarvis, H., ‘The Tall Shadow of Ignalina,’ Lithuania in the World. Vol. 2, No. 2, March/April 1994, pp 
12-13.
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Gorbachev initially cut o ff all gas and oil supplies to the region/ Lithuania now needed 
Ignalina to survive. Unfortunately, like most nuclear centres throughout the Former 
Soviet Union, Ignalina had been built and run by Russians; 90% o f the residents o f  
Ignalina were o f Russian origin.^ While this may have caused some ethnic tensions during 
the late 1980s amongst the predominantly indigenous Lithuania population, the exodus o f  
trained staff in 1990 brought a new set o f  problems.
The environmental gestures o f 1988 were “sacrificed when the national interest 
was at stake” during 1990.^® As relationships between Lithuania and Russia eased, 
growing concerns over the Ignalina plant re-emerged. Lithuania turned to Sweden for 
advice and help on how to make the plant s a f e r . I t  joined the World Association o f  
Nuclear Operation which inspected the site, stating that it met normal safety standards.
Today, 40% o f Lithuanian electrical power is produced at Ignalina ^ 25% o f  its 
output is sold to Belarus and Latvia. Although the plant is profitable, the Lithuanian 
Government is, searching for another internal alternative energy source to complement the 
Ignalina plant. As a result o f increased costs (market price), coupled with the 
uncertainties o f oil supplies fi'om Russia, Lithuania has decided to utilise oil reserves 
located in the Baltic Sea, even though this may disrupt the tourist value o f  the coastal 
region.
Under Soviet Moscow was accused o f ecological colonialism: today,
Lithuania is continuing with the nuclear programme, but with the blessing and 
co-operation o f its own Government. Nuclear energy^ providing 76.4% o f  Lithuania’s 
p o w e r , i s  obviously here to stay for the foreseeable fixture, even though it continues to 
be plagued by a series o f mishaps.
 ^ Peterson, D.J., ‘Environmental Protection and the State of the Union,’ Report on the U SSR  Vol. 3, No. 
12, 22 March 1991, p 6.
 ^ Piyde, P R , Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1995, pp 125-141.
Peterson, D.J., ‘Environmental Protection and the State of the Union,’ Report on the USSR. Vol. 3, No. 
12, 22 March 1991, p 6.
“ Bridge, A., ‘Lithuanians take Pride in Reactors,’ The Independent. 26 April 1996, p 10.
Jarvis, H., ‘The Tall Shadow of Ignalina,’ Lithuania in the World. Vol. 2, No. 2, March/April 1994, pp 
12-13.
Pryde, P R , Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics. Westview 
Press, Oxford, 1995, pp 125-141.
Lashkevich, N., ‘Lithuania tries to Escape from Energy Dependence,’ Izvestiva. 17 November 1993, pp 
1- 2 .
Figures for 1994 provided by the IAEA.
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Vilnius -Survey Results
(Please see Appendix for full list o f questions)
As Lithuania was the first state to obtain independence from the Soviet Union, the 
results o f  the survey, conducted in April 1994, could possibly show differences from the 
previous case studies. As the Ignalina power plant became a major symbol o f  the 
country’s bid for independence, I expected the main differences between M oscow and 
Vilnius to be found in the sections related to nuclear energy and environmental issues. 
The results are as follows:
Question 1
As this question was only asking the respondent to indicate which definition o f  air 
pollution they felt most appropriate, I did not expect there to be any great discrepancies 
between the Lithuanian and Russian response. As expected 99% o f  those surveyed 
indicated that the definition should be either or both o f  the first two answers.
Question 2
When asked which area created the most pollution, 100% o f  the sample group 
believed Eastern Europe was the main culprit. This could be linked to the fact that the 
indigenous population o f Lithuania feel that the M oscow regime was responsible for all 
the pollution problems in the Eastern European block, indicating there is still anti-Russian 
feeling in the country.
Question 3
InfûW, 6 8 % o f the Lithuanian population are urban based. Although this is very similar 
to Russia’s urban population, 1 0 % more o f  the Vilnius sample appreciated that air 
pollution is not just an urban problem when compared to the M oscow sample. Ove./^vl) 
85% o f  the Vilnius group see air pollution as a general problem. This compares to 
74.66% in Moscow and 65.2% in Murmansk.
Kritkausky, R , ‘Lithuania,’ In: Pryde, P R , Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former 
Soviet Republic. Westview Press, Oxford, 1995, pp 125-141.
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Question 4
In total nobody felt that pollution in Lithuania was very severe, 54% perceived it 
to be severe, 38% quite severe while 8 % felt it was not severe. This response is more 
positive than in both Moscow and Murmansk, possibly indicating that people feel that 
measures to improve the environment have led to a stabilisation o f such problems.
Question 5
As the response in question 4 was relatively more positive than in the other 
regions, it is surprising that 69% perceive air pollution to have increased over the last ten 
years^.'Wbde- 2 .4 5^* psx'ca.wc feel pollution levels have decreased. As with
Moscow, this interpretation could be due to a growing level o f transportation in the city. 
In 1990, Lithuania had one o f the highest ratios o f  cars per capita in the Soviet Union at 
84 per 1,000 population. Since independence there has been a growing market for 
imported second hand cars from Europe. Unfortunately, some have been relatively old 
and ill-equipped, possibly enhancing the perception o f pollution levels.
Question 6
It is estimated that 60% o f Lithuania’s air pollution problem originates from the 
motor v e h ic l e . T h i s  is probably an underestimation for Vilnius itself. Vilnius is 
predominantly an administrative centre and has little heavy industry. This is shown by the 
fact only 32,000 tonnes o f emissions originated from stationary sources in 1989.^® This 
compares with 294,000 in Moscow.^^ (Both o f these figures are lower than in 1987. when 
Vilnius’s stationary emissions represented 37,400 tonnes and Moscow's emissions were 
367,100 tonnes).^^ With this in mind, it is surprising that 30.7% o f the sample group 
perceive 60-80% o f air pollution to originate from industry. An additional 23% perceive 
industrial emissions to fall between 40-60% o f the city’s total air pollution problem. Only
Lavrov, S.B., ‘Regional and Environmental problems of the USSR. A Synopsis of Views from the 
Soviet Parliament,’ Soviet Geograohv. Vol. 31, 1990, pp 477-499.
Kritkausky, R., ‘Lithuania,’ In: Pryde, P.R., Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former 
Soviet Republic. Westview Press, Oxford, 1995, pp 125-141.
Op. cit. p 130.
Feshbach, M., and Friendly, J R., Ecocide in the USSR. Basic Books, New York, 1992, p 289.
Op. cit. p 291.
Sagers, M.J., ‘News Notes,’ Soviet Geograohv. Vol. 30, 1989, pp 512-520.
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30.7% believe that transport is responsible for between 60-80% o f  airborne emissions. 
Actual figures are 62% transport and 38% industry.^  ^ As with the M oscow survey, the 
residents o f Vilnius do not appreciate the air pollution balance in the city.
Question 7
The survey shows that only 7% o f  the Vilnius group anticipate a corresponding 
increase in pollution with foreign investment, 46.5% feel it will decrease, while 46.5% feel 
there will be little difference. This response is much more positive than in M oscow and 
Murmansk. It could indicate that Lithuanians perceive foreign business/trade as more o f  a 
friend than foe. Foreign investment could lead to more jobs and eventually greater trade 
with the West, leading to a fiirther decline in Lithuania’s reliance on Russia. This is 
especially true in the oil industry. Foreign companies such as Pemco (Finland) and Shell 
(UK) were well established in Lithuania by 1992, therefore when most republics o f  the 
former Soviet Union were experiencing a shortage o f  fiael supplies in the winter months o f  
that year, Lithuania did not suffer such severe problems, as it already had links with other 
sources o f  fiiel. Lithuania was also aided by the fact that prices o f  fuel had been 
liberalised. Therefore, the price increases witnessed in other republics had already 
occurred.^^
Question 8
The Lithuanian response to how well environmental issues were covered was far 
more pessimistic than in Russia. Nobody considered the topic to be well reported, 30.7% 
considered it to be satisfactory, while 69.3% considered such issues to be reported badly.
Question 9
The responses fi’om all three areas (Moscow, Murmansk, Vilnius) were similar in 
terms o f  the percentage o f  each group which trusted environmental information provided 
by the television, radio and newspapers. In the Vilnius survey, the results were;-
Peterson, D.J., Troubled Lands : The Legacy o f Soviet Environment Destruction. Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993, p 33.
Karaliiinas, A., ‘Power Industiy at the Cross Roads,’ Lithuania in the World. March-April 1994, p
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Yes No
Television 4694 54%
Radio 53%4 47%
Newspapers 53% 47%
Table 12 H ow  Trustworthy is E nvironm ental Inform ation P rovided
by the M edia.
However, there is a difference when asked how trustworthy their respective 
governments were. Graphs 20-22, p 207, show the comparisons between Moscow, 
Murmansk and Vilnius. Only 17% o f the Murmansk sample believed the Russian 
Government in comparison to 29% o f  the M oscow group. The Vilnius sample shows 
38% believe their government. Yet again this could be linked to their relatively new status 
o f an independent country.
Question 10
Taking into account that the fight for Lithuanian independence was closely linked 
to an upsurge in environmental issues and protests, it is not surprising that the results o f  
the Vilnius survey show a marked difference to those established in the two cities in 
Russia. Graphs 23-25, p 208, show a staggering 85% o f the Vilnius sample had signed a 
petition linked to the environment. This compares to a mere 21% and 26% in M oscow  
and Murmansk. A  similar scenario, although not so dramatic, can be seen in graphs 26-28, 
p 209, indicating that 46% o f the Vilnius group have demonstrated over an environmental 
issue. This is, however, where the discrepancy between the three cities ends. Graphs 
29-31, p 210 shows that only 23% o f those questioned in Vilnius have financially 
contributed to an environmental campaign. Although this is a greater percentage than 
shown in the Moscow survey, it is actually less than the Murmansk response. The 
economic difficulties experienced in the former Soviet Union have definitely hindered the 
population’s ability to financially contribute to such issues.
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Can You Trust The Environmental Information Provided By Your Government ? 
A Comparison Between Moscow. Vilnius And Murmansk.
Moscow
62%
□ Yes
□  No
□  Do Nrt Know
MurmanskVilnius
38%
17%
'  ' ' —  
" ~ f * - j
62% 83%
□  Yes
□  No
□  Yes
□ No
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Question 10a - Have You Ever Signed A Petition 
Linked To The Environment ?
Moscow
21%
79%
□  Yes
□  No
MurmanskVilnius
15% 26%
74%
85%
□  Yes
□  No
□ Yes
□  No
Page Z 0 8
Question 10b - Have You Ever Demonstrated 
Over An Environmental Issue ?
Moscow
Vilnius Murmansk
46% 17%
54%
83%
□  Yes
□ No
□  Yes
□ No
Page 2 0 9
Question 10c - Have You Ever Contributed 
Money To An Environmental Campaign ?
Moscow
15%
85%
□  Yes
□ No
Murmansk
23% 26%
74%77%
□  Yes
□  No
□ Yes
□ No
Page Z10
Question 12
Question, 12 asked if people felt that their health had been adversely affected by 
five different categories. The results are listed below:-
Causes Yes No
i) Stress 46%6 54%o
ii) Industrial Emissions 46.2%
iii) Vehicle Emissions 4fr% 54%
iv) Own Behaviour 38.4% 61.6%
v) Living Standards 5T8% 46.2%
Table 13 In fluences on H e a lth  Vilnius.
As with the M oscow survey, the sample group in Vilnius perceive industrial 
emissions to have caused them more health problems than transport, even though the 
latter creates the most pollution in both o f these urban centres. The Vilnius sample 
obviously feel they suffer from less stress than their Russian counterparts (Moscow  
66.6%, Murmansk 52%). This could be because they perceive their lives to less stressful 
since independence.
Question 13
Yet again this question was misunderstood. No arguments can be formulated. 
Question 14
Table 14 shows that most people perceive government attempts to curb pollution 
as ineffective. The most negative category is transportation, with 77% o f the groups 
considering attempts to be bad.
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Source Good Quite Good/ 
Satisfactory
Bad No
Answer
Industry 0 30.7% 61.5% 7.8%
Transport 0 15% 77.2% 7.8%
Nuclear Installations 7.8% 38.4% 46% 7.8%
Agriculture 7.8% 38.4% 46% 7.8%
Research Institutes 7.8% 38.4% 46% 7.8%
Table 14 The E ffectiveness o f  G overnm ent M easures to Curb A ir  Pollution.
Question 16 - Prior to the Chernobyl Accident did you consider 
nuclear plants to be potentially dangerous?
Whilst 39% did perceive that there was a danger, 23% did not. A further 38% did 
not know. Graphs 32-34, p 213, show the respective differences between the three cities 
and that the Moscow respondents were the least knowledgeable about the dangers o f  
nuclear power (47% No) followed by Murmansk and then Vilnius.
Question 17 - Seven Years After Chernobyl Would You 
Knowingly Eat Food Grown in the Exclusion Zone?
Graph 35, p 214 shows that a much higher percentage o f  the Vilnius group would 
not be prepared to eat the produce grown in this region (92.3%). Only 7.7% would eat 
the food as a last resort. Knowledge o f radiation problems through a more substantial 
environmental movement may indirectly be responsible for this. The Chernobyl Plant is 
also closer to Vilnius than to Murmansk and Moscow. The radiation plume after the 
accident moved in a north, north-westerly directly towards Belarus and the Baltic States, 
so Lithuania was more directly affected. This could account for the differences shown in 
the graph(35) between the three cities.
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Question 16 - Prior to The Chernobyl Accident Did You 
Consider Nuclear Plants To Be Potentially Dangerous ?
Moscow
1 %
21% 31%
47%
□  Yes
□ No
□ Do N(4 Know
□ No Answer Given
MurmanskVilnius
39% 39%38% 22%
39%23%
□ Yes
□ No
□  Do Not Know
□ Yes
□  No
□ Do Not Know
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Question 18 - How Severe is Lithuania’s Radiation Problem?
- ^ e .  sample group perceive radiation in Lithuania to be very severe or
severe. The split is 53.8% very severe and 46.2% severe. Unlike the M oscow survey 
results, there are no real disparities between the two genders, suggesting that realistic 
information about the dangers o f  radiation is available for all.
Question 19 - Should the Respective Governments Abandon their 
nuclear energy programme?
Graph 36, p 216 shows that 30.66% o f the Vilnius group, in comparison to 8% of  
the M oscow group, would like their Government to abandon nuclear energy. This is a 
response, firstly to nuclear protests in the late 1980s and secondly to the new reliance on 
nuclear energy after Lithuania had obtained independence.
Question 20 - Do you feel that Government is still withholding 
information about
Source o f Radiation Yes No
a) Levels o f fallout from Chernobyl 77% 23%
b) Levels o f  radiation surrounding Nuclear Weapon Sites 77% 23%
c) Levels o f  radiation surrounding Research Institutes 77% 23%
d) Radioactive Dumpsites 85% 15%
e) Contaminated food supplies 69% 31%
f) Number o f deaths attributed to radiation sources 92% 8%
Table IS  A re  the G overnm ent W ithholding Inform ation?
Overall, results indicate that the Vilnius group still feels that the Government is 
withholding information linked to all categories. With the exception o f  category (f), the 
responses from this sample group show that the people o f  Vilnius are less pessimistic o f  
their government than those based in Murmansk
- 2 1 5 -
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Conclusions
As expected there were differences between the Lithuanian and Russian survey 
results. It is very difiBcult to find hard and fast reasons for these different patterns o f  
response. However, it may be the case that the difficulties in obtaining independence and 
the subsequent economic problems o f Lithuania could be responsible for these variations. 
The survey indicates that Lithuanian people in general still hold an element o f anti-Soviet 
sentiment. They perceive the members o f  their own Government to be relatively more 
trustworthy than their Russian counter-parts. This could imply they are more optimistic 
than those living in M oscow about their politicians^ ability and willingness to tackle 
environmental issues. Ultimately, while their knowledge or fear o f air pollution especially 
when linked to radiation appears to be greater than those in Russia, both areas have the 
same dilemma; a lack o f finance with which to improve the situation.
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Chanter 14
Conclusion
Air pollution in the Former Soviet Union has reached catastrophic proportions. 
Expanding urban centres are severely contaminated by industrial activities and an 
expanding transportation base. A  lack o f  ecological supervision, outdated, inadequate 
pollution controls and no real energy conservation policy all contribute to the severity o f  
the situation. While the present economic climate has temporarily led to an overall 
decrease in airborne emissions, the lack o f state funds has also hampered the development 
o f new ecological controls. Any fixture economic growth may therefore adversely affect 
the environment for many years to come.
Nuclear radiation contamination, from both the civil and military sectors, could 
represent the Former Soviet Union’s worst post-Cold War disaster. Although it is now  
recognised that vast tracts o f  land are irreparably damaged, nuclear energy appears to 
remain on the agenda o f  many o f the New Independent States. As nuclear energy is still a 
reality for many countries, international safeguards and regulations are required for all to 
follow in order to sustain some level o f  safety.
In theory, with the adoption o f international peace agreements the military nuclear 
threat should decline. The two main nuclear test sites (Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk) 
in the Former Soviet Union have been decommissioned and vast quantities o f  weapons 
are to be deactivated. However, assuming these agreements continue to be upheld, the 
actual process o f decommissioning is proving to be just as dangerous as the previous 
threat under Cold War conditions.
The various sources o f air contamination have severely damaged the health o f  the 
indigenous population. Life expectancy has fallen over the last decade. While ill health has 
many contributory factors, environmental contamination plays a major role. The most 
frightening evidence has come in the form o f thyroid cancer after the Chernobyl accident 
o f  1986. Unfortunately, with a deteriorating health care system and a general decline in
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living standards, the plight o f the population will continue to increase for many years to 
come.
Finally, it has become apparent from my study, with particular reference to three 
cities in which I conducted my questionnaire, that Soviet air pollution at first was, and 
continues in the CIS, to be above normally accepted safety standards. This I have 
demonstrated in several tables and graphs throughout the dissertation. The reasons for 
this dangerous legacy o f the old Soviet Union are mainly twojfol<\,
A  nation in the throes o f rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, largely on its 
own resources, is likely to take shortcuts, by non-observance o f safety standards and by 
ignoring potential hazards for the future. This is evident in Soviet development and is a 
lesson to be learned by other modernising communities. This problem is exacerbated by 
the nuclear energy programme which contains far greater dangers than the use o f  coal and 
oil, as became tragically apparent at Chernobyl.
From this study it emerges that a totalitarian regime, such as the USSR, which 
does not possess the checks and balances o f a liberal democracy, can effectively do what 
its political leaders decide. With respect to the environment, in Soviet times no official 
lobbyists or environmental pressure groups were allowed to . , , or lend
a word o f  caution. As a result, under the influence o f  a command economy, one-man 
management. Five-year plans and quotas, the tendency was to fiilfil the plan at anv cost. 
It is an irony that no environmental protection group within the Soviet Union warned the 
Soviet people or the world about the Chernobyl explosion and subsequent radiation leak. 
Given the nature o f  totalitarian Soviet society, the warning had to come from outside the 
Soviet system, namely, Scandinavian scientists.
The inheritors o f this totalitarian legacy now have the intractable problems o f  
dealing with its consequences. Any attempts to improve the environmental situation will 
ultimately depend on a more buoyant economy, which can provide essential investment 
into environmental controls and policies. Given the present economic climate, foreign 
investment in terms o f finance and technology, especially in the realm o f nuclear energy, 
might prevent the situation from deteriorating further.
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These measures will, however, be academic if  attitudes and perceptions towards 
pollution issues within the FSU do not change. A  totalitarian regime inhibited the growth 
o f an environmental consciousness, within both the general public and government 
agencies. It appears that in order to adapt from over 70 years o f  communist rule, a 
re-education programme is required. In terms o f industry, it must be accepted that natural 
resources have a value, and therefore must be used efficiently. Pollution concerns should 
also be incorporated into cost-benefit analysis which, in the long-term, will indicate the 
true cost and relevant price o f  each product.
Unfortunately, the transition to a capitalist society, especially within industiy, has 
created great hardship for much o f  the population. These suggestions have not been 
adopted. Survival is the only aim. Ironically, the economic downturn is at present the only 
reason why environmental degradation is not increasing to even more catastrophic levels.
Educating the general public is also a key element in improving the environmental 
situation. Starting at basic school level is o f  great importance as the young people o f  any 
society represent the real future o f each new republic. Bringing younger people into 
environmental groups/issues will also be o f benefit as they will not yet have the same 
family ties and burdens o f the older generations. This is especially the case in the female 
sector o f society which carries the double burden o f fiill-time work and extensive family 
commitments.
Although within the FSU some environmental groups have been established for 
over a decade, they are still deemed as novices in the international arena. They need time 
to obtain greater experience in presenting issues and mobilising the general public in order 
to encourage increased membership. They also have to learn how to communicate with 
government agencies, which is a relatively new process, since the fall o f  the totalitarian 
regime. Assistance from foreign environmental groups will help. But at the end o f  the day 
the main emphasis must come from the Russian population.
In theory^with the demise o f  the Soviet regime at the end o f the Cold War period^ 
many aspects o f environmental degradation could be effectively dealt with. Unfortunately, 
old habits die hard, changes take considerable time, much longer than the ten years we
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have already witnessed. The dynamics o f  the attempts to convert to a capitalist society 
causing political turmoil and great economic hardship, which afz-not going to be resolved 
in the immediate fixture.
Political and economic instability could potentially lead Russia back towards a 
government which in some ways is similar to those o f previous totalitarian regimes. 
President Putin is an ex-KGB man who wants to rebuild a strong military base in the 
country. He also supports the Chechen War with what appears to be the public’s support. 
All o f  this could indicate that Russian attitudes in general have changed little since the fall 
of Communism. Therefore, it could take several generations before
environmental problemf Even the Russian youth o f today, owing to their socialisation in 
old values, perpetuat^attitudes. Individuals do not live in a vacuum, they are influenced 
by society in general. At present, this means that the fixture o f environmental issues in the 
FSU is restricted by the slow process o f change fi'om a totalitarian regime, which included 
a command economy, to that o f  a capitalist society.
-221 -
APPENDIX
Questionnaire
1) What in your view is correct from data on air pollution definitions?
a) changes in the atmosphere caused by natural or 
artificial pollutants
b) the state o f  the air caused by local (mainly industrial) 
pollution sources
c) sulphur emissions
2) Number the following 1 to 3, where 1 represents the area which creates the most 
air pollution.
Western Europe 
America 
Eastern Europe
3) Is air pollution in Russia only an urban problem? 
Yes No % Don’t Know
4) How severe is Russia’s air pollution problem?
Very Severe 
Severe 
Quite Severe
Not Severe
- 2 2 2 -
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5) How have levels o f air pollution changed in the last ten years? 
Increased Decreased Constant
6) To what extent do the following contribute to air pollution in Moscow?
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100%
a) Transport
b) Industry
7) How will foreign company investment affect air pollution levels in Russia? 
Increase Decrease No change
8) How well reported are environmental issues in Russia? 
Very Well
10)
Quite Well/ 
Satisfactory
Bad
9) Can you trust the environmental information provided by Russia’s?
a) Television
b) Radio
Y/N
Y/N
c) Newspapers
d) Government Statements
Have you ever
a) Signed a petition linked to environmental problems?
b) Demonstrated over an environmental issue?
c) Contributed money to an environmental campaign?
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
II) Have you ever heard o f
a) Green World?
b) Moscow Ecology Federation?
c) Greenpeace?
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
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12) Do you think your health could have been adversely affected by
a) stress? Y/N
b) industrial emissions? Y/N
c) vehicle emissions? Y/N
d) your own behaviour? Y/N
e) living standards? Y/N
13) Number the following in order (where 1 represents the greatest concern)
inflation radiation air pollution
food shortages housing problems
political instability work related
14) How effective are Government steps to curb air pollution from
Very Good Satisfactory
a) industry
Bad
b) transport
c) nuclear installations
d) agriculture
e) research institutes
15) How close is your home to a nuclear reactor?
0-25km 
25-50km  
50-75km
75-lOOkm
100-125km
16) Prior to the Chernobyl Accident did you consider nuclear plants to be potentially 
dangerous?
Yes No Don’t Know
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17) Seven years after Chernobyl would you knowingly eat food grown in the 
exclusion zone?
No Don’t KnowYes
Only as a last resort
18) How severe is Russia’s radiation problem?
Very severe Severe Quite Severe Not Severe
19) Should Russia abandon the nuclear energy programme?
Don’t KnowYes No
Only when alternative energy is found
20) Do you feel the government are withholding information about
Y N
a) levels o f fallout from Chernobyl?
b) levels o f  radiation surrounding Nuclear test sites?
c) levels o f radiation surrounding Research Institutes?
d) radioactive dumpsites?
e) contaminated food supplies? •
f) number o f deaths attributed to radiation sources?
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